American Miscalculations Catalyst to the Korean War
American Miscalculations: Catalyst to the Korean War The invasion by North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950 created an international crisis that placed the United States and the Chinese governments at a head. The attack, spurred on by Soviet promises of military aid, expanded the American-Communist military standoff that had previously focused on the European theatre. It is indisputable that Soviet assertions, along with North Korean initiative, were the initial cause of this war. As the war progressed, foreign players in this conflict, including the Soviet Union, The People’s Republic of China, and the United States of America, were drawn into a confrontation that placed global prestige and influence, as well as military balance on the line. After the successful initiatives by Kim Il Sung’s army, the United States mobilized her forces within Asia as well as stirred movement in the United Nations to form a UN military force that would repel the North Korean advances. It was during this time of preparation and then during the actual pushes by UN forces northward through Korea that the United States had the opportunity to limit the escalation of the Korean War and prevent Chinese involvement. Although it has been stated by Chen Jian that the CCP had decided to intervene in Korea well before MacArthur’s landing at Inchon or the non-Korean crossing of the 38th parallel, there is evidence to suggest that the United States neglected to probe all possible avenues for peace. Nor did they comprehend the immediate danger posed to China’s national security by UN forces, particularly American military on the Korean peninsula. ... The escalation of the Korean War into an international and bloody conflict can be attributed to the United States’ oblivious attitude toward China’s warnings. ... policy in Korea threatened the domestic security of China and forced her hand to intervene in the Korean War. ... politicians and analysts was the belief that China would not involve herself in a war in which she faced technologically advanced American forces. The United States, time and time again, ignored Chinese warnings to limit non-Korean forces south of the 38th parallel. ... officials did not understand was that the proximity of fighting to the Chinese-Korean border alarmed the Chinese Communist Party and its senior officials. ... forces on the Korean Peninsula posed an immediate threat to her national security. ... The CCP was well aware of the hostility towards its government, and they felt that allowing American troops in Korea could serve as another military front besides Indochina and Taiwan in a future American invasion of the Chinese mainland (Jian 128). ... The United States overlooked the possible strain US forces on the Korean peninsula placed on China. Instead of realizing that military operations in Korea threatened Chinese national security and could provoke a war, various parts of the American administration and government downplayed the willingness, preparedness, and ability of the Chinese to fight. On July 7th and 10th, leading members of almost all military group within the PRC held conferences in order to assess the Korean situation and create a military plan to challenge any threat. The decision by the collective conferences was to mobilize certain veteran units to the Korean border to form the Northeast Border Defense Army (NEBDA). Following the publication of the orders on July 13th, the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 13th Army corps began to relocate to the Manchurian-Korean border. Over the next two months preparations were made in order to fund the newly formed army logistically, financially, and militarily in order “to defend the borders of the Northeast, and to prepare to support the war operation of the Korean People’s Army if necessary (Jian 137).