The Future of American Military Leadership
... take on strong ones; to make their governing and security positions untenable. They do so by attacking at times and in places where the stronger forces' guard is down or where they can be outnumbered locally.” They also attack “the infrastructure on which the population they are supporting and protecting depends for its livelihood and welfare” (para. 31). Terrorism on the other hand, “masks a different phenomenon that shares with guerrilla warfare the need to overcome much stronger opposition. Whereas guerrillas focus on the local infrastructure and armed forces, terrorists focus almost exclusively on people, and mainly on civilians at that” (Deitchman, 2004, para. 32). Recent examples of the use of terrorism can be seen by the “use of nerve agent in the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda's offensive leading to its 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon” (Meigs, 2003, para. 1). Deitchman also describes how terrorism tries to, “play on the Western world's high valuation of human life to create internal dissent that is even more powerful in meeting their purposes.” Terrorist also intentionally, “attack in situations where many local civilians will be killed, and they deliberately set up situations in which U.S. and allied forces will kill innocent civilians or insult local religious sensibilities” (Deitchman, 2004, para. 32). Terrorists use our value of human life in order to demoralize the military and the public’s opinion by creating mass-casualties. Because of the mass number of causalities that the United States incurred in Vietnam, many Americans are not prepared and do not wish to see such a tragedy repeated. “America now is not willing to take any casualties. Vietnam produced a whole new attitude” (Lacquement Jr., 2004, para. 6). There is, however, a “wide range of policy objectives on behalf of which the public is prepared to accept American casualties as a cost of success.” There is not, however, a specific number which states what is an acceptable number of casualties and what is not (Lacfquement Jr., 2004, para. 1). “Avoidance of casualties is an unassailably desirable objective. It is precisely the natural nobility of the argument that makes it susceptible to misuse in the policy-making process, potentially leading to ineffective or inefficient choices” (Lacquement Jr., 2004, para. 2). American military leaders must understand this and must not let it affect their decision. Otherwise the terrorists have obtained their objective and crippled the leaders making them ineffective at decision making. This problem has been multiplied in Iraq. “During the Gulf War, the ratio of private contractors to soldiers was one to fifty; in Iraq, the ratio is one to ten” (Sherman, 2004, para. 4). This has given the terrorist more civilian targets, and has created more targets for the military to protect. Asymmetric and Idiosyncratic Approaches to Terrorism In order to deal with the new threats that terrorists pose, our military leaders must understand how they operate. Terrorism is a “combination of asymmetry and the terrorists' ability continually to devise idiosyncratic approaches presents our real challenge. Assessing the distinction and interrelationship between these two factors provides us with the initial understanding required to address the operational challenges” (Meigs, 2003, para. 1). Meigs (2003) described these two factors as follows: Asymmetry means the absence of a common basis of comparison in respect to a quality, or in operational terms, a capability. Idiosyncrasy has a different connotation-possessing a peculiar or eccentric pattern. In a military sense, idiosyncrasy connotes an unorthodox approach or means of applying a capability, one that does not follow the rules and is peculiar in a sinister sense (para. 2). Meigs (2003) continues to on to site this example: Actually, al Qaeda's overall strategy is not new. In the 11th and 12th centuries the Assassins, a militarily weak fundamentalist and extremist sect, used pinpoint killing to bring more powerful ruling groups to heel. Indoctrinating their young followers into an extreme and enthusiastic cult of Shiite Islam, they sent individuals and small teams out to infiltrate the inner circles of targeted leaders. These zealots worked their way into the retinue of the targeted official by gaining trusted status as a groom, guard, or servant. When close enough to the target and with no regard for their own survival, they murdered their prey with the dagger given them by their leader. The Assassins even managed to threaten Sal al Din the Kurd, the commander who drove the Crusaders out of Palestine. After Sal al Din's mail shirt foiled the first attempt, while on campaign a wooden tower was built in his camp to provide him a safe resting place. For the Assassins, dying in the attempt mattered not, since their ascension into paradise was assured. Sound familiar? (para. 3). It should sound familiar, because this is