Neutrality in Third Party Interventions: The MOVE Negotiationsand the Failure of Impartiality
...ion represents one group that shunned all things linked to “modern society.” Similar to the Panthers, they also took a stand against gang violence and police brutality (Assefa & Wahrhaftig, 1990). Although comprised of both Blacks and Whites, the MOVE organization embodied the ideology and spirit of the Black Power ear. Literature Review The history and incidents in the MOVE case can be summarized with two basic theories of conflict, the Community Relations theory and the Psychoanalytically Informed Identity theory. In the very beginning, the MOVE crisis represented a classic example of a Community Relations form of conflict (Ross, 2000, p. 1009). From this approach, the dispute is characterized as a dilemma between neighboring communities or groups that for some reason cannot interact successfully with each other. In the MOVE crises, this was exhibited on two separate occasions. In 1978, upon inhabiting the first MOVE headquarters in the Powelton Village section of Philadelphia, there became distinct problems between the MOVE members and the rest of the neighborhood regarding lifestyle. Given the “back to nature” way of living advocated by MOVE, they used no electricity, threw garbage out into the yard to be naturally recycled, collected various stray animals (including rats), and defecated and urinated in the yard (Assefa & Wahrhaftig, 1990.) To their neighbors this type of living created not only unwanted animals and pests in their neighborhood, but also an intolerable stench of human and animal feces,. The continuation of these behaviors by MOVE, coupled with their confrontational style, led to the first Community Relations type conflicts between MOVE and their Powelton Village Neighbors. The second such conflict occurred around 1984-1985 when MOVE members started to take up residence with the sister of founder John Africa on Osage Avenue in West Philadelphia. Motivated by both their lifestyle and a need to instigate attention to their cause, MOVE began a second wave of Community relations conflicts with the neighbors on Osage Avenue. Initially the complaints about MOVE were the same as the Powelton Village residents, unhealthy conditions, improper disposal, and complaints of the stench. In addition, Osage Avenue residents were intentionally subjected to rants and tirades emanating from MOVE via bullhorns at all hours of the night. These activities on the part of MOVE continued and escalated the tension between them and their new neighbors on Osage Avenue. Both of these examples point out the distinguishing characteristics of a Community Relations form of conflict. They arise between residents, races, groups, etc. who have to occupy the same area but have conflict with each other based on some type of disagreement or incompatibility of values or goals (Ross, 2000.) The neighborhood disputes between MOVE and their neighbors were just one type of conflict exhibited in the well-documented history of the organization. Ross, in assessing conflict, points to another framework to explain disputes between parties, Psychoanalytically Informed Identity Theory (Ross, 2000, p. 1014.) With this approach conflict is said to be inextricably linked with the identity of a person or group. Many of the MOVE encounters with the court system and city of Philadelphia, including police, can be explained with this theory. MOVE members stood in opposition to man-made laws. Their position regarding authority can be summed up in statements like, “we don’t believe in man’s reform world system,” and in them seeing their work as, “confront[ing] this system upfront to show people not only that they can fight this system and win, but to show them the urgent need to fight” (Assefa & Wahrhaftig, 2000, p. 10-11). Membership and identification with a group with this stated purpose automatically forms an identity that is antagonistic and diametrically opposed to the legal system and the officers, rules, procedures, and enforcers of the system. Ross (2000) notes, “people with a common identity share targets of externalization- common enemies” (p. 1015). Thus, the identity forged by being a member of MOVE dictated that conflict with the “powers that be” was a necessary part of being. Theory of Neutrality The approach of this paper is to analyze the various methods of third party intervention utilized during the course of the MOVE crises. Given the lack of effort by the city given to negotiation and mediation during the escalation that led to the May 13th bombing, the focus will be on the interventions that took place prior to the 1978 shootout. In analyzing these approaches the theory of neutrality will be used to serve as a gauge for the effectiveness of intervention techniques. It is the position of this paper that in the MOVE crises, a position of neutrality on the part