'Japanese rule, in Southeast Asia, simply exchanged one externally- based power for another.' Discuss the validity of this statement
...d from her. However, their favourable balance of payments did not bring them any financial benefit since yen credits, piling up in Japanese banks, were virtually frozen. In Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, and all other countries occupied, the Japanese military took over the communications, railways and river transports as well as strategic minerals such as oil, rubber and timber. This complemented the monopolization of the production of prime commodities, such as salt and tobacco as well as the heavy requisitions of food products such as rice. Essentially, the economic exploitation of the Japanese was as unrestrained and equally detrimental as the colonial authorities. Yet, while the principles and methods of Japanese rule appeared to be simply the exchange of one foreign power for another (albeit a Asian one), the above points should not lead one to conclude that the Japanese Occupation was unimportant as the view implies. As a matter of fact, it may be argued that the Japanese Occupation had significant social, economic and political consequences on Southeast Asia. On that basis, the view fails as an assessment of the Japanese Occupation and its significance on Southeast Asia. In this respect, the view proves narrow and myopic as it fails to consider the profound and disastrous social consequences the Japanese Occupation had on Southeast Asian society. While the social consequences of war and occupation cannot be quantified with any degree of accuracy, the loss of life was on a scale unknown in the region since the beginning of modem government records, and the atrocities committed by occupying forces upon Southeast Asians verged on genocide in the case of Singapore's Chinese. Nor was that all. Communities were uprooted. Families fled the towns to escape direct contact with the regime and squatted on forest fringes to scrape together a livelihood from subsistence cultivation. Labour was forcibly recruited from, for example, the Burmese, the overseas Indian community and amongst Indonesians in order to build such projects as the Burma railway or military defences. In addition, men were conscripted for military or paramilitary service or for the Indian National Army. Subsequent food shortages reached starvation proportions in some areas and diseases (particularly malaria) were on an epidemic scale throughout the region by the time of the Allied reoccupation. The view also proves inadequate as it fails to recognise the significance of the Japanese Occupation to the Southeast Asian economies. It must be remembered that the event was important to the economic history of Southeast Asia and represented a distinct break with the colonial past in practice. What was characteristic and important was that Japanese rule had led to the complete breakdown of Southeast Asia’s economy accompanied by a disastrous deterioration of living conditions. For one, Southeast Asian industries suffered heavily from the destruction during the Japanese conquest. The general mismanagement of the mines and factories, technical ignorance and the short supply of new machinery and spare parts and the inadequate knowledge of plant diseases and proper cultivation methods, pushed Southeast Asian industries to the brink of collapse. In addition, the Japanese’s unwillingness to use the wide range of resources available led to Southeast Asia’s economic production levels falling. The Japanese had discouraged the production of items for which they or ‘Greater East Asia’ had no real use, while on the other hand they concentrated on products in which they were interested such as rubber, coal and sugar. Thus, the mining of the Indonesian bauxite, a vital element of aluminium, was carried on throughout the war, with the total output exported to Japan. Other factories were converted for other purposes or demolished, and the machinery removed, particularly the iron and copper parts, which were used as scrap. For example, out of the 837 tin mines operating in Malaya in 1940 either with dredges or with gravel pumps, less than 100 were worked during the Japanese Occupation and production fell nearly 90%. Tin mining in Billiton came to an almost complete standstill. In 1942, the output of the Tongkinese coalmines was halved compared with the 1937 figure. The acreage under tea cultivation in the Indies was reduced by 52% that under coffee by 28%, and production dropped disastrously. Thus, capacity was reoriented to meet the economic interests of the Japanese and the Japanese occupation had contributed to reducing Southeast Asia's production capacity dramatically. Japanese economic policy also inflicted excessive and devastating effects on individual Southeast countries and led to widespread inflation in the Southeast Asian economies. The economic programme for the Co-Prosperity Sphere of 12 December 1941 provided for issuing military paper money, expressed in local currencies and designed eventually to merge with them. These notes were issued on par with the currencies locally in use. However, devoid of bullion support, they were in effect worthless. Their circulation