The Architectonic Explanation of Norms
...lical view of creation in the Genesis best corroborates it. The Biblical account yields more knowledge about this universal drama in terms of meaning and purpose. By this, I am referring to the darkness that appeared at the beginning of human history, after God had created the heavens and the earth: “And the earth was without form and void, and darkness covered the deep…. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.” And God said, “Let there be light.” And there was light,” as nomos (Genesis 1:1,2). The light that dispelled this chaos (anarchy, pandemonium), and prepared the way for God to create the cosmos, or ‘ordered universe”, for (wo)mankind, we here refer to as nomos, which is antipodal to chaos. Thus, as the best corroboration of the universal cosmogony, nomos does yield knowledge about the nature and character of this universal drama (night and day) across the ages, which turns it into a cosmology, and it also provides a solution to inherent conflict in history by interpreting it as the Will of God: meaning it has meaning and purpose. By this I am referring to the specific purpose that lurks behind the three-tiered cosmic conflict of the universal drama, whose struggles and displacements (migrations and psychological distortion of reality) have always been the engine that pulls the historical processes forward towards its built-in goal of continuous perfection of human nature. Thus, to the three dimensions of Will, Knowledge and Possibility that the concept of norm posits, I hereby add a fourth dimension based on the Arnold Bretcht (1970:83) concept of entelechy1- the Greek word for meaning and purpose, which gives me the basis for the architectonic definition of norms as nomos. The Nomos; The Study of Norms in Diachronic Perspectives By diachronic perspective, I am concerned with phenomena (in this case norms), as they change through time. According to Julius Sensat (1979: 17), in the reconstruction of historical materialism, Jurgen Habermas claims that in several writings, Karl Marx fails to recognize socialization as a dimension of social evolution distinct from production, consequently he formulated historical materialism in a reductionist, one-sided way. This critique of Marx is not only fundamental but also highly consequential to the whole corpus of Marx’s thoughts on societal development. It therefore calls for a greater appreciation of Habermas’s efforts and intentions. Habermas’s work comes out of a tradition concerned with developing a “critical theory of society,” that was formulated in the 1930’s by the Frankfurt Institute. According to this institute, an adequate social theory must be an objective, empirically malleable theory of social institutions, which is at the same time critical of them, aiming at their transformation into a rational social order. Such a theory, it is claimed, must have a distinctive epistemological status, which Habermas has been at great pains to formulate precisely (Sensat 1979:17). In his critique of Marx, Habermas pointed out certain flaws in Marx’s critique of political economy, considered as a theory of present-day capitalism. Because of state intervention in the economy, political and economic phenomena are no longer related to each other as ‘super-structure’ to ‘base’. Since Marx’s value-theoretical conception of capital development presupposes such a relationship, it is no longer capable of capturing the essential features of capitalist society (Burchill et al, 2001:147). To comprehend certain fundamentally new possibilities and tendencies in the society, a new approach is needed. Habermas claim that progress towards a “universal communication community” requires the eradication of all asymmetries in society”. These asymmetries include “forms of exclusion associated with patriarchy and ethnic and racial domination as well as class inequality” (Burchill et al 2001:147). On the other hand, Habermas claims that the adoption of an adequate theoretical stance is hindered by certain misformulations of historical materialism. To expose these errors is the goal of the criticisms. It is Habermas’s view that there are two forms of historical progress, namely, technical rationalization (production) and practical rationalization (socialization) -- which are logically independent of each other. The former has to do with society’s power of control over natural processes, while the later has to do with the justifiability of norms guiding human interaction. Habermas claims that in characterizing the process of societal reproduction as production, Marx mistakenly attempts to reduce practical rationalization (socialization) to technical rationalization (production). Habermas maintains further that this categorical framework is inappropriate for Marx’s critique of political economy, which implicitly recognizes the logical independence of these two forms of progress (Sensat, 1979 12). Habermas’s aim is to re-emphasize the dialectical interplay between production and socialization in the concept of the mode of production such that in a