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Lions led by donkeys "Lions led by donkeys." Can this criticism be applied fairly to the Allied leaders responsible for the Gallipoli Campaign? Discuss. The Gallipoli Campaign is recorded in British history and through popular memory as a heroic disaster: a possibly war-winning scheme that ended in complete disarray. The horror of the First World War was encapsulated in this microcosm of the wider conflict. It shared much with the Western Front in terms of the discomfort of the trenches and the stalemate that came with them. But it also had the difficulties of the amphibious nature of the operation as well as the extremes of climate that the troops experienced. The Leadership that sent the Allied troops to the Dardenelles has often been criticised for the foolhardiness of the operation, but as the British Official Historian stated: "There is little doubt today that the idea of forcing the straits ...... was one of the few great strategical concepts of the world war." So why now does the whole campaign receive criticism as strong as the following? With the possible exception of the Crimean War, the Gallipoli expedition was the most poorly mounted and ineptly controlled operation in modern British military history. The answer lies within the quotation itself, specifically that it was "poorly mounted and ineptly controlled". In order to demonstrate this it will be necessary to consider several levels of the "leadership" involved with the operation. Initially the political-strategical decision making must be studied as the root to the operations problems. The Naval and Army's planning must also be scrutinised as this fundamentally doomed the troops to failure. Finally the tactical leadership must be considered in light of the situation developing on the ground and how the Turks reacted to the amphibious landings. Before scrutinising the expedition in any detail the background of the situation must be explained so that one can have some sort of perspective on the decisions that were made. By the end of 1914 a stalemate had developed in Europe. Already, after only three full months of fighting, there were almost one million Allied casualties and a trench system that stretched three hundred and fifty miles from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps. No obvious successes were apparent in this impasse; the Allies did not even seem to be wearing down the Germans in this attritional form of warfare. Thus within the British higher command people were looking at some form of flanking manoeuvre. Churchill and Lloyd George were keen proponents of considering alternatives other than focusing entirely on the theatre of conflict in the West. However many of the British and French General Staff were wholly resolute on attacking the Germans head-on, quite understandably so for the over-run French. As for the British, with their traditional strength lying in their Naval and expeditionary forces, one is surprised that alternatives to a continental land war were not considered more readily. For example Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord's proposition of a Naval led invasion into Northern Germany through the Baltic. No such plans were given much credibility by the General Staff's overwhelming desire to fight a land war. Ultimately this opposition of the General Staff was soon tempered by events in Russia. The battles of Masurian Lakes and Tannenberg, August 1914 crippled Russia's war-fighting ability in two successive blows by the Germans. In order for the Allies to keep Germany under pressure the war had to be fought on two fronts. Those in the West were determined to prolong Russia's war efforts for as long as possible. Therefore when the British received requests for assistance from The Grand Duke Nicholas, The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies, they were taken seriously. In effect what he suggested was a naval or military demonstration in order to place pressure on the Turks who were in turn placing pressure on the Russian Army in the Caucasus. The pivotal role that the Gallipoli operation could have had can clearly be seen from this summary by Sir William Robertson: The advantages to be derived from forcing the straits were perfectly obvious. Such a success would, as the advocates of the project said, serve to secure Egypt, to induce Italy and the Balkan states to come in on our side, and, if followed by the forcing of the Bosporus, would enable Russia to draw munitions from America and Western Europe, and to export her accumulated supplies of wheat. Although a most succinct appraisal of the situation ironically Robertson opposed the scheme. This was a characteristic of the Dardenelles operation in that many people in positions of authority could see the benefits that it could potentially bring yet still they would not take their focus from Western Europe. Thus a key facet to the campaign's failure was in British high command; throughout its implementation there was a constant need to plan based on compromise. On a strategic level the disparity between the military commanders and the political leadership of the country was immediately apparent. The political hierarchy had a broader perspective of the international situation; they realised the potential that Turkey held in the Dardenelles' position and therefore coveted it. The Military command, predominantly the Army were solely focused on the job in hand. The Turks, however, were also aware of the British need to have influence in the area.
Approximate Word count = 3536
Approximate Pages = 14.1
(250 words per page double spaced)
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