caused a devaluation of the various Southeast Asian currencies, which gradually developed into inflation when the Japanese increased the output of printing press. For eaxmple, in Java, 450 million guilders were in circulation in the beginning of the Occupation. By 1945, some 1500 million guilders were issued. In the Philippines, the Japanese added an amount variously estimated between 6 and 11 milliard to the total money supply of around 300 million pesos. Essentially, the issue of military paper money had ruined the structure of Southeast Asian economies. This resulted in the loss of money as a medium of exchange as the economy took a step back into barter trade. Nor was that all. Such momentous economic changes had significant implications for the economic well-being of the people. The scarcity of food and provisions led to rising prices, which, along with the inflationary effects caused by the generous circulation of Japanese paper money, resulted in financial disorder. Despite the fact that the government had tried to stabilise prices and check the inflation, all these proved to be ineffective. Black market prices spiralled since there was an acute lack of necessities. This was evident in Singapore where food prices had increased by 300 percent in June 1943 as compared to December 1941. In the city areas, the decline of production caused many workers to lose their source of income and those who could stay behind had their wages cut considerably. The countryside was caught in a similar predicament. The decline of commercial agriculture caused numerous labourers to lose their jobs and this was most acutely felt in areas where export production had been fully integrated with village life. For instance, in Java, the collapse of the sugar industry and the limitation on the cultivation of export crops led to a significant loss of income for the rural population. As a result, a serious decline in public health was effected and this along with the failure of colonial medical services and the ignorance of proper sanitation measures, brought about a greater frequency of epidemics. The most critical deficiency of the view is that that totally ignores the significant political effects of the Japanese Occupation. In fact, a case can be made that its most important effects lay in the boost it gave to nationalism. The Japanese occupation strengthened the nationalist elite and endowed them with the necessary confidence and ability to pose a credible challenge to the western colonial powers after the war. In this regards, the Japanese Occupation was psychologically a morale-booster for the nationalist movement. In most cases, the Japanese were inferior in number to the troops they were facing and the Asians witnessed mass surrenders of their former masters on Luzon, at Singapore and in the Indies. In places such as Penang and Rangoon, the locals noted the flight of European families, leaving the native population to face the mercies of the Japanese. The sight of white soldiers rather meekly surrendering, being sent on long marches to prison camps in which many collapsed along the road and later being herded into forced labour projects such as the infamous Burma-Thai ‘Death Railway' may have elicited sympathy but it did not reflect omnipotent colonial power. In addition, the rounding-up of Western colonial administrators, merchants, planters and professional men and their families established an entirely new environment which was free from the old masters and lacked the racialist tone which had characterized colonial society. Perhaps most important of all, the new power in the region was a fellow Asian who in the initial euphoria of victory appeared to many as a liberator from colonial oppression. All these shattered the traditional myth of ‘White Man’s Superiority’ and shook the fundamental foundations of colonial rule. The fact that the colonial governments were incapable of defending their subjects called into question their right to rule. Never again would the colonial powers feel themselves to be complete masters of their territories in South-East Asia. Wartime occupation also weakened of the monopoly of modern weapons formerly held by the colonial powers. Prior to the war the efforts of nationalists to mount attacks against European forces were inevitably doomed to defeat. There were very few Burman, Javanese or Vietnamese officers in 1940 and almost no arms were available to nationalists who wanted to become involved in insurgent activity. The war effectively changed this military situation. By the end of the war, there existed large stockpiles of weapons for those who would later take up arms against the returning colonial powers and the independent governments that succeeded them. Generally, these military supplies came from four sources. First, the Japanese supplied units they considered loyal with arms as well as training. The Allies also did the same thing, providing arms to Chin, Karen and Kachin supporters in Burma, 'Free Thai' elements in Thailand, and, through the American ass, to units under Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China. The invasions and counter-invasions of Burma and the Philippines allowed a leakage of weapons to those who wanted them. ...