summit feever
...to his rest and recuperation). Boukreevs decision to do the climb without oxygen bottles, although all experts advice guides to do it on bottled oxygen can be linked to this state of mind. The wrong assumption is made that nothing can happen. This kind of “habit reinforcement” can be compared to an attitude of “arrogance”. Hall believed he had everything under control because he had everything well organized. This ‘perfect organization’ allowed him to accept less experienced climbers, and expand the group number. However, the landscape on the Mount Everest can change quickly into a complete different situation. Grau who did not want to wait which caused a slow-down during the climb (due to the fact that he was not loyal to decisions made, in case it was agreed upon, or due to a poor communication between Grau and Fisher/Hall, in case it was not agreed upon), and a storm that came up, are just 2 examples of facts Hall did not had under control. A last state of mind worth mentioning is distraction. Distraction is caused by whatever takes the climbers mind off their climbing job. Getting good publicity is one cause that for sure distracted the leaders of the commercial expeditions (Hall and Fisher) during the climb. This distraction influenced their decision to go on or to return at several stages. In Halls perception, he could not afford a second failure after his turnaround in 1995. Also Fishers group saw the importance of a successful climb (“you serve them (= “customers”, RHA) or you lose them to the competition” testified Dickinson). The poor weather conditions, the lack of oxygen, the disappearance of the human strength at high altitude were other distractions influencing decisions at “The Death Zone”. A clear example is given by the rapid descent of Boukreev. His descent can be explained by what is called “the horse syndrome” (a rush to get back to the barn). At the top of the Death Zone, and under the extreme circumstances, he starts perceiving the information data in a way he was rather home by the fire. By doing so, he cuts corners and rushes decisions. Instead of paying attention to his role as guide, he does the opposite and decides to go for a quick descent. Camp IV is been seen as coming home. Once arrived in Camp IV, he comes to his senses again and starts acting in line with his view of a guide’s role: “A guide should be there when things mess up”. He makes several attempts to save climbers in troubles an even succeeds in saving 3 climbers! It needs to be mentioned that decisions and human behavior have a high degree of correlation. Decisions influence and are influenced by the human behavior, and vice versa. A part of this is already explained in previous paragraphs. Some elements need to be added to get the full picture and understanding of the decisions made in the Summit Fever case. In addition to the classic decision model, rules of thumbs and state of minds, human decisions processes and behavior are driven by the human attitude and by a mixture of diverse streams of intentions (f.e. “to the summit and safe return”) and motives (f.e. getting good publicity), feelings and thoughts, beliefs (Weathers who believed Hall would come down and by consequence he decided to wait) and values. All these elements are in a state of intensive dynamic interaction. Let’s have a closer look at this last group of influences. Attitude, ego, pride and goal orientation (intentions) can make a climber filtering the information in line with his personal needs. By consequence, he decides looking only at a small part of the big picture. This is also called “the tunnel vision”. It creates an unyielding behavior in the face of contrary evidence, especially if the person is in a weaker moment. Danson, Fisher, Hall, Grau, Lopsang, and others, they all went for the summit. Before they got to the Hillary Step, they were late (later than the latest turnaround time = contrary evidence), exhausted (=weaker moment) and should have not gone up. Indeed, every climber, and certainly the experienced once like Hall, Fisher, knew the last part of the climb would demand extra-ordinary physical demands, but there was something that drove them to the summit. What was it? The goal of the climbers is that heavy, they start acting within “the tunnel vision”, meaning going back was no option. Another kind of attitude that guides some decisions throughout the case is loyalty. One should expect that every team member is loyal to his task description. In particular, a guide and a sherpa should be loyal to his team members. This was not always the case. Sherpa’s returned sick while afterwards it seems they were not that sick. Boukreev as guide left his customer alone when he choose for the fast descent (he corrected himself afterwards). On the other hand, there were some ‘strange’ decisions made based on loyalty. Weathers was loyal to Hall and kept on waiting for Halls return. Hall on his turn was loyal to Danson not leaving him when he was dying, Lopsang was loyal to Fisher (Fisher forced Lopsang to leave him behind + Lopsang returned afterwards but too late). Also Harris was loyal to Hall. Besides people being loyal to people, things went also wrong because one was not loyal to decisions or to principles. When Grau decided to go for the summit, he was not loyal to the agreement he would go a day later (assuming there was an agreement on this. If not, see also poor communication). By consequence, situation on the mountain became very crowded. In addition, the IMAX and the South African expedition team were not loyal to the principle to help other teams in case of emergency. The previous paragraphs mainly explained how decisions were made and what influenced them. In summary, as long as the situation is not critical and there is time and people are willing to spend some mental energy on the problem, the basic decision models can work. Before going up, some arrangements were made between Hall and Fisher (who goes when, fixing the ropes, …). As soon as the situation becomes critical, there is lack of time/mental energy, these basic models stop and decisions will be made based on heuristics. In both cases influences by the individual state of mind and attitudes will occur. It is quite logic that the influence on the final decision will be more positive if a basic group decision model is used. In