Korean Airline 801
...accident at 0207, but the federal dispatch facility records indicated that notification was received at 0234 and that Engine No. 5 arrived at the scene at 0239. The records also showed that a call was made by the ramp controller at 0208 to the Naval Regional Medical Center to place its personnel on standby. The Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas, testified during the public hearing that she first became aware of the crash after an airport official called her husband at 0216 to report that a Korean Air 747 was missing over the Nimitz Hill area. The Chief of Staff went outside and observed a “bright orange glow” in the sky. She then notified the Navy Security Office and Command Duty Officer to activate the Navy’s “first responders,” search and rescue assets, and hospital mass casualty units. The delay of Guam Fire Department Engine No. 7 was one that could have been avoided. It was after this accident that the Guam Fire Department policy was changed to drain fire truck brake lines only during periodic maintenance to prevent moisture from contaminating the lines. It was also the recommendation of the Guam Fire Department chief that a fire truck would not be taken out of service without having another vehicle in its place. The Guam Fire Department was the On Scene Commander in this accident. They were late due to vehicle maintenance problems. The On Scene Commander told investigators that he arrived at the accident site about 0234 and proceeded down the access road toward the wreckage. The access road to the site had a narrow (one-lane) dirt and stone road with a drainage ditch on both sides. The area was also blocked by a section of damaged oil pipe, which was removed 1 hour later by a truck-mounted winch. Further investigation revealed that the Guam Fire Department Engine No. 7 became stuck in mud when the driver tried to maneuver around the oil pipe obstruction. The Guam Fire Department chief stated that the broken pipe had been removed and the fire truck had been towed out of the mud (about 0345). By this time approximately 1 hour and 47 minutes had elapsed from the time of the initial communication response. In a post-accident interview and at the Safety Board’s public hearing, the On Scene Commander testified that he and other rescue personnel abandoned their vehicles and approached the accident site on foot. The On Scene Commander indicated that he and the rescue personnel carried flashlights, rope, and a trauma kit. He also stated that he heard people screaming and could see small areas of fire…the darkness and terrain made access to the accident site difficult…we had to go across all types of vegetation, sword grass, all types of trees…it was very rough getting down to the crash site, especially with no light whatsoever but flashlight alone…we had to deal with all kinds of bugs down there, snakes...we tried to pull out the survivors the best way we could and from what we received in fire-fighting training. The On Scene Commander also stated that the airplane had been totally engulfed in fire when we got there...already to the point where the fires weren’t really bothering the rescuers. The rescue personnel were actually going into the plane checking passengers…who was still alive and who was not…. We had to go back up on those slippery hills without any rappelling gear whatsoever…. We were holding the victims in one arm and holding the tools in the other so we just could make it to the top…. We did this until we could clear a landing site for the choppers…. According to the On Scene Commander the command post was established to the east (on higher terrain) of the main wreckage site, where requests for resources and personnel were relayed by radio to the Guam Fire Department dispatcher. The dispatcher then relayed the information to the response activity coordination team located at Guam Civil Defense headquarters. The Guam Civil Defense director told Safety Board investigators that he arrived at the access road gate about 0235. The director stated that the Guam Civil Defense owned a command post vehicle but that he did not use the vehicle because it was outdated and had been out of service for several years. He stated that funds were not available to repair and equip the vehicle. After the accident, the regional director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency stated that the agency would provide money to refurbish the command post vehicle. A U.S. Navy Emergency Medical Technician assigned to the Naval Regional Medical Center told Safety Board investigators that he received verbal notification of the accident between 0200 and 0230 from personnel at the Guam Naval Activities Station, which is located about 8 miles southwest of Nimitz Hill. The Emergency Medical Technician reported that he arrived at the accident site on foot between 0245 and 0300, and upon arrival, the Emergency Medical Technician observed the fuselage and interior engulfed in “bright blue flames.” The Emergency Medical Technician stated that he approached the burning wreckage to within about 150 feet and saw about 14 survivors outside the airplane with various injuries, most of which were burn related. The Emergency Medical Technician said that many of these survivors were clustered together and that they appeared to have extricated themselves from the wreckage. The Emergency Medical Technician told investigators that it was difficult to maneuver around the wreckage because of darkness, intermittent rain, soft ground, tall grass, and rugged terrain. Further, the Emergency Medical Technician stated that two triage areas had been set up: one near the front of the airplane (near the nose section), and the other between the fuselage wreckage and the access road. A Guam Department of Public Health physician told Safety Board investigators that she was notified of the accident by Guam Civil Defense about 0245 and arrived at the accident site about 0315. Upon arrival, she noted that the triage and transportation activities were “functioning well” but that medical and evacuation efforts lacked coordination. Additionally, she said that, after assessing the situation, she established another triage area near the Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Radio Range (VOR), where the terrain was level. Some of the survivors that had been treated at the triage area near the airplane and were evacuated by military helicopters. Others had been carried to the triage area near the VOR to be treated and then transported by ambulance via the access road. The On Scene Commander stated that the first survivors were transported to hospitals between about 0300 and 0330. The Emergency Medical Technician stated that the last survivor was found about 0430. Hospital records revealed that the first survivor transported by helicopter to the U.S. Naval Hospital arrived about 0334, and the last survivor arrived by helicopter about 0710. Also, hospital records indicated that the first survivor transported to Guam Memorial Hospital arrived by ambulance about 0420 and that 16 other survivors were transported by ambulance to Guam Memorial, the last of which was admitted about 0709. The NTSB held a public hearing that suggested the Guam Airport have an active Emergency Response Plan and conduct exercises. At the Safety Board’s public hearing, the Guam Civil Defense director testified that, in April 1997, a joint full-scale disaster drill had been conducted on the airport with Guam airport authorities. Title 14 CFR Section 139.325, “Airport Emergency ...