rational social order, there is a constant and interminable interplay of production and socialization dialectically. The necessary interference thus is that in a “non-rational” social order, there is a disturbance in the dialectical interplay of these vital processes resulting in the subsumption of one process under the other or vice versa. In this, Habermas appears to be on the right tack. However, his efforts are hampered by his own misinterpretation of Marx’s work, which is common to Western theorists, namely, mistaking epistemology for ontology. What Marx offers in his theory of society is merely an epistemological tool of analysis in the sense that it is derived from his study of Western European society, thus it is not in any way ontological. It is based on the logic of dominance, perceptual bias, or shall I say Eurocentricism. Ruth Benedict in her book- Patterns of Culture (1968: 2) aptly puts it thus: Any scientific study requires that there be no preferential weighting of one or another of the items in the series it selects for its consideration. In less controversial fields, like the study of cacti o termites, or the nature of the nebulae, the necessary method of study is to group the relevant material and to take note of all possible variant forms and conditions. It is only in the study of man himself that the major social sciences have substituted the study of one local variation, that of Western man. By way of elaboration, the mode of production that Max studied and based his theory of society on was the type in which socialization had been subsumed under production. Therefore, there being no visible evidence of any dialectical interplay between the two processes, Marx concluded that socialization was a mere aspect of technical reproduction (production). This mistaken assumption has become the bane of Habermas’s efforts. It has impaired the second phase of his reconstruction, which he considers to be two-dimensional: According to Sensat (1979:50), He [Habermas] holds technical rationalization (production) and practical rationalization (socialization) to be changes for the better. Since he holds these processes to be logically independent on each other, he is still faced with the problem of comparing two societies [the tribal and the modern societies], each of which is superior in one dimension but inferior in the other. The fact of the matter is, by virtue of the biased perception in the Euro-centrist approach that permeates his work, Habermas effort to reconstruct Marx’s historical materialism by merely focusing on capitalist society has not only become counter-productive, having reached a cul-de-sac, but also, it has floundered for lack of a case study of another type of mode of production, which will present him with the “other side of the coin,” namely, the subsumption of production under socialization, and with which to engage in a genuine dialogue. Thus impaired, Habermas makes a sortie into his now famous “communicative rationality or moral practical forms of reasoning in social life”, or discursive form of collective reasoning, which has now become pivotal in his reconstruction efforts (Burchill et al, 2001: 172-173). According to this form of reasoning, “international norms [norms of socialization and production] and institutions must also be subsumed to collective scrutiny and deliberation on this basis if they are to maintain legitimacy” (Burchill et al 2001: 173). As Habermas posits, communicative rationality results when a community’s members discuss disputes or problems in order to discover or develop inter-subjective agreement (ibid). But then, what he fails to see is that normative consensus is ideally achieved in inclusive and public deliberation that are free from various distortions, such as dominance, threats, two-facedness, half-truths, misinformation, propaganda or lies. In short, structural violence. Instead, it is its yield of distorted communication, which, I intend to show, stems from the fact that the basis of his reconstruction is the authentic word- nomos, that transforms the world, but on the inauthentic word that can not transform the world- evolutionism, which makes it part of the problem and not the solution to it. Put differently, and for epistemological reasons, there is a dire need for an analytical tool that does not blur reality’s fullness, and which does not make facts conform to theory, but makes theories conform to facts in the social science research. What I mean here is that an analytical tool in which material production can be subsumed under socialization dictates other activities in society. This is the only way to arrive at a reconstruction of the dialectical nature of human progress. It is because of this vacancy that I now introduce a postulate of an African mode of production. African mode of production is socialization-subsumed, because it lacks technical rationalization (production); and Habermas and Euro-centrist scholars interested in the study of human society would do well by taking a close second look at the African social structure. Unlike in Europe or