those cases, there is time for discussion. Corrections can be made to reduce the poor influences and increase the good ones. An aspect that has not been discussed yet and also had influence on the decision process was the way communication was organized. Communication was poor, very poor. First of all, the Fisher group was not well equipped. They were using unreliable radios and distributed them illogically between the team members. Boukreev nor Beidleman (the 2 guides) had one. A lot of useful information could not be passed on (f.e. what happened at the Hillary Step when Boukreev and Beidleman were at the top?). But even if they had had good radios, they could end-up in a poor communication situation such as the Hall-group. Due to hypoxia, wrong information was given to Hall by Harris about the location of extra oxygen bottles. Another example of poor communication, is proven by the tension raised in Fisher groups between Boukreev and the other group members. Boukreevs English was not perfect and this made communication rather difficult. A last example is the fact that Grau went up on the same day as Hall and Fisher. Hall and Fisher assumed Grau would go up the day after because they considered their suggestion as accepted by Grau (assuming Grau did not agreed upon this suggestion). In summary, 3 types of poor communication occurred: no communication, incomplete/incorrect information and misunderstandings of the plan (what was the turnaround time?). Finally, an answer can be given to the question: “Did the expeditions have any chance to succeed?” Under the defined circumstances and with the attitudes, they did not. However, if they had fulfilled some important conditions, they could have had success (get to the summit or not getting hurt/dying). First of all, success depends on good guidance. It is a given fact that during the climb decisions must be made. These decisions need to be based upon the integration of hard data, rather than upon assumptions or rule of thumbs. In any case, chances of success versus chances of failure must be weighed. The role of the leader and guides are crucial in this. As soon as they get signals that decisions are no longer made based on these conditions, they should order to make the turnaround. Hall did the contrary in convincing Danson to hold on when he got exhausted during the first part of the climb. Another error was made by guide Boukreev. He should at all times have carried oxygen bottles during the climb. He did not. Secondly, decisions and some basic principles need to be respected. In addition, they need to be made clear beforehand. If Grau would have respected the decision (assuming it was an agreed decision, cfr supra) to go up after Fisher and Hall would have left, it would have been less crowded during the climb. At any time, the turnaround time should have been respected. By respecting the turnaround time, the climbers already at that top would not have been delayed in their descent and they could have had a higher chance to reach safely (before the weather conditions really became poor) Base Camp IV. Even more, the people would not have gone up after 14 p.m. and could hence also return safely to Base Camp IV. It was the role of a good guide (having the right attitude) to assure this all. Boukreev had the attitude to do this if he had had good radios. Another basic principle neglected was the rule that different expeditions help each other in case of emergency. If the IMAX or the South African expedition would have been more loyal to this basic principle, a lot of misery could have been avoided as well. An expedition should have been well prepared, organized. This is mainly the responsibility of the leader. Hall was a good organizer, Fisher was not. A lot of casualness (poor radios, late climbing permit, …) made him unreliable. A good preparation means focus on the technical details, going through check-lists, take acclimatization routines serious, spare your body energy, … Boukreev emphasized frequently these aspects but Fisher neglected the warnings. Another important aspect for success is a healthy combination of team work and self-reliance. Team members should work together when required (for that, they need to be loyal and trust each other). Also self-reliance is essential. In the extreme circumstances at the Mount Everest it is unlikely that the other team members would be able to help you out if you get into trouble. They probably would also be in a nasty situation. At that moment, a climber needs to look after his own, making reliance on his own experience. Self-reliance means a certain level of experience needs to be present in the individual. Fishers’ group members were more experienced compared to Halls’. Selecting his clients, Fisher considered self-reliance as very important. Hall on the contrary, counted more on teamwork. A final condition worth mentioning is a clear goal setting, and sticking to it. Both expeditions had the same and good goal: “to the summit and safe return”. Although they saw the importance of the second part if the goal (safe return) they neglected it. The second part of the goal should have been mandatory. Driven by commercialism, they both emphasized the first part and neglected the mandatory aspect of the second part. It is not enough to respect only some of these conditions. There is a correlation between the chance of success and the degree of fulfilling the conditions. This explains why more victims came out the group of Rob Hall. Most of Halls members were less experienced. On the mountain, driven by different states of mind, the good organizational work of their leader fell away. The team members became more and more self-reliant and they did not now how to act. Reading the case, to get success, the team should have a leader with the organizational talent of Hall, and with a member selection attitude of Fisher, a guide like Boukreev and customers like those of Fishers’ group. By consequence, Fishers’ group had a higher intrinsic chance to survive. If they would have paid more attention to the organizational aspect (radios) and to some basic rules (guide takes oxygen with them), all members would have survived. Because of the fact they neglected these aspects, their chance to get out of the poor situation was mainly linked to external factors (IMAX team, South African team, weather conditio...