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Comparative Essay In reading two articles on the preparation and planning of the largest military Raid of the Second World War, two diverse perspectives are acknowledged. The first, “The Bare Facts a Historical Tragedy” from Brian Loring Villa’s “Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid”. The second, Peter Hershaw’s “ The Dieppe Raid: A Product of Misplaced Canadian Nationalism” “The Canadian Historical Review”. Villa’s in depth analysis of published and unpublished memoirs, accounts of interviews and minutes of meetings between senior officials of the Combined Operations Headquarters, leads Villa to conclude that the Canadian Army and her Officers in Command were without authority or responsibility in the decision making process on Canadian involvement in military operations. Whereas Hershaw’s study of papers, memorandums and minutes from Jubilee planning meetings, War office Papers and Department of National Defense papers help form the basis of his theory that Canadian Officers in Command in Britain at the time had their focus so much on independence from Britain, that once they had achieved the authority to lead the troops the results were disastrous. Villa takes us on a journey of how the Dieppe Raid of 1942 was mounted and launched. In his article, he suggests that the responsibility for the disaster of that day lay at the hands of Lord Louis Mountbatten British Adviser to the Combined Operations Organization. HIE208 Assignment # 3 He further argues that Canadian Senior Officers in Britain, General McNaughton and Crerar were unwittingly swept along in a tide of British pressure. In 1942, two years into World War II the Western Allies felt pressure to show stronger support to the Soviet Union against Hitler. British Navel Force Commander Hughes-Hallet knew that small raids would not be enough to satisfy Stalin. Something substantial would be required, thus the plan for the Dieppe Raid evolved. Every military deliberation argued against this type of mission. Even the Germans had declined to take part in such operations on the British Coast. Pressure for action was so great from Cabinet that Mountbatten lay the plans for Dieppe before the Chief of Staff committee prematurely. They hastily gave it tentative approval and gave it the code name “Rutter”. Combined Operations Organization and the Force Commanders were to fine-tune the plan. Canadian Major General Roberts was to command all allied ground troops. The 2nd Canadian Division was to form the majority of the attacking force. Roberts nor his men had seen combat. Air Vice Marshall Mallory was Commander of Air support and Rear Admirable Bailles-Grohman Commanded Naval support. HIE208 Assignment # 3 One of the fundamental principals of the British military was that the Commanding Officer must give final approval of the plan and had the authority to decline to commit his troops if he felt the plan was inadequate. Given that there were three Commanders it was problematic to have all three present and in agreement all of the time.