Israel and the Hezbullah, will their ever be peace in the middle east?
...water) ; as a result, sources of usable drinking water are scarce. Although the topic of water may not seem to play a role in the war, water data from the region suggests that water may have played a much larger role in Israel’s decision to invade Lebanon. Specifically, control of the waters of the Litani River would greatly benefit Israel. As the country in most need of usable water, having free access to the More than 130 Cubic Mm the lower portion of the Litani produces annually (Mallat, 1982), would significantly help the Israeli water problem. Israel’s awareness of the benefits of controlling the Litani are not new ideas. In fact, Zionist leaders in Europe were aware of and actively lobbied the French and the British governments to adjust the northern and northeastern borders of Palestine to include a large part of the Litani River, pre-1948. These demands were made explicit in a number of letters from Chaim Weizmann, the head of the World Zionist Organisation, to various British government officials (Weisgal, 1977, vol 9). In one such letter to the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, Weizmann argued that Lebanon was a "well watered" region, thus that the Litani waters were "valueless to the territory north of the proposed frontiers. They can be used beneficially in the country much further south." Therefore, the WZO considered "the [Biqa`] Valley of the Litani, to a distance of 25 miles above the bend" of the river, to be essential to the future of the Jewish national home (Weisgal, 1977; 267). Even though, Israeli officials have never publicly acknowledged a desire for control of the Litani, all of the evidence leads only to the conclusion that water most certainly was a motivating factor in Israel’s decisions to advance upon the Litani River. Although the waters of the Mediterranean Sea do not hold the same significance as the waters of the Litani river, they play a large role in the economic struggle contributing to the war of 1982. Israel’s superior military power enabled them to control the borders during the war, which permitted merchants to freely export Israeli goods into Lebanon and make great economic gains. Within six months of the Israeli invasion, the International Herald Tribune reported that Israel’s exports to Lebanon increase more than five fold, totaling more than $20 million by December. The Lebanese bought Israeli exports even though the quality may have been inferior to their own, because they were cheap and in part because they had little choice. According to one U.S. official, the Israelis had forcefully prevented the Lebanese from harvesting and marketing their citrus crop in the south. The Israelis also facilitated the flow of imported goods through the free port of Haifa and into Lebanon without payment of customs , preventing the Lebanese from setting up even temporary customs posts at the border and depriving the government of revenue as well as upsetting trading patterns. (The Israelis used customs control as one of their bargaining points in the later negotiations.) Even until their withdrawal in 2000, Israel maintained a “security zone” that was originally established after the Israeli invasion of 1978 (Operation Litani) and expanded after the Israeli invasion of 1982 (Operation Peace for Galilee). The security zone is no more than a directly colonized area in which Israeli goods are sold, and from which cheap agricultural and industrial laborers are recruited. The zone is also a base of operations for continued Israeli military attack against unoccupied territories to the north, for disrupting Lebanese government activities in the south, and for exerting pressures to prevent the reestablishment of political and social peace in Lebanon. Security may have been the official agenda for which Israel justified its invasion of Lebanon, but it is clear that many other factors, both strategic and economic influenced Israel’s decision to go to war. After scrutinizing some of the factors for Israel’s decisions, equally important is an understanding of the actual events known as the Lebanon War. In March1978 Israel launched Operation Litani, in response to a PLO attack on a bus in northern Israel. The main objective of which was to advance Israeli troops to the frontier of the Litani River under premise of securing the communities of northern Israel from further attacks from Lebanon. With Palestinian and Syrian forces placing great pressures on both the Lebanese and Israelis, Israel found themselves with the opportunity they were looking for to change their role in Lebanon. Israel quickly changed its position from one of defense to one of offense. In response to Israel’s actions, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with maintaining peace. Although Operation Litani was short lived, it provided Israel with the opportunity to set up the security zone. After withdrawal, Israel turned the security zone over to its Lebanese allies in the South Lebanon Army. The establishment of the security zone set the stage for future Israeli advancement in the region. Despite the apparent failure of Operation Litani, Israel found itself in a similar position in June 1982; this time the provocation was an assassination attempt of Israel’s Ambassador in London, and it was deemed Operation Peace of Galilee. The Israeli objective this time was to push the PLO forces back forty kilometers to the north. Easily moving up the Lebanese coastline, Israel could not pass up the opportunity to eliminate all PLO presence in south Lebanon. Israeli generals saw the opportunity to take the capitol Beirut and seized it. As a consequence of the assault, the major cities of Tyre and Sidon were left in ruins, and the Lebanese economy significantly damaged. An estimated $500 million in damages were caused by the conflict. An accord was reached in May 1983, and Israel withdrew from the capitol retreating to the security zone, but the damage was done. Although many Lebanese embraced Israel’s support in driving out Syrian and PLO forces, Israeli occupation was not their idea of support. As a result, the accord was shaky and would fall less than a year later, but more importantly Lebanese sentiments turned against Israel. The largest and most costly result of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon was the creation of the Hizbu’llah, translated as the Party of God. The primary goal of which is to drive Israel completely out of what they believe to be Southern Lebanon. However, Hizbu’llah’s objectives reach far beyond the liberation of Lebanon. In fact, Hizbu’llah is dedicated to liberating Jerusalem, ultimately eliminating Israel, and has formally advocated ultimate establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon. The reasoning for their goal of the liberation of Jerusalem is as follows: the sanctities Jerusalem contains, such as the al-Aqsa mosque, are ‘our umma’s (present and future generations) sanctities’, and by extension, the land where the umma’s sanctities are located becomes the possession of the umma. Accordingly, no one can determine the fate of a land that belongs to an entire umma which consists of present and future generations of Muslims. The only acceptable fate for Jerusalem, in Hizbu’llah’s conception, is its liberation from Israeli occupation by the pan-Islamic ‘Jerusalem Army’. In addition to their goal for the liberation of Jerusalem, Hizbu’llah has actively participated in Lebanon’s political system since1992. Hizbu’llah is closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran but may have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran. While Hizbu’llah does not share the Syrian regime’s secular orientation, the group has been a strong tactical ally in helping Syria advance its political objectives in the region. They receive financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran and diplomatic, political, and logistic support from Syria. Efraim Sneh, a former Israeli general in Southern Lebanon who is now a legislator with the opposition Labour Party, warned of the danger that Hezbollah rockets pose to Israeli towns, and said Syria must be held accountable. “Syria and not Lebanon, is the one who gives Hezbollah permission to carry out these actions,” he told Israeli radio. Since it is doubtful that Syrian inhabitants of the Golan would be eager to attack the Israeli settlements, and reap the consequences from Israeli forces, Syria could - as one diplomat put it - "extend Hizbullah's licence" further into the Golan instead. For the time being, Damascus keeps the Lebanese Hizbu’llah guerrillas on a tight leash, confining their attacks mainly to the Sheba'a Farms, a tiny corner of the Golan which is occupied by Israel but claimed by Lebanon; however, this has not always been the case. Hizbu’llah has been one of the world’s most infamous terrorist organizations since their formation in 1982. Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-US and anti-Israeli terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombings of the US Embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the US Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Three members of Hizbu’llah, ‘Imad Mughniyah, Hasan Izz-al-Din, and Ali Atwa...