almost exactly the strategy that the terrorists and suicide bombers are using to fight the Western ideologies. During Operation Iraqi Freedom we can see two stages of the war. During the first stage the United States and coalition forces had an asymmetrical advantage. The Taliban forces could not amass a force in order to defend or counterattack the United States forces. “The asymmetrical advantage of the US ground-based targeting and air attack made the ground forces of the Northern Alliance unstoppable. The Taliban and al Qaeda had nothing of comparable capability with which to oppose the US advantage (Meigs, 2003, para. 12). During the second stage of the war the United States lost their advantage and the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces gained the advantage. After their defeat, when the Taliban and al Qaeda forces broke apart and exfiltrated into the mountains of Pakistan and into the villages of remote Afghanistan, they removed the US advantage. Then the comparative force capabilities returned to a situation very familiar to Afghan fighters over the centuries, a relatively conventional military force on the ground attempting to chase down groups and individuals almost invisible in the native culture and terrain. Now what is left of the Taliban snipes at the international effort and the government in power in Afghanistan. At this point in time al Qaeda presents a more dangerous problem with regard to how we frame the strategic challenge (Meigs, 2003, para. 13). The terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq are exploiting both their asymmetric and idiosyncric advantage against the coalition forces in those countries. The terrorist “operational asymmetry is derived from his ability to continuously evolve new tactics and by the cellular and compartmented nature of his support structures” (Meigs, 2003, para. 14). They are using their asymmetric “ability to change [their] operational system at will in response to the methods needed to approach and attack each new target” (Meigs, 2003, para. 22). Their idiosyncric advantage stems from “the lower end of the spectrum of violence, we find idiosyncratic approaches posing tremendous threats to operational and national targets alike.” The terrorist by attacking idiosyncratically can “avoid US operational advantages, and by exploiting our weaknesses or blind spots, the terrorist is capable of inflicting harm at will” (Meigs, 2003, para. 14). To respond properly to future unconventional attacks “requires an atypical approach.” If the enemy is “constantly [changing] form and method at will” then we need to be continually vigilant in watching for new “conventional and unconventional” means to repel those attacks. We must be properly trained to know what to look for and we must have leaders who are well-trained who can adapt to the enemies changes and in turn adjust their own plan of attack (Meigs, 2003, para. 28). “The merging of conventional and unconventional capability and the ability of terrorists to strike at the operational and strategic levels demand a new doctrinal context.” In order to be effective United States Military “leaders need to be trained to recognize the warning signs and to expand their approaches to this new environment. We must provide them the tools to prevent the benefits of unconventional conflict by adapting to the current reality” (Meigs, 2003, para. 23). Why Small Unit Leadership As the paper has previously discussed, we need leaders who are well trained to deal with these changes in unconventional warfare. Currently most top ranking military officials are familiar with these theories. The changes this paper is focused on is training the small-unit leadership to be able to handle these situations. Small-unit leaders have already shown their effectiveness in the Iraqi war. Much of the success of the “Coalition air supremacy, furthermore, used precision and conventional weapons with enormous effectiveness, providing close air support for ground troops and destroying the enemy's massed forces” can be contributed to the small units and their leaders (Byrne, 2003, para. 3) Meigs (2003) states that to continue this type of advantage “The ratio of leaders to led should be increased.” The small unit leader must be prepared to move on short notice to accomplish a range of operational missions.” This requires these leaders to have “a high level of experience and individual competence. Soldiers have to be physically and emotionally mature, and there should be a higher density of experienced leaders in the formation” (Meigs, 2003, para. 42). Sending out small units is more effective because the enemy is also using small units. Anne Barnard quotes Chief of Staff Colonel John C. Coleman as saying, "Foreign fighters were operating in three- to five-man cells all over the city" (Barnard, 2004, para. 19). This means that dispatched teams and squads will be engaging these small groups and they must be prepared to make decisions as to how to deal with them. Senior m...