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Two kinds of War Powers Legislation awaited final action in the Senate and the House in 1973. One would establish strict limits on the Presidents power to take the country into war without specific authorization by Congress, in pursuance of the power to declare war given to the Congress by the Constitution. The other, more importantly, allowed Congress to use Congressional power to prevent the Executive from taking us into a third Indo-Chinese war.
Presidential war-making powers did not become a substantial threat to the Congressional power to declare war until the 21st century with the appearance of what used to be called gunboat or dollar diplomacy in our relations in Central America and the Caribbean. ... Then too, as with the undeclared war in Vietnam, this was a bi-partisan phenomenon. ...
The character and course of the war powers legislation in Congress showed the same weaknesses that allowed presidential power to grow so strong in the past. One difficulty was foreseeing the contingencies under which war may arise. When the Constitution was being written, Congress was first given the power to make war, but this was changed to declare. The purpose of this change was twofold, to allow the President to repel sudden attacks and to free him as commander in chief from interference by Congress in the day-to-day operations of the armed forces once war had been declared. Too specific a spelling out of presidential powers would have restricted his powers too greatly or given him a blank check in advance for actions that might go far beyond the means of being legitimate.
Congress passed war powers bills but they died with the session when the differences between them could not be reconciled. ... In the House there were more than a dozen bills to limit the Presidents war-making powers. ... "
The Senate bill sought to disarm White House opposition by exempting the Indo-China war and it did not apply to "hostilities in which the Armed Forces of the United States are involved on the effective date of this Act. ... The President was allowed to use troops abroad without a declaration of war in order to repel an attack upon the United States and its possessions, or on its armed forces outside the United States, or "to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack," or to evacuate citizens from an area in which they are endangered. ...
Another weakness in the Javits-Stennis-Eagleton bill was that it did not automatically provide for calling Congress into session once an undeclared war began. ...
Senator John Sherman Cooper wanted to substitute for all these elaborate thirty-day procedures for a simple joint resolution requiring the President to notify Congress whenever he uses the armed forces abroad in an undeclared war or believes that such use is imminent. ... It reaffirmed the congressional right to declare war, recognized that the President had in certain extraordinary and emergency circumstances authority to defend the country and its citizens, but limited the exercise of this authority to two kinds of cases. One was to respond to any act or situation that endangered the United States or its citizens, (but not their property) abroad when the necessity to respond did not allow time for advance congressional authorization.
Approximate Word count = 2559
Approximate Pages = 10.2
(250 words per page double spaced)
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