WITHIN NORTHERN IRELAND, WHY HAS THE ‘CULTURE OF VIOLENCE’ TRIUMPHED OVER THE CULTURE OF CO-EXISTENCE?
... Ireland it is important to examine the national identities that have emerged and helped in the development of Nationalism and Unionism, McGarry and O’Leary identify that both ideologies want their ‘state to be ruled by their nation’, (quoted in Tonge J, 1998, p 522). What this is saying is that Northern Ireland is a divided society based on religious, cultural and political grounds with the Catholics wanting to be a part of the Republic of Ireland and the Protestants wanting to remain constitutionally tied to the United Kingdom. This can be better understood with an evaluation of the main political activists that emerged after the ‘troubles’ began in 1969. From the Protestant communities there was a growth in the number of political parties, out of these there are two parties that are in favour of non-violent measures to achieve a political settlement, these are the moderate Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the radical Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Between them they agree on the core principles about the relationship between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom, these are; the union with Britain should be maintained, hostile towards United Ireland and a ’belief in the legitimacy of Northern Ireland as a distinct political, economic and cultural entity’. (Tonge J, 1998, p 524). However, they disagree over how it would be maintained. The UUP on the whole believe that the continued integration of British interests in Northern Ireland would help in upholding the Union, whereas the DUP favour a return to a devolved parliament through majority rule, with some allowances being made for the minorities in Northern Ireland. (Tonge J, 1998) There are a number of Loyalist Paramilitary organisations that advocated violence as a means to protecting the constitutional rights of the Union. The main two are the Ulster defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), their political links can be found in the minority parties of the Ulster Defence Party (UDP) and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) respectively. Their main aim was that of defending the Union against Republican aggression because after the imposition of Direct Rule, there was a lack of institutions that could provide suitable security for the Protestant Unionists. (Bairner A, 1996) Like the Protestants there are two main parties that represent the Catholic communities, but, only one of them was in favour of seeking a non-violent settlement, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) was created in 1970 and their central aim is a United Ireland that can only be ‘achieved through the consent of the people of Northern Ireland’. The SDLP produced a constitutional policy document called, ‘Towards a New Ireland’, two proposals from this were central in finding a political settlement, the first was to create a short-term joint London/Dublin condominium government, but this was dismissed on the grounds that Direct Rule would probably give the Nationalists a greater say in political matters. The second proposal was a power sharing initiative between Northern Ireland and Dublin that would be controlled by a Council of Ireland, the aim of this was to bring harmony to the North and South with a view to creating a United Ireland, this was also dismissed. (Patterson H, 1996). Unlike the Loyalist Paramilitaries who relied on a number of minority parties, the Republican Provisional IRA was politically represented by Sinn Fein who refused to accept British Sovereignty in Northern Ireland, their aim at first was for a United Ireland but, this changed later on when they sought to unify Ireland within a Socialist Republic. In seeking to achieve their outlook has changed from using political violence in the 1970s to moving towards a constitutional political settlement in the 1990s. What has been considered up to this point would support the argument that the ‘culture of violence’ did triumph over the ‘culture of co-existence’ during this period and prevented a political settlement being found, but, the discussion set out below is a counter argument that identifies political inadequacies that could have prevented a political settlement being achieved. The final part of this discussion is going to examine the political mis-management of policy formation after Direct Rule was imposed in 1972. When Edward Heath did this he identified that consideration had to be given to an ‘Irish dimension’, by this he meant that the Republic of Ireland would have to have some input in finding a political solution for Northern Ireland. (Dixon P, 2001). What needs to be understood here is that since 1972 there has been a consistent theme pursued by British and Irish governments in the search for a political settlement, Duncan Morrow has identified these elements as ‘British Sovereignty, Northern Ireland power sharing and an ‘Irish Dimension’. (Morrow D, 1996, p 21) This part of the discussion is going to consider the various initiatives and political agreements that have been tried between 1972 and 1997. After Direct Rule was imposed there was three attempts made at re-introducing devolved power in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 provided legitimacy for the Sunningdale Agreement to be signed by the British and Irish Government in December 1973. A seventy eight strong Assembly would be created through single transferable voting (Proportional representation). The executive would be made of representatives from Catholic and Protestant communities and their powers would cover ‘health, social services, education, housing, agriculture and the environment’ with law and order, anti terrorism and electoral matters remaining at Westminster, the result of this was a power sharing executive being formed early in 1974. (Forman F N, 2002). A Council of Ireland was formed and seven ministers from the new Assembly and seven from the Dublin government would meet to discuss cross-border matters, this raised strong opposition from the Ulster Unionists who found the idea of power sharing with Irish Nationalist distasteful, predictably the Chief Executive Brian Faulkner withdrew the Unionist element from the Assembly. Without this support it was impossible for political progress to be made and the Assembly was dissolved after the new Labour Government passed the 1974 Northern Ireland Act. A further two attempts at creating devolution in Northern Ireland were tried , but failed. The first in 1974 through the Northern Ireland Convention failed to get off the groung and was abolished in 1976. The next one was through the Northern Ireland Act 1982, an Assembly was established with similar structure and functions to that of the 1974 Sunningdale Agreement. This had an added function that would include a Rolling Devolution that eventually lead to a United Ireland, but this failed on this occasion because the SDLP refused to participate on the basis that the ‘Irish Dimension’ was too restrictive, the Assembly was dissolved in 1986 after much promise. With the IRA’s continued acts of violence in Northern Ireland and on mainland Britain where, they almost claimed an astounding success with the ‘Brighton Bombing’ of the Conservative party hotel at the 1984 party conference, this prompted a major breakthrough in the search for a political settlement in 1985. The Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed by the British and Irish governments, the significance of this was that the Irish government acknowledged for the first time that any changes in Northern Ireland could only be achieved with the ‘consent of the majority’. Once again there was opposition from the Unionist parties and Nationalist Sinn Fein, the Unionist were totally against the Republic of Ireland having any input concerning issues on Northern Ireland and all fifteen Unionist MPs resigned. Sinn Fein’s argument was that the issue of majority consent did not qualify because, Northern Ireland in the eyes of Sinn Fein is a minority within a United Ireland majority. The SDLP supported it because of the ‘Irish Dimension’ and the main political parties in Britain and Ireland supported it as well. (Pilkington C, 2002). Despite this opposition the Anglo-Irish Agreement was retained and is seen as a foundation for progress to be made through the Hume – Adams talks, the Brooke-Mayhew initiatives, IRA Ceasefires and the Downing Street Declaration during the following decade. What can be said here is that there is pattern emerging that identifies the reluctance of political parties in Northern Ireland to participate in the various forms of power sharing initiatives and agreements discussed so far. What this suggests is that the failure to reach a political settlement could be could be a result of this and the British and Irish government’s mismanagement of the peace process is also to blame. In 1988 John Hume the SDLP leader initiated talks with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams his concern was that because the IRA had persisted with Violence, it was getting the way of reaching a political settlement. Hume’s argument was that a United Ireland could only happen if the SDLP and Sinn Fein were together in seeking this, he stressed to Adams that the main reason why this could not be achieved was because the 1 million Protestants living in Northern Ireland were against a United Ireland. (Tonge J, 1998) By 1990 Northern Ireland was enjoying a new economic and social prosperity and violence was in decline. The British Secretary of State Peter Brooke showed his support for the Hume- Adams talks by declaring that ‘Britain had no selfish, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland’. ...