DEATH PENALTY
... restated in terms of the Golden Rule because if people were treated as they treated others, then they would be following the Golden Rule because people could only willingly act towards others as they were willing to have others act toward them. Finally, that the death penalty is a violation of the Kantian principal of using someone else as an example for any type of punishment. To elaborate, the Kantian approach explains that if a person is rational that he will act the way in which he wishes to be treated. Therefore, to treat this person as a rational being, he must be treated the way he treats others. Kant then claims we have a duty, or obligation, to do to offenders what they have done to their victims because if we did not treat them, the same way, as they treated their victims, we would be denying that those their status as rational beings. Reiman rejects Kant’s belief in societies’ duty to carry out Lex Talionis to its full capacity. Reiman claims that treating people exactly the way they treat others would, in fact, be an impossible task, because we would have to do everything good and bad that they have done. In the end the victim, and in a state, the courts have the right to punish and not the duty to punish. The victim or the state should have the ability to punish legally for the transgression, in order to regain equal stature, but they are not obligated to punish by the exact same means. From this, it can be concluded that we have the duty to act the way the offender has done since this amounts to the respect of rational beings. Again, Reiman opposes this view by saying that it is going too far; a rational being gives permission to others to do the same to him but this does not necessarily make them too. This then leads to the connection of the notion of lex talionis and the equality of persons. The two approaches lead to equality and rationality of this form of punishment. The equality and rationality of a person imply that an offender deserves a punishment, and his victim has the right to impose on him, suffering equal to that which he imposed on the victim. This clearly indicates that lex talionis is the criminal’s just for the victim and states the right to punish in this manner. There is no simple way to find the correct penalties of certain crimes. Reiman then figures out slowly the ranges of just punishments, both the bottom end and the top end. Reiman must find punishments that would fulfill the two major claims believed by death penalty advocates. On the top end, it is obvious that we cannot torture someone repeatedly if say, the punishment was for a serial killer. We have moral considerations which make us refrain from such a punishment. Therefore, we must impose a punishment that is closest to both the idea of lex talionis and what is moral. Otherwise best noted to be the worst crime is punished by society’s worst punishment. It is still based on lex talionis which will still make offenders deserve what lex talionis would impose and also remains faithful to the victim’s right; the idea of equalities of persons is still intact by imposing suffering to the greatest extent possible that is morally permissible. Reiman proves that retribution is only a right and not a duty. The victim, and in turn the state, are under no obligation to impose a sentence upon the offender. The victim has the right to forgive the violator. There exists no duty to impose lex talionis literally. The “ability” to exercise, an amount of authority, over the violator, equal to the amount that he unfairly exercised over the victim, is enough to restore the victim’s equality to the violator. Reiman also discusses the ability to inflict a proportional punishment that is not equivalent to the offender’s actions. There are some offenses that should not be duplicated. Reiman uses rape and torture as two examples, of offenses that should not be duplicated, by the state. The notion that justice permits us to avoid extremely cruel punishments is that there is a range of just punishments that includes some that are just though they exact less than the full measure of the lex talionis. It is because of a wide range of appropriate punishments, but equivalent punishments exists that the death penalty is not necessary to exact retribution. Reiman clarifies this idea and states in reference to ...