Do Juvenile Boot Camps Work?
...uth has gone though the juvenile boot camp program, usually three months in time, he/she is required to enter in a program called aftercare. In the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) funded juvenile boot camps, the aftercare programs were built around academic education in a setting comparable to a school, in combination with other services (Bourque, 1996, 7). This aftercare program according to the Koch Crime Institute, is “…a key element in juvenile boot camp program” (Darville, 2001, 254). However, this implementation is a difficult task. In order for the aftercare program to work, the youth must receive a large amount of personal attention, and all of the prescribed services (Peterson, 1996, 2). This importance of the aftercare program often becomes a problem with the large caseloads of probation and parole officers. In addition to the negative feelings probation and parole officers have towards a program that increases their caseloads (Darville, 2001, 454). In comparison to the probation and parole officers general negative feelings toward juvenile boot camps, the staff, or instructors generally have a positive view of the facilities. The individuals staffing juvenile boot camps are generally white, males in their mid thirties, who have either completed, or at least attended college, with about half possessing a military background (Armstrong, 2001, 5). When compared to a staff of a traditional facility, juvenile boot camp staff members have a higher favorability of their environment, and believe that the environment is more therapeutic for the youth than other facilities (Armstrong, 2001, 5). However, there is still a problem with staff turnover. The problem occurs when a staff member leaves in the middle of a program, thus creating a disruption in the program. Problems such as staff turnover, and negative stigmas attached to juvenile boot camps, have made the goals of the facility difficult to obtain. As noted before, the issue of recidivism is a leading cause of controversy over juvenile boot camps, since some studies have shown that they are ineffective in combating recidivism (Benekos, 2004, 172). Eric Peterson the writer of “Juvenile Boot Camps Lessons Learned” offers rationales of this failure in the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention sponsored juvenile boot camps. Peterson notes that the selection of juveniles must be appropriate for the boot camp to be effective. Additionally, he writes that the location of the boot camp as well as the aftercare facility’s location is crucial to reducing recidivism (Peterson, 1996, 2). Because aftercare programs are significant in the effort to reduce recidivism, aftercare programs must be more accessible. Peterson suggests that these facilities be located in “…gang neutral areas accessible by public transportation” (Peterson, 1996, 2). II. Goals of juvenile boot camps: The goal to reduce recidivism was not the only failed goal of the demonstration programs funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Another goal was for the juvenile boot camps to be “cost-effective alternative to institutionalization” (Bourque, 1996, 4). Juvenile boot camps when used as an alternative to traditional confinement are less expensive. However, the juveniles who are placed in boot camps are usually first time offenders who would not have been placed in an institution but on probation (Benekos, 2004, 173). Comparing the cost of juvenile boot camp to the cost of probation, the costs are far greater (Darville, 2001, 450). According to the Koch Crime Institute the average cost for a juvenile boot camp per year to operate is $33,480. This cost is on average $2126 less expensive then a detention center for juveniles (Darville, 2001, 450). However, once again most of these juveniles would not have been place in a detention center, but on parole. Another issue when comparing the cost of juvenile boot camps to a traditional confinement facility is that the time a juvenile spends in a boot camp is far shorter (Darville, 2001, 450). Regardless of the evidence that shows juvenile boot camps were ineffective from the pilot program, juvenile boot camps continued to grow. This growth can be linked to image that juvenile boot camps project to the American public, and political leaders. This images is that juvenile boot camps are tough on juvenile crime (Darville, 2001, 456). Thus any program that shows concern for crime, in particular juvenile crime, and puts forth a plan to combat it, in turn becomes popular. Juvenile boot camp’s method of discipline consists of a physical conditioning routine that begins at around 6:00 a.m. and concludes at around 10 p.m. Moreover, when one juvenile infringes upon the rules, the entire platoon which the juvenile is in, is punished (Bourque, 1996, 6). This method of discipline is supposed to encourage team work, moral values, and work ethics among the juveniles involved (Borque, 1996, 4). The juvenile boot camp’s method of discipline seems to be helpful to juvenile offenders. However, Christian Parenti the author of “When Tough Love Kills” writes that this discipline is taken too far in some instances. In Parenti’s article she notes a former juvenile boot camp staff member saying that the program “isn’t successful unless someone pukes or pisses their pants” (Parenti, 31, 2000). Parenti writes about a young girl Gina Score, who was obviously not physically fit, at five foot four, and 226 pounds, placed at a juvenile boot camp and forced into the physical discipline (Parenti, 31, 2000). On only her second day of attending the boot camp, Gina Score, while on a 2.7-mile run fell to the ground and later died. Parenti goes on to tell of many other instances of juvenile death, and serious injury as a result of the discipline they received at juvenile boot camps. She contends that recent “…revelations of abuse and the costly lawsuits may finally be taking the shine off the boot camp fad” (Parenti, 31, 2000). III. Effectiveness of juvenile boot camps: More recently, the National Institute of Health put together a panel of thirteen experts to determine the effectiveness of juvenile boot camps (Meckler, 1, 2004). According to Laura Meckler, in her article “Expert Pa...