Be it as it may, critical pedagogues must take the critiques of their practice very seriously
...concept, however, is quite vague, and, as such, may not be too helpful. To make it more specific, I suggest the principle of Universal Dignity (Marina & Válgoma, 2000): We, the members of the human race, attentive to history’s experience, moved by our compassion for those who suffer and by a wish of happiness and justice for all, recognize ourselves as members of a species granted with dignity, that is we recognize in all human beings an intrinsic value that must be protected regardless of age, ethnicity, gender, nationality, language, skin color, religion, political opinion, or any other individual or social trait, condition or circumstance. Moreover, we affirm that human dignity entails and is realized through the possession and mutual acknowledgment of rights (p. 300, italics and translation mine). If used as a referent, this principle can help educators reflect critically upon their conditions, beliefs, and actions. Conscientization can begin whence. By being cognizant of our own dignity, we can begin to recognize the dignity of all others (regardless of creed or condition). Although not always, this can lead to a mutual recognition, to the emergence of historically- and contextually-silenced voices, to a dialogue among equals, and, ultimately, to a join struggle toward emancipation. Granted, this principle alone is not sufficient to bring about personal and social transformation; yet, it is a condition without which transformation cannot occur. 2. Scrutinizing the dominant technocratic rationality. Once the ontological principle of Universal Dignity has been realized, we may be able to scrutinize the dominant rationality that rules people’s lifeworld. The dominant rationality is “technocratic rationality.” Gibson (1986) explains “technocratic rationality” as a way of thinking and acting that gives priority to means over purposes. By centering on method and “efficiency,” it limits itself to the question of how, instead of why or/and for what, hence separating facts from values. In this vein, it creates an obsession with measure and quantitative evaluation, classifying and labeling even all that is human (including people themselves). In addition, given its preference for “reason,” devalues and marginalizes emotion and ignores history, providing a lopsided and limited view of social life. Consumed with practical principles instead of with moral and political ones, such rationality ends up distorting “reality” and, ultimately, leads to a decline of reason itself (Boler, 1999; Horkheimer, 1972; Muros, 2004). One can easily see technocratic rationality in the context of schooling, where, according to Giroux (1988), what matters is disciplinary control and one-sided character formation. Increasingly, under such logic, (a) teachers and students are forced to comply with externally imposed “standards” and “teacher-proof” curricula; (b) testing and assessment are practiced as means to ensure “accountability to,” compliance with, and efficiency in, the given order; (c) people are evaluated and classified according to supposedly “objective” (yet clearly arbitrary) criteria; (d) grades are given more importance than learning; (e) method is confused with purpose; and (f) content (curricular and otherwise) is given priority over people. We may begin to see the implications of all this by reflecting on how willingly we let others (“authorities” and “experts”) dictate what is “good” for us. Moreover, another sign of technical rationality is our predisposition to fit into the system as long as we get some some kind of compensation (e.g., money, some leisure, a few possessions), albeit insufficient. Marcuse (1964) calls this latter state of affairs “happy consciousness ”. Yet, the situation is not “happy” at all. For instance, in schools is not uncommon to see “burned-out” teachers teaching to the test and going through the motions as long as they get paid at the end of the month. It is not unusual either to see “students,” enduring the tedium of some schools and memorizing concepts they do not understand so as to get a passing grade and, eventually, graduate. With the backing of “behavioral experts” who continue to fabricate “evidence” (Kohn, 1998), it is also common to perceive punishment as being good for people. No wonder bodily punishment, mental abuse, public ridicule, a bad grade, extra homework, in-class assignments, and even “detentions” are practiced and experienced so often in the classroom. This, of course, is not what education, according to critical pedagogues, ought to be about; for it does not foster dignity. Punishment is fatal. It creates resentment, fear, dependence, rage, confusion, pain, and violence, among many other ills (Fromm, 1993; Miller, 1990, 1998). Again, this is “poisonous pedagogy” (Miller, 1990, 1998), and, if not confronted and stopped, tends to re-emerge when abused children become adults (and even much earlier, as is the case of young bullies) and they impose these tactics on others. Knowing all this, educators may begin to seek alternative ways of educating their students and break this ominous cycle once and for all. 3. Examining our negative feelings in relation to common