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materialism - The view that everything that actually exists is material, or physical. Many philosophers and scientists now use the terms `material and `physical interchangeably (for a version of physicalism distinct from materialism, see physicalism). Characterized in this way, as a doctrine about what exists, materialism is an ontological, or a metaphysical, view; it is not just an epistemological view about how we know or just a semantic view about the meaning of terms.
Introduction
Materialism is a general view about what actually exists. ... Characterized in this way, as a doctrine about what exists, materialism is an ontological, or a metaphysical, view; it is not just an epistemological view about how we know or just a semantic view about the meaning of terms.
Materialism versus Dualism
There are two prominent construals of `material. ... Given this construal, materialism is just the view that everything that exists is extended in space, that nothing nonspatial exists. This portrayal of materialism is attractively simple, but may be unilluminating. ... If there is such dependence, conceptual circularity hampers the proposed characterization of materialism. ... If this is so, the proposed characterization of materialism should be qualified to talk of physical space or physical extension. ... Perhaps a notion of spatial extension is crucial to an elucidation of materialism, but further explanation, without conceptual circularity, will then be needed. ... )
If there is indeed a coherently conceivable distinction between minds and material bodies, we must reject the view that materialism, understood as entailing mind-body identity, is conceptually, or analytically, true—that is, true just in virtue of the meanings of `mind and `body. Given such a coherently conceivable distinction, we can also challenge any version of materialism implying that psychological concepts (for example, the concepts of belief and sensory pain) are defined in terms of the ordinary physical causes of belief states and pain states. ... Only proponents of reductive materialism hold the latter view, and they are a small minority among contemporary materialists. Proponents of nonreductive materialism reject the latter view, and affirm that psychological properties can be exemplified even in an immaterial world. ... A third prominent version of materialism, eliminative materialism, recommends that we eliminate most, if not all, everyday psychological discourse, on the ground that it rests on seriously misguided assumptions about human psychology—assumptions that will disappear with the advance of science. ...
Nonproductive Materialism
Nonreductive materialists generally follow functionalists in emphasizing the importance of multiple realizability. ... )
The type-type identity theory has the disadvantage that, as a formulation of materialism, there is inadequate evidence for it. ... Nonetheless, acknowledgment of just token identity is, as materialist doctrines go, a nonreductive formulation of materialism. Another nonreductive version of materialism, compositional materialism, casts even token-identity theories as too demanding.
Compositional materialism implies that physical (and thus, for the physicalist, psychological) events are not typically identical to their smaller constituent features. There is, according to compositional materialism, plasticity (or, multiple realizability) even within a single physical token, just as there is within a type susceptible to instantiation by different physical tokens. An example from some influential work on compositional materialism states that an individual car remains the same car even if its generator is replaced, at least on our ordinary criteria of car identity (Boyd 1980, p. ...
Materialism, Naturalism, and Explanation
The fates of naturalism and materialism are intimately related. ... The following two general views of the relation between naturalism and materialism are noteworthy: (a) Naturalism is ontologically neutral regarding materialism, and thus is logically compatible with ontological dualism; (b) Naturalism presupposes materialism, and thus is incompatible with dualism. If (a) is correct, the defense of materialism on the basis of naturalism must appeal to additional supporting evidence, presumably empirical evidence. If option (b) is correct, an appeal to naturalism in defense of materialism would be question begging, because materialism would then be part of the doctrine of naturalism. ...
Materialism and Mind
Materialists have always had the difficult task of explaining how their materialism can account for such psychological phenomena as thoughts, beliefs, desires, intentions, and sensory experiences—or at least for familiar talk of such phenomena. A materialists options, put roughly, are these: (a) explain how ordinary talk of psychological phenomena ("folk psychology," for short) can, at least for the most part, be reduced to language that does not commit one to any kind of ontological dualism; (b) explain how folk psychology is misguided to such an extent that it will disappear altogether with the advance of science; (c) explain how folk psychology is perfectly compatible with materialism even if the kind of reduction sought by (a) is unavailable—in particular, explain either (i) how psychological phenomena actually depend on physical phenomena, owing to nonreductive "supervenience" relations of some sort, or at least (ii) how psychological phenomena are just special relational (for example, causal/functional) features of wholly physically composed systems (see Kim 1992).
Approximate Word count = 3471
Approximate Pages = 13.9
(250 words per page double spaced)
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