of an intervener would do more to continue the conflict rather than reach a settlement. Neutrality refers to the impartial position that a third party intervener takes in approaching disputes between parties. It has been conventional wisdom that in fairness to both or all parties involved, the intervener should attempt at all costs to remain neutral (Pruit & Kim, 2004, p. 243). While the initial thought of neutrality in conflict resolution disputes seems honorable, there have come challenges to the assertion that impartiality is the best way to achieving an optimally agreeable solution. Laue (1982) advanced this argument by couching the neutrality issue in the form of a discussion on empowerment. He highlighted the importance of empowering weaker parties in a dispute and pointed out that by virtue of the introduction of a third party into a conflict, the power dynamics have already in fact changed. In the event of such changes, the weaker party in the dispute should benefit from the power shift (Scimecca, 1987). Ultimately the issue of empowerment and neutrality in the conflict resolution process boils down to a discussion of power. In any dispute there is the presence of a power dynamic. Mial, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999) point to two forms of conflicts, Symmetrical and Asymmetrical. Symmetrical conflicts are those conflicts in which both parties to the conflict have relatively the same power and status. In contrast, Asymmetrical conflicts are those in which there is a distinct imbalance in the power, influence, or status of the parties. It is in the arena of asymmetrical conflicts that the issues of neutrality and empowerment are most influential. Often in disputes the more powerful party uses its influence and control to beat down the weaker party into submitting to a less than favorable settlement. In relying on the power dynamic, the conflict is not truly ended. While the more powerful party has forced a settlement in the current dispute, another dispute is almost guaranteed to arise given the fact that a mutually agreeable solution was not brokered between the two parties in negotiations. So, in essence, the more powerful party has in truth continued the conflict instead of dealing with the appropriate issues and ending the conflict in a manner suitable to both parties. In this context the role of partiality and empowerment becomes clear. In those conflicts where there is an asymmetrical relationship in power, the introduction of a non- neutral intervener is necessary in order to empower the weaker party to achieve a mutually satisfying agreement. In these instances empowerment and non-neutrality are necessary because a neutral intervener would not actively seek to correct the power imbalance. As explained by Scimecca (1987), “anything neutral introduced into an unequal system, in the end, supports the group in power” (p. 31). Thus, the dire need for empowerment of weaker parties in asymmetrical conflicts becomes clear if sustainable, mutually agreeable outcomes are to be achieved. Neutrality and the Move Negotiations Before analyzing the impact on negotiation strategies in the MOVE case, there must first be a clarification of parties involved. In order for successful negotiations to take place, there have to be willing, sincere, parties involved. At the outset the MOVE organization has been challenged on its ability, and even desire, to enter into any type of negotiations. As the events leading up to the May 13th bombing were unfolding, many informed the mayor and city officials that negotiating with MOVE was “impossible” (Conflict Resolution Center, 1986). In undertaking the task of determining successful methods of resolving the MOVE crises via third party intervention, determining MOVE’s ability to rationally enter into and hold up negotiated agreements is necessary. An answer to that question can be found in MOVE’s first major disagreement with the residents of the Powelton Village section of Philadelphia. As mentioned earlier, the disputes of the residents were based on the lifestyle habits of MOVE members, including attracting and harboring stray dogs and rats, discarding of trash in the yards, and the stench of human and animal waste that had overtaken the neighborhood. It was this primary conflict of MOVE and its neighbors that the willingness of MOVE to negotiate and live up to their agreements can be based. As Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1990) elucidate, an agreement was in fact reached by MOVE and the residents of Powelton Village regarding MOVE’s lifestyle. The authors note that the stipulations included recycling their garbage by composting instead of discarding in the yards. This detracted both from the stench of waste in the neighborhood and from the amount of rats in the vicinity (p. 50). An agreement was also reached that brought an end to the threats leveled at the neighbors by MOVE members. This resolution was mutually agreeable to both MOVE and the neighbors, was carried out, and was recognized as such by the Powelton United Neighbors group (p. 50). Another example of MOVE’s willingness to initiate and enter into negotiated agreements occurred in the hours leading up to the bombing on May 13th. