Knight v. Avon Products, Inc., 438 Mass. 413, 780 N.E. 2d 1255 (2003).
...hat she would like her to run the Pittsfield and the Northampton districts, in a temporary basis; this deal was accompanied by extra pay. Valvo warned Knight that the situation was to remain "top secret" for a few weeks. In response to Knight's questions, Valvo informed the plaintiff that the current Pittsfield’s district sales manager was not performing satisfactorily and that one of the top sales representatives in the Pittsfield district, Sandra Houghtlin, "was not qualified and no one in that district was qualified to take over." The plaintiff specifically had asked Valvo about Houghtlin because the plaintiff felt that Houghtlin would be in line for the job. Mrs. Knight agreed to run both districts and, on May 10, 1995, the plaintiff was designated interim assisting district sales manager for the Pittsfield district. During the month of May, 1995, Knight trained a 24 year old college graduate named Mar-E Bean. Ms. Bean was recruited by Valvo as a “floater” district sales manager and needed a seasoned manager to train her. A letter to the Northampton district sales representatives was sent on June 16, 1995 by Valvo notifying that the plaintiff was reassigned as sales manager of the Pittsfield district and that Ms. Bean was to be the new district sales manager in the Northampton district. On August 3, 1995, Knight was informed of her termination with Avon. The reason presented by Valvo was that an unidentified person had written a letter to Avon's chief executive officer, complaining that the plaintiff was selling Mary Kay cosmetics in her store. When Knight reminded her that she informed Avon of her stores and her line of business before being recruited, Valvo denied completely any knowledge of this. Over the next few days, the plaintiff, Valvo, and Foster participated in three-way telephone calls directed toward saving the plaintiff's job. During these conversations, a number of conditions were suggested, including that the plaintiff remove her name from the store's sign and business forms and terminate any connection, financial or advisory, with the store. The plaintiff left Foster a voice mail message in which she offered to use the store location as a training center for Avon and a meeting place for Avon sales representatives. Foster never responded to that offer. Finally, negotiations stalled. Foster reconfirmed the plaintiff's termination, refused to discuss the matter further, and called the plaintiff "naive." Knight sued Avon for age discrimination under c. 151B. A Berkshire superior court jury found in her favor awarding her about $795,000. After the superior court denied Avon’s motion for a new trial, Avon appealed, arguing that in the absence of direct evidence of age discrimination, Knight must prove that she was replaced by a substantially younger employee. Houghtlin, the sales representative whom Valvo previously had dismissed as unqualified, was then designated interim district sales manager of the Pittsfield district. In January, 1996, that appointment was made permanent. The plaintiff was forty-six years of age when she was terminated by Avon. Houghtlin was forty-three years old at the time, twenty-eight months younger than the plaintiff. Bean remained as sales manager of the Northampton district. Avon denied that her age played any role in the determination to fire her. On appeal, Avon claims that the plaintiff was required to show as part of her prima facie case that her replacement was "substantially younger" and the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to support a jury's finding that her replacement was Bean (who was substantially younger); and that even though Avon's stated reason for termination was the plaintiff's alleged competitive business, the evidence pointed only to another reason for her termination (the plaintiff's poor health), which, in the context of an age discrimination claim, is still nondiscriminatory. NELF(National Elder Law Foundation) filed a brief in support of Avon arguing that the SJC should adopt the “substantially younger” test applied by the federal courts under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. A “substantially younger” requirement, NELF argued, is consistent with the role of a prima facie case in the three-stage analysis under c. 151B,...