Marbury v. Madison
...’s efforts to impose an indirect tax on the Bank as a federal instrumentality” (The Supreme Court, 21). The decision in Dartmouth College v. Woodward was another major ruling by Chief Justice John Marshall. “In 1769, King George III of Great Britain granted Dartmouth College a charter as a private school. Various states succeeded to the rights and obligations of such charters when they became independent. In 1816, New Hampshire tried to make Dartmouth the State University by canceling the charter. Former trustees of the college claimed that the royal charter was still valid. They sued to recover the school seal and records from William H. Woodward, the college secretary. Daniel Webster, a graduate of Dartmouth, presented the trustees case before the Supreme Court in one of his greatest arguments. The court ruled for the trustees saying that the state had impaired the obligation of the charter in violation of Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution. Because of this case, legislatures today put time limitations on charters or include provisions allowing cancellation by the government under proper circumstances” (William, 38). Marshall also had a major decision in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden. “New York granted Robert Fulton exclusive steamboat rights on the Hudson River in New York for a limited period of years” (Mendelson, 85). “Thomas Gibbons had a federal license to use the same waters” (Kutler, 185). “Gibbons ran steamboats from New York to New Jersey violating Fulton’s patent. The case began as an action by Fulton’s interests to stop infringement. The court said it was repugnant to that clause in the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to regulate Congress. It was also repugnant to that which authorizes Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts” (Mendelson, 85). “The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gibbons, declaring the federal license superior to the state grant. This case marked the first time the Supreme Court of the United States dealt with the powers of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The court ruled that federal powers were superior to those of the states in all matters of interstate commerce. The court broadly defined the commerce to include the means and routes of transportation” (Kutler, 185). “Gibbons helped to implement the framer’s unarticulated vision of the United States as a common market. Marshall decided that interstate commerce included interstate transportation” (The Supreme Court, 21). “This decision had an impact on steamboat navigation of American Rivers and it relieved the terror of state-created monopolies” (Mendelson, 90-91). The decision in the case of the Cherokee Nation v. the State of Georgia in 1831 was one of the last decisions made by Marshall before his death in 1835. “The Cherokee Nation claimed that under the Supreme Court’s power to resolve disputes between states and foreign nations, the court could forbid Georgia from unlawfully attempting to move the Cherokees from their lands. Marshall decided on March 5, 1831 in Washington, D.C. that the court had no power to hear the dispute, because Indian tribes are not foreign nations. By refusing to help the Cherokees, the U.S. Supreme Court left the Indians at the mercy of land-hungry settlers. The Cherokees were forced to move to Oklahoma along the Trail of Tears” (Knappman, 88-90). “Chief Justice John Marshall has had a tremendous impact on the United States judicial system. He used the court’s authority to restructure and clearly define the boundaries of power between the states and the federal government. Marshall established broad judicial principles. Some of these principles laid the foundation for modern decisions that made possible the court’s ruling in such areas as civil rights and criminal justice” (Williams, 229). “By the time Marshall died, the judicial branch of the federal government had become equal in authority with the executive and legislative branches” (Williams, 230) BIBLIOGRAPHY Harkavy, Michael D., “Marshall, John.” The New Webster’s International Encyclopedia, 1996, 680. Knappman, Edward W. “Cherokee Nation v. Georgia: 1831.” Great American Trials, 1994, 88-90. Kutler, Stanley L., “Gibbons v. Ogden.” World Book, 1992, 8, 185. Kutler, Stanley L., “Marbury v. Madison.” World Book, 1992, 13, 193. Kutler, Stanley L., “McCulloch v. Maryland.” World Book, 1992, 13, 335. Mendelson, Wallace. “Dartmouth College v. Woodward.” The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 1965, 2nd Edition, 242-245. Mendelson, Wallace. “Gibbons v. Ogden.” The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 1965, 2nd Edition, 85-91. Mendelson, Wallace. “Marbury v. Madison.” The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 1965, 2nd Edition, 5-9. Mendelson, Wallace. “McCulloch v. Maryland.” The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 1965, 2nd Edition, 185-191. The Supreme Court of the United States Its Beginning & Its Justices 1790-1991. Commission on the Bicentennial of The United States Constitution. “U.S. Law.” The Volume Library 1, 1997, 11, 883. William, Jerre S., “Dartmouth College Case.” World Book, 1992, 5, 38. Williams, Owen G., “Marshall, John.” World Book, 1992, 13, 229-230. MADISON Marbury v. Madison, one of the first Supreme Court cases asserting the power of judicial review, is an effective argument for this power; however, it lacks direct textual basis for the decision. Marshall managed to get away with this deficiency because of the silence on many issues and the vague wording of the Constitution. During the early testing period when few precedents existed, there was much debate about fundamental issues concerning what was intended by the words of the Constitution and which part of government should have the final word in defining the meaning of these words. Marshall used the Marbury case to establish the Supreme Court's place as the final judge. Marshall identified three major questions that needed to be answered before the Court could rule on the Marbury v. Madison case. The first of these was, "Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?" The Constitution allows that "the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, . . . " (Art. II, § 2). The Judiciary Act of 1793 had given the President the right to appoint federal judges and justices of the peace; there is no dispute that such an appointment was within the scope of the president's powers. Debate arises because the Constitution is silent on the exact time at which the appointment is considered complete. The Supreme Court ruled that "when a commission has been signed by the president, the appointment is made; and that the commission is complete, when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the [secretary of state]." This ruling does not have direct constitutional support, but it is not an unreasonable decision. The second question which Marshall addressed was, "If [Marbury] has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of this country afford him a remedy?" The answer is logically yes although there are no specific words in the Constitution to support such an answer. Based on the type of government intended by the Constitution, the government is expected to protect individual liberty. As Marshall says, "[The government] will certainly cease to deserve [to be termed a government of laws, and not of men] if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested right." However, with this assertion Marshall established the power of the Supreme Court to review actions of the executive branch - a power that does not stem directly from the Constitution. The third and final question which Marshall addressed was whether Marbury "is entitled to the remedy for which he applies." Marshall further divides this question into two parts: the nature of the writ and the power of the Supreme Court. In examining the nature of the writ, Marshall solidifies further the Supreme Court authority over members of the executive branch. Marshall admits...