elsewhere, African societal structures are tribal as opposed to feudal society; and their dynamics demonstrate a complete ‘otherness’ from everything Western. The psychoanalyst, Erik Erikson (1964:161) said the following about tribal societies: “Systems of child training….represent unconscious attempts to creating out of human raw material that configuration of attitudes which is (or once was) the optimum under the tribes particularly natural conditions and economic historic necessities. Thus each society develops its dominant social and cultural patterns, and upon this are imposed the variation of the individualized character permitted in that society”. Doubtless, there are limited but functional hierarchical structures in tribal societies just as there are in feudal structures. The primary distinction, however, is that they are not production oriented; they are mere war-machines developed for self-defence or to protect the long distance trade routes across the Sahara desert. For instance, the economies of the most prominent African tribal societies in pre-colonial times, e.g., the Ashanti, were based on long distance trade and war. Having thus articulated the thesis of the African mode of production, which happens to be the ‘other side of the coin’, let us now test it in the context of Habermas’s reconstruction of historical materialism, particularly in relation to the idea of the dialectical interplay between the processes of production (technical rationalization) and socialization (practical rationalization). The following equation will serve as a guide: Socialization (S (P+S)) + Production (P (S+P)) = Human and Social Progress (HSP) We proceed from the basic deduction that the primitive community that Marx theorized about was based on the dialectical interplay as the above equation demonstrates, in which there is not primacy or dominance of one over the other, and therefore no subsumption of one structure under the other. Polarization of Structures As the rhythms of history -- conflicts, struggles, colonization and displacements -- indicate, the polarization of structures emerged to alter the character and in some ways, the composition of the structures such that one structure becomes subsumed under the other. To illustrate this point, I will employ a dialectical interplay between the two types of structures, as follows: P O L A R I Z A T I O N Disanomie Disanomie Figure 1 As figure 1 above shows, in the wake of this polarization, the dialectical interplay between the original structures of the primitive community is terminated by courtesy of the rhythms of history. The outcome, very simple and logical, is that the feudal hierarchical production-oriented structures will prevail over the tribal. Herein jells out our knowledge of historical development. In Habermas’s historical reconstruction, he starts off from a point in biological evolution when hominids distinguished themselves from other primates by conferring on the reproduction of their life an economic form, i.e., a form characterized by production of tools, division of labour and rules of product distribution. According to Sansat (1979:41), Habermas claims that, “at this beginning stage of human development evolution proceeds by way of interplay of organic and cultural mechanism”. To gainsay this extravagant speculation, I shall have recourse to the concept of Nomos, which represents the process of reconciling man’s inner stability with his external adaptability as the genesis of human culture, which is the true embodiment of the dialectical interplay of structures. The effort now is to observe the behaviour of this entity, nomos, through history; hence the first task is to establish the fact that there has been nomos in human history, thus our point of departure is the very beginning of written history. The locus is the Near East, and the societies that developed there had the unique thing that distinguished man from animals, namely, Culture-- meaning material, cognitive and normative culture (tradition, mores, customs, way of life, etc)- the possession of a shared body of belief and habits. (These early societies had belief systems as well as norms---internalized norms to regulate those beliefs). Notably, it is around this same period that we encounter the phenomenon known as ‘the Neolithic Paradox” (or shall one say, the Agricultural Revolution). Claude Levis-Strauss (1974:14-15) puts it succinctly: “It was in the Neolithic times that man’s mastery of the great arts of civilization- of poverty, weaving, agriculture and the domestication of animals- became firmly established. No one today would any longer think of a series of chance discoveries or believe them to have been revealed by the passive perception of certain natural phenomena”. The basic hypothesis here is that the Agricultural Revolution was the direct outcome of the dialectical interplay between technical rationalization (production) and practical rationalization (socialization), which imply nomos. Levis-Strauss (1974:14-15) continues accordingly: “Neolithic or early historical man was therefore the