pedagogical practices. And speaking of the feelings technocratic rationality creates, let us remember that feelings are crucial in the learning process (Boler, 1999; Marina & López, 1999; Noddings, 1984). Hence, we must pay attention to them. Needless to say, such attention should not be given to simply attain a more “touchy-feely” pedagogy. Feelings are not just psychological; they are schooled, learned, and embodied, both in positive and negative ways, through particular practices and complex dynamics of power (Boler, 1999; Bourdieu, 1977a, 1977b; Foucault, 1979; Kirk, 2004). As such, they have a strong political and ethical component (Boler, 1999; Popkewitz, 1998) and ought to be seen as essential elements for emancipation. It is from this perspective that we must examine them. We can approach our analysis from, at least, two directions: (a) looking into what types of schooling practices tend to provoke what feelings and (b) inquiring into what types of feelings tend to provoke what practices. Table 1 contains a number of examples of both feelings and pedagogical practices (in alphabetical order) to be used as a starting point of our analysis. In this vein, we may ask: How many of the oppressive practices listed on the right column do provoke anger, anxiety, confusion, etc.? Likewise, we may also ask: What feelings in the left column do conduce to crowding, berating, bullying, etc.? To be sure, we could list many more feelings and practices, both positive and negative, while establishing additional links among all these. [Place Table 1 about here] Also, we could delve deeper into our analysis with questions such as: Who determines these practices and feelings? Who benefits or suffers as a result of perpetuating or stopping them? Are there other ways to create more positive feelings while attaining better learning outcomes? If so, how can they be put into practice? In sum, the study of feelings in relation to pedagogical practices can be a rich source of awareness and humanizing transformation. 4. Analyzing the main social discourses of schooling. The social discourses of schooling are worth analyzing, too. Foucault (1974) points out that, in addition to referring to what is being said, a social discourse also encompasses matters such as: who speaks, to whom, under what circumstances, and with what authority. Discourses are manifestations of power that systematically form the objects they refer to. Hence, more than defining objects, discourses construct them and give them meaning. Yet, incidentally, given their “taken-for-grantedness,” discourses disguise the objects’ creation (see also, Gee, 1996; Miller Marsh, 2002a, 2002b; Muros, 2004) making it seem “natural.” [Place Table 2 about here] Within the context of schooling, we can examine several dominant discourses stemming from various social institutions. As one can see on Table 2, many of the terms employed in schooling are rooted in other institutions (i.e., the military, the Church, business and industry, and the prison). These terms contribute to the creation of a particular, segmented view of “reality” concerning “education” that has very little to do with the ontological vocation of humanization. When people use words like “detention,” “probation,” “homework,” “product,” or/and “trenches” in relation to teachers, students, and/or schools, they send very particular messages that, in turn, are imprinted in the receiver’s mind. The more these terms are used, the more the receiver will internalize them, and the more “normal” and “natural” they will appear to be. This, of course, makes it extremely difficult to transgress these discourses and meanings and envision things otherwise. Worse yet, all these social discourses interact to create what Fairclough (1989) calls ideological “discoursal common sense”: …discoursal common sense is ideological to the extent that it contributes to sustaining unequal power relations, directly or indirectly. Ideology, however, in not inherently commonsensical: certain ideologies acquire that status in the course of ideological struggles, which take the linguistic form of struggles in social institutions between ideologically diverse discourse types. Such struggles determine dominance relations between them and their associated ideologies. A dominant discourse is subject to a process of naturalization, in which it appears to lose its connection with particular ideologies and interests and become the common-sense practice of the institution. Thus when ideology becomes common sense, it apparently ceases to be ideology; this is itself and ideological effect, the ideology is truly effective only when it is disguised. (p. 107) Moreover, discourses are related to the uses and disciplining of the body (Bourdieu, 1977). When we say things like: “line up,” “sit down!” “be quiet,” and or “listen up,” we create particular dynamics of power and peculiar ways in which the students will see and use their bodies and relate the world. These dynamics, after a while, are internalized in the form of lasting patterns seldom conscious to those acquiring them; still having serious implications for their success or lack thereof in the world. Therefore, it becomes crucial that educators also understand and deconstruct these embodied