|
|
This is only a preview of the paper
Click here to register and get the full text.
Existing members click here to login
|
|
|
... Diplomacy
The story of mankind is that we always strive for that we cannot have. ... The fruit of knowledge that we could have was too much of a temptation for “us” not to take when offered. ...
Let us not bureaucratically extend the deterrence concept of the first phase of the nuclear age while claiming that the role of nuclear weapons has shrunk simply because there are fewer of them. By the same token, let us resist the emotional urge to ôretireö nuclear weapons without appraising their future value in securing national interests and international peace. ...
The option that prevailed was to rely on nuclear weapons to block Soviet aggression, back up Cold War diplomacy, and deter nuclear attack. ...
The strongest argument for a nuclear no-first-use pledge during the Cold War was that it could save us from nuclear hell. The strongest argument against such a pledge was that it could condemn us to Communist hell. ... Our use of multivariate regression allows
us to directly assess to what extent major or regional powers di_er in their proliferation decisions. ... For example, US weapons
makers developed Multiple Independently Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) in 1962, before US planners had any strategic
10
3. ... 15 Logging the
variable allows us to discount di_erences in later periods more so than those in early periods.
Approximate Word count = 14533
Approximate Pages = 58.1
(250 words per page double spaced)
|
|
|
|
|
|