heir of a long scientific tradition. However, had he, as well as all his predecessors, been inspired by exactly the same spirit as that of our time, it would be impossible to understand how he could have come to a halt and how several thousand years of stagnation have intervened between the Neolithic revolution and modern science”. First Dimension Nomos: Disnomie The first problem that we encounter here is the period of stagnation between the Neolithic revolution and the modern science. What explains it other than the polarization of structures and the cessation of the dialectical interplay between them? This is where we enter the orbit of the fist dimension nomos in disequilibrium, or nomos in conflict with itself, hence “disnomie.” This is the state of affairs where a substantial number of persons who are members of the community are attached to a given value “X”, while a substantial number of other insist upon the disvalue of the said value “X” and cherish its opposite “Y”*. The result of this is a conflict situation, for which reason we advance the notion of the “primal conflict”, the intimation of which abounds in historical development, particularly in terms of its significance of the polarization of the primal human group. This was the polarization which marked the dissolution of the primitive community, and the groups that emerged from it were not only distinct in terms of character and outlook but also, the one group would aspire to conquer and control the other group in the context of the ancient Hegelian and Nietzschean “master/servant dialectic”. The Hegelian dialectic suggests coherence between concrete and abstract, subject and object, reality and fantasy, part and whole-and, for purposes of this paper, master and slave. Second Dimension Nomos: Nomocracy The sequel to this dissolution and polarization of structures constitute the rhythms of history, namely, conflict, struggles colonization and migration--physical and psychological displacements. This was where and when nomocracy--the imposition of the second dimension nomos, made its entrance in the historical process. Nomocracy according to Carl Friedich (1963: 145) is the state of affairs wherein everything is judged in terms of traditional values and beliefs, wherein values representing the original nomos have become the tyrant of the community, forestalling all forward movement. Nomocracy is thus analogous to our two categories above in which the feudal is characterized by a hierarchical, single-purpose- victory and profit-structure and a directive mode of work, while the tribal would tend to be non-hierarchical structure in view of its transcendental purpose and a mode of work that is cooperative. Third Dimension Nomos: Anomie In fine, nomocracy, which describes the contracted conditions of the structures of society, and which therefore cramps the liberty of the human mind, is precisely what explains the period of stagnation between the Neolithic Revolution and modern science. And with that, we have now reached the Third Dimension Nomos, anomie, which in the case of the feudal structure is the result of both exogenous and endogenous sources of change. By this, I am referring to the combined impact of the Islamic expansion into Europe and the Renaissance, on the one hand, which led to the transformation of the feudal structure into capitalism, and colonialist expansionism, on the other hand, which helped to consolidate its world dominance. The tribal structure, thus has not been able to transform itself, in part because, unlike the feudal, it is not expansionist; rather, it implodes, contracts and atomizes, in part because of its subsumption under the trajectory of the feudal, now capitalist structure. This is similar to Immanuel Wallenstein World System theory, in which he noted that the world is divided into three levels: the Core, the semi periphery, and the periphery. Herein is the sense in which colonial expansion plays a unique role in the historical process; its purpose is to breakdown the structures of nomocracy that have imprisoned the minds of the people and turn them into mass inertia; its purpose is not to build again what it breaks down (nomos-1) but to produce a “critical mass,” which through the learning they acquired through their suffering will pursue the task of reconstructing a new nomos-2, to replace the old norms that are in a rapid stage of disintegration, which, in turn, will trigger the needed transformation of minds. That history has a built-in meaning and purpose is a fact that none in his right mind can gainsay or ignore. Touché! Historian Arnold Toynbee (Marwick, 1970:85) hit the point tersely: “When civilizations rise and fall and in falling give rise to others, some purposeful enterprise, higher than theirs, may all the time be making headway and in a divine plan the learning that comes through the suffering cause by failure of civilization may be the sovereign means of progress.” The analogy of this statement can be found in the Bible as well, if we carefully read, Isaiah 45, verse 7. What is this sovereign means of pro...