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported that MOVE had sent a taped to authorities asking for reporters and police to come to the Osage Avenue residence for a last ditch effort at resolution. As reported in the article, this request went unanswered and hours later the bomb was dropped (McCoy & Nicholson, 1996, p. A01). This successful show of rationality, sincerity, and willingness to accommodate the views of others absolves MOVE from the charges leveled at them regarding their inability to enter into and carry out negotiated agreements. From here an analysis of the two principle negotiated agreements between MOVE and the city of Philadelphia will be analyzed. Brokered by Joel Todd and Oscar Gaskins, the two approaches, and their success will be viewed in light of the overriding issues of neutrality and empowerment. Joel Todd’s Neutral Intervener Approach Joel Todd was a white lawyer who represented a jailed MOVE members arrested after a skirmish with police in 1977. Todd was accepted by the extremist group as a person to deal with because he was seen as a person who could deal fairly with MOVE’s issues (Assefa & Wahrhaftig, 2000). He had become very familiar with MOVE and their positions in his capacity as lawyer and hence was in a position to convey their position to city officials. Another key to Todd’s involvement was his connections. Todd, a practicing lawyer, was in contact with key people in the city government, including the District Attorney. This was seen as a possible asset in terms of access to and influence with the necessary public officials. Admittedly, the role that Todd saw himself playing was one of “mailbag” (Assefa & Wahrhaftig, 1990, p. 58). By basically transferring the position of the city and the position of MOVE back and forth to each other, his function was merely that of a message carrier. Todd’s ultimate goal was the prevention of violence between MOVE and the city and his brokered deal reflected that position. To his credit, Todd’s nearness to MOVE and his city connections did allow him to move toward an agreement between MOVE and the city prior to the 1978 shootout. According to Assefa and Wahrhaftig, the terms of the agreement primarily dealt with realizing the city’s concerns, that being the surrender of MOVE members for previous weapons and civil violations, vacating of the Powelton Village residence, and a turning in of all weapons (p. 53). Understandably, these terms were not acceptable to MOVE. Foremost on MOVE’s list was the release of several members imprisoned under charges viewed as trumped up after an altercation with police in 1976. Herein lies the fallacy of the Todd agreement. First, Todd’s insertion into the conflict was as a neutral third party intervener. In this capacity, he was not concerned with advocating on the behalf a particular party, but with shuttling back and forth between parties delivering position statements. From an empowerment perspective, Todd’s presence didn’t alter the severe power imbalance that the city had over MOVE. As a result, Todd’s participation in the conflict didn’t level the negotiations by seeking ways to make MOVE more equal in power to the city. Second, Todd’s agreement was unsatisfactory because while the interests of the city were addressed, namely the continued perception of staying tough on criminals, the major concern of MOVE, that of releasing those seen as political prisoners, was not even addressed. In his capacity of a neutral message carrier, Todd’s ignoring of the principle concern of MOVE in trying to reach a settlement ultimately would result in a repression of the root cause of the dispute. Ultimately, whether settlement was reached or not, the unresolved issue of prisoner release would surface again in some other dispute. Again, to MOVE’s credit, despite what they perceived as an unfair agreement, the organization continued to engage in negotiations with the city. It wasn’t until word came back that police had beaten incarcerated MOVE members that MOVE ended the negotiations initiated by Todd (Assefa & Wahrhaftig, 1990). With this analysis of Joel Todd’s neutral intervention strategy it is evident that his impartial approach failed primarily for two reasons. One, the introduction of an impartial intervener in an unbalanced power dynamic doesn’t empower the weaker party to ensure that its interests and concerns are addressed. This was evidenced by Todd not advocating for MOVE’s core concerns. Second, Todd’s position of neutrality prevented him from engaging in reality checking and nov...