discourses. As important as social discourses are, it is also crucial to analyze the silences—that which, either voluntary, due to ignorance, or by force, is not said. Silences also carry messages; sometimes of resistance, but, more often than not, of oppression (hooks, 1989). For Freire (1973, 1985), a central question in the creation of a holistic consciousness so as to be with the world is how people can escape from the “culture of silence” and take steps toward naming the world. “…understanding the culture of silence presupposes an analysis of dependence as a relational phenomenon that gives rise to different forms of being, of thinking, of expression, to those of the culture of silence and those of the culture that ‘has voice’” (Freire, 1985, p. 72). By overcoming the culture of silence, we may begin to demystify false relations and structures of power, get rid of naïve perspectives, transcend “happy consciousness” and denounce “the concrete situation which begets oppression” (Freire, 1977, p. 138). This is why Giroux (1988) points to the need of developing both a “language of critique” and a “language of possibility.” The former to enable people to judge and manifest injustice, and the latter to make it possible to construct an alternative vision. 5. Consciously recalling and recounting our negative experiences and influences in school to avoid reproducing and legitimizing them. Within the context of education, all teachers operate from diverse positions of privilege in terms of identity, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, social class, political persuasion, etc. (Dippo, Gelb, with others, 1991; Giddens, 1991). The personal, political, and pedagogical are interrelated in a symbiotic fashion (Fernández-Balboa, 1998b)—each one affects the other two. From this perspective, the use of life history can be a viable and useful resource toward articulating reasons for contesting conventional wisdom (Sikes & Troyna, 1991), uncovering hidden curriculum power relations (hooks, 1994), and acquiring transformative professional knowledge (Spouse, 1999). Here, it is particularly important to recall and recount negative experiences and influences in school. This may be difficult to do because most of us would rather forget about them. Yet, forgetting about these experiences, however, may be a sure way of reproducing them (Miller, 1998). In contrast, by bringing them to the fore, by connecting them with specific cases, faces, and feelings, we may be able to understand their origins, provide real and alternative explanations and, ultimately, avoid reproducing and legitimizing these experiences. In turning their our classrooms into “islands of decency” (Horton, 1990) we must first confront the “ghosts” from our own past. After identifying the principle of Universal Dignity, detecting the pernicious effects of technocratic rationality, recognizing the negative feelings resulting from poisonous practices, and acknowledging how social discourses shape “reality,” adding our own “personhood” to the picture of pedagogy can really contribute to our humanization. Without us, educators, in the picture, conscientization will remain a foreign concept, far removed from life, too distant to do us much good. Closing remarks All in all, in the pursuit of the ontological vocation of becoming fully human and fostering Universal Dignity, conscientization is not merely a cognitive affair; also, it is a process of ethical and political (self-)reflection and cultural action. As with all processes, it must be accompanied of a certain content—something upon which to focus our reflection, dialogue, reading and/or the inquiry. In a sense, it is this content that gives meaning to the process—its reason d’être. The content of conscientization is quite varied and encompasses abstract concepts like “lifeworld” (Habermas, 1987), “happy consciousness” (Marcuse, 1964), “poisonous pedagogy” (Miller, 1990), “discourse” (Britzman, 1991; Foucault, 1974; Gee, 1996); “habitus” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977), “power” (Foucault, 1980, 1983), “feelings” (Boles, 1999), to name a few. In turn, each of these concepts has its own ramifications and is embedded in particular contexts. In the “educational context” we find many particular kinds of these that contribute to dehumanization. Consequently, critical pedagogues must strive to create an interlocking congruence among CP’s ontological, epistemological, and methodological principles. Put another way, people’s vocation toward becoming “fully human” (Freire, 1970), or toward achieving Universal Dignity (Marina and Válgoma, 2000), must be understood in connection to both epistemology (i.e., how we come to know what we know) and methodology (i.e., what means we use to achieve our vocation). Conscientization must reflect all this; otherwise, it runs the risk of losing both its meaning and its aim. It is thus that we can make it possible to identify and transform the oppressive and repressive conditions that stand in the way of our journey toward humanization and social reconstruction. The five content areas we have presented may contribute in this regard. It is with this hope we have suggested them here. 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