A Mind's Identity
...d and desire to have waffles over pancakes. To reply to the prier argument, pain is a sensation, and sensation is a report of something (aches in this case). The sensation pain is felt by processing of the brain; therefore I can conclude that sensation is a brain process. But what if someone questions that the feeling of pain (aches) is just a report of sensations and the respond (aches again) is a report of the brain processes, in other words, not brain states itself? To answer that, for example, it is necessarily true that pain is equal to C-fibers firing. And it is also true that pain is a name of a type of sensation and C-fiber firing is a name of a type of brain process (Smart, p.408), therefore, sensation is equal to brain process and thus, equals brain states. In other words, without the processing of the brain, there would not be a report of sensation, so sensation does equal brain process. A brain process involves a brain, hence, it is a brain states, and without brain states there would not be mental (mind) states. Therefore, my friend does not have mental states because she or it cannot feel pain. Replying to the latter argument, believes and desires are something internal, or is something a brain creates. The brain is constructed in a way that is fitted to the believes that ones have (Tutorial notes, Nov 10th 04). Without a brain, there would be no believes, desires, or overall, brain states because all these require the processing of the brain. As mentioned before, the identity theory claims that brain state equals mental state, therefore my friend does not have mental state because she or it cannot not have believes and/or desires. On the second argument, the doctor claims that my friend has no awareness of what her own words mean. Using Searle’s Chinese room example as a support, I can conclude that this argument is true. In the Chinese room example, Searle was given instructions in English to help him answer the questions in Chinese. As Searle states, “I produce the answers by manipulating uninterrupted formal symbols.”(Searle, p.440). Searle is only manipulating the symbols the English instructions is instructing him to, meaning he cannot distinguish what the answers were if he was just looking at the Chinese answers itself. To Searle the Chinese writings would only be meaningless squiggles. Searle is simply behaving like a computer taking in inputs and giving out outputs. (Searle, p.440) Comparing this Chinese room example to my friend’s case, I justify that she was given a “program” that her computer brain understands and therefore gives out “answers” to the questions that I asked. The program acts as the English instructions that are given to Searle. The “answers” were replied by the interpretation of the program and not by my friend herself. Thus, my friend by replying to the questions does not mean that she can think or know how and what to reply. Furthermore, my friend has no awareness of what her responses mean because it was the program that answered the questions just like Searle cannot distinguish his “answers” in Chinese because it was the English instructions that helped him answer. The program is somehow acting like a brain, but not a brain exactly. It can reply to the questions, but cannot enable my friend to think, judge, doubt or have any mental substance to what she is replying. Thus, as mentioned before, my friend does not have mental substance hence has no mental state and therefore has no brain state. In the third argument, the doctor states that my friend can only do what she was given the capacity to do. As t...