Nietzsche Notes on his philosophy
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche [1844 - 1900]. Nietzsche’s father was a Lutheran pastor who died when Nietzsche five years old. ... Nietzsche was raised in a household which contained his mother, grandmother, sister and two aunts. ... He was deeply affected and influenced by the philosophy of Schopenhauer. He was a friend and great admirer of Richard Wagner until they had a falling out and both the friendship and the admiration cooled to the point where Nietzsche became a harsh critic of Wagner. ... Nietzsche went virtually unnoticed during his productive life, but after his mental collapse in early 1889 his influence increased dramatically although unevenly. ... Perceptions of Nietzsche as a thinker worth exploring have risen steadily in the English-speaking world since then, and he is increasingly seen as important in the formation of twentieth century consciousness. But this is not the emergence of an unruffled consensus, and Nietzsche continues to produce ardent worshipers and vehement revilers in a way unimaginable for the other major philosophers in the Western tradition. Nietzsche passionately wants to influence our approach to life, and no other philosopher places such importance on the affirmation of this world. ... The task Nietzsche undertook as his philosophy matured was the revaluation of all values. THE REASSESSMENT OF REASON Nietzsche’s reassessment of reason is fundamental to his critique of values. Although at times Nietzsche appears to be an outright enemy of reason and a proponent of irrationalism, this is misleading. ... For Nietzsche, there are no absolute truths: hence, there are no absolute value judgements, and no absolute moral truths. ... THE MASTER, SLAVE, AND HERD MORALITIES The master morality emerges from the top of the group whom Nietzsche assumes are more powerful, more dynamic, more daring, more life-affirming, healthier, and harder. ... The slave morality is generated by those at the bottom of the group whom Nietzsche assumes are weak, lacking vitality, timid, and ease-seeking. ... Nietzsche regards the master morality as superior to both the slave morality and the herd morality, but it is not the case that the master morality is espoused and every other morality criticised from its stand-point. Rather the superiority of the master morality itself follows from Nietzsche’s higher-order values of life enhancement. Nietzsche nowhere suggests that the value crisis he sees Western civilisation as facing can be resolved by returning to a pre-existing master morality. ... Nietzsche sees the slave morality as having an unhealthy grip on Western civilisation, even though its metaphysical underpinnings have collapsed. ... Nietzsche takes universality to be a key feature of the slave morality, but a successful attack on universality would be of major significance even if the slave, master, and herd morality conceptions were entirely untenable. Nietzsche has numerous objections to universality. ... Nietzsche maintains we ought to assess persons and lives on an aesthetic value model rather than a moral value model. ... According to Nietzsche, moral values have been taken to be the highest values. ... For Nietzsche, one’s life having value or meaning is of fundamental importance. ... However, Nietzsche’s opposition to universal moral rules is not a blanket opposition to all moral rules. ... Nietzsche’s principal attack is against certain kinds of morality, and against the placement of morality at the peak of a value system; it is not principally an attack against morality conceived in the broadest sense. ... Nietzsche was a persistent critic of altruism, and takes it to be the dominant value in the slave morality. ... Nietzsche has a range of objections to altruism, and regards the egoistical drives as valuationally more fundamental. ... Nietzsche has other objections to altruism. ... For Nietzsche, this can only arise where the self-sacrificer has an impoverished self-conception, and this can only arise in devitalised and declining life forms. ... Nietzsche thinks that acting altruistically is both an expression of life in decline and contributes to its decline. Nietzsche regularly thinks in terms of types. ... For Nietzsche, such an exclusive orientation towards the interests of others presupposes a lower valuation of oneself, and expresses declining life. But Nietzsche is not worried by the anaemic and declining spending their meagre resources on others, just as he is not concerned about the superabundantly endowed directing some of their resources to others. ... What concerns Nietzsche most about the embrace of the altruistic ideal is the he sees it as having a deleterious influence on life as a whole. In addition, Nietzsche maintains that the advocacy of altruism has been self-undermining. ... Nietzsche sees such selfish advocacy as undermining altruism as a value. ... Nietzsche was a resolute critic of utilitarianism regarding it as part of the slave morality. ... For Nietzsche, a major difficulty in hedonistic utilitarianism arises from considering the biological role of pleasure and pain. ... For Nietzsche, the health and vitality of the body take precedence over feelings of pleasure and pain. ... Nietzsche is totally opposed to such a valuation. ... For Nietzsche, not only is autonomy an independent value, it is an independent value higher than happiness or pleasure. ... Nietzsche’s concern with the origins of value systems leads to a characteristic question here. ... According to Nietzsche, it is the exhausted and decadent. ... For Nietzsche, the more exhausted you are, the less autonomous you are, and the more values are set for you rather than by you, and the more you will be controlled by pain and pleasure. Nietzsche does not maintain that the exhausted and decadent should abandon this value system; indeed for them it may be the best system to adopt. ... Nietzsche is not opposed to the exhausted operating with such a value system, as long as they do not seek to impose it on others. ... THE PLACE OF SUFFERING Suffering appears as an objection to life, and seeking to defeat the objection while accepting the unavoidability of suffering was a constant preoccupation of Nietzsche’s. ... For Nietzsche, life is will to power, the drive to master. ... If, for Nietzsche, the relation between the suffering and the achievement were merely one of means and ends, then this would not constitute any novel or remarkable revaluation of struggle and suffering.