EPISTEMIC JUSTIFACTION
... Eventually, if a person is asked that question once too many times, he or she will make a statement such as, “Because that’s the way it is.” Or even, “because everyone knows that, so you can’t question it.” A philosophical answer might be, “Because Foundationalism proves it.” The theory says some beliefs are justified, but not justified by other beliefs, and that all other beliefs are justified by these. Historically, the biggest adversary to the theory of Foundationalism has been that which is called Coherentism. Whereas Foundationalists suggest our beliefs are structured like a building, Coherentists propose our beliefs are as a boat. To properly float on the sea, a boat does not need a sturdy foundation, but rather all the parts of the boat must fit together well. To find epistemic justification, Coherentism relies on -2- “degrees” of coherence, and says the higher the degree (or, the more coherent and consistent our beliefs are), the more epistemically justified we are in maintaining those beliefs. The more our beliefs are supportive of each other, the higher the degree of coherence, and the more epistemic justification we have to rationally accept them. (Beliefs are rejected from a coherently justified belief system if accepting the belief makes the system incoherent.) Also, it should be noted for clarification that Coherentism denies the validity of the Regression Argument (discussed earlier), and that the theory sees justification as a holistic process. In other words, P is not justified by some inferential chain of reasoning (so say the Coherentists), but rather P is justified because of the belief system of which it is a part. (Usually this system is a complete set of beliefs, that is, one’s theory of the world. ) Further, while Coherentism accepts coherent beliefs, it is crucial to note that it does not claim ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY. Suppose we are serving on a jury, expected to determine if the defendant is guilty of murder, and the defendant is Italian. Then, suppose there is strong evidence that the murderer has dark eyes and a dark complexion, was eating pasta before the time of the murder, was wearing Gucci shoes (Italian designer dress shoes), and dropped his plane ticket to Sicily at the scene of the crime. Well, the “evidence” in this case shows some connection to Italy, and there is a high degree of coherence, so others (especially Coherentists) might feel epistemically justified in believing the defendant is guilty. Still, what if, say, the plane ticket to Sicily at the scene of the crime, was -3- strategically put there by someone (and not dropped by the person accused of the murder)? Sure, there are coherent beliefs that deny the defendant’s innocence, but what if it was all a set up? Again, this is why we must note that the theory of Coherentism does not claim infallibility; they argue only “probabilistically.” Given the evidence in this case with the defendant, we we cannot say WITH ABSOULTE CERTAINTY that the murderer is Italian. Yes, “probabilistically,” he or so may be. However, a reasonable theory of justification (and a little common sense) should NOT make the claim with absolutely certain, so it is unreasonable to accuse Coherentism of not claiming absolute certainty. If our beliefs are entirely coherent, which would cause us to think they are probably true, we have sufficient reason to feel epistemically justified. As we know, objections are raised for every philosophical theory, and it is said there are problems with both the Coherentist and Foundalist view. First, Coherentism seems to accept the idea of circular reasoning, which a number of people find problematic. Consider the following dialogue : City Slicker: Why are you able to grow so many great-tasting sweet potatoes? Farmer: Because the sweet potato goddess, who lives in the center of the earth, likes me. I always put part of the sweet potato back in the ground so she can have a bit too. City Slicker: Really? How do you know there's a sweet potato goddess and that she likes you? Farmer: Because my potatoes grow so well. Here, the farmer’s reasoning seems circular, and his belief (though he may think it is justified) is a little unreasonable. Since Coherentists deny that there are basic beliefs, and say every belief must be justified by another, tracing any coherent belief system will -4- always form a circle (as in the example we just considered). It could seem at a first glance there is no support for circular reasoning, which would mean (if that is the case) that it is not justified, and that there is no reason to accept it. We shall return to this concept later. Perhaps one of the problems Foundationalism has is in defining “basic” beliefs. That is, how can one determine which beliefs are “basic,” and which are derivative? Or, which are “foundational” and which are “inferential” (derived from perceptual beliefs, and inferred through logic)? It is not necessary to differentiate, claim the Coherentists, as long as our beliefs seem to support each other. Another big difference between these two theories of empirical justification, and perhaps the biggest, is the effect of changing a belief close to the center or foundation of the belief system. In Foundationalism, changing a foundational belief does not necessaril...