reconstructing somalia
...ermined the mission. Aideed and other warlords saw the split in the IC and exploited UNOSOM II just as they did UNOSOM I. UNOSOM II’s mission objectives were comprised of “nation-building and included disarming the warring factions; securing ports and airports necessary for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and building up new political and administrative structures at the local, regional, and national levels.” UNOSOM II was explicitly authorized to employ coercive force for a much broader mandate that covered more territory. Little planning and development had been employed before the command transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Problems quickly arose “because of [a] lack of planning, the top UNOSOM II military commanders had no understanding of the transition; the number, capability, or concept of employment of their forces; or the rules of engagements (ROE).” The dramatic shift in mission created tension and confusion within the command, control, communication, and intelligence infrastructure. The UN needs to examine the past failures of UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, and the UNITAF operations in order for it to be successful in establishing peace in Somalia. To this end, it is recommended that the UNSC create a cohesive military force that utilizes special operations (SPEC OPS) and tactical weapon systems. The inability to provide overhead cover to UNITAF operations because of divided command, control, and communications infrastructure inhibited the UN’s ability to establish control over military operations. The confusion over mission objectives underscores the need for a cohesive military unit under single leadership. It is recommended that the UN implement an international central command to effectively utilize a command, control, and communications infrastructure. Additionally, the strategic objectives are to provide internal security and to support the developing TNG’s ability to gain significant control over its population. At the tactical level, international forces will directly engage dissident warlords and violent uprisings. Due to the nature of urban warfare, adequate overhead support will have to be provided though significant airpower from international forces. It is recommended that the UN use the aerial firepower of the AH-64 Apache Gunship, C-130 Specter Gunship, unmanned combat aerial vehicles support, and other air support platforms. The failure to provide adequate aerial support to target and eliminate enemy forces enabled Farah Aideed to exploit and kill US SPEC OPS during UNITAF. Concurrent to the SPEC OPS and tactical objectives to eliminate dissident warlords, the UN should create a disarmament and identification administration. In Al Fallujah, Iraq, the US military has implemented ID checkpoints to identify individuals that threaten stability. Similar tactics and disarmament regimes have been utilized in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Implementing similar tactics will allow the international forces to build upon the success and failures of previous operations. Upon the implementation of these recommendations, the UNSC and Somalia can bring to fruition a peaceful transition of power to the Transitional National Government, successful humanitarian operations, and economic development. Humanitarian Operations The Somali people have continued to struggle with chronic food shortages, poverty, and disease for over a decade. The human development index of Somalia remains among the lowest in the world. There are currently 370,000 internally displaced Somalis with an additional 400,000 Somalis living as refugees in neighboring countries. The Somalis left in Somalia are heavily dependant on aid from international agencies for basic healthcare needs, education, and water. Although advancement has been made toward stability, “more than 700,000 Somalis continue to be precariously vulnerable” to starvation and disease. A number of international sources contribute aid to Somalia. The top two donors are the European Union and the US. The World Food Program and other NGOs provide food and support to facilitate humanitarian operations. In addition to the countries of Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, “France, Britain, Canada, and Belgium are other bilateral donors.” “Several [other] UN agencies, particularly the UN Development Program and the UN Children’s Fund,” will also provide assistance in other humanitarian endeavors. These humanitarian efforts confront a number of Somalia’s problems by “targeting development assistance, emergency assistance, and food aid.” Support is also committed to “supplementary nutrition programs, re-establishment of infant growth monitoring, rehabilitation of health facilities, provision of essential medicines, immunization programs, rehabilitation of water resources, and the provision of seeds and tools to rural farm families in central and southern Somalia.” In May 2003, the in-country UN team and its partners reviewed the Somali situation, as well as the response from the IC to the UN Consolidated Appeal for funding. They concluded that “considerable progress had been made in the delivery of humanitarian relief…[but that] only 24 percent of the $77.8 million requested through the Consolidated Appeal has been funded thus far.” Instability and civil disorder continues to be the biggest obstacle to providing relief to the most vulnerable Somalis. However, an active humanitarian effort remains a feasible alternative to Islamic extremism. The UN should never ignore humanitarian crises, and over time, failed states can create environments where terrorism might take root. In such situations, the UN should continually measure its commitments carefully. It is recommended that the UN establish humanitarian distribution centers in non-urban sectors. This would eliminate the urban clashes between international forces and Somali militia that plagued previous distribution strategies. In light of the previous lessons learned from Somalia, the UN should be more realistic in its expectations of what can be accomplished and the possibilities of its humanitarian objectives. However, the UN should fully fund humanitarian aid to facilitate international efforts to help the Somalis. The risk of continued failure in Somalia will condemn its people to further despair, famine, violence, and erode the credibility of the UN as an organization that is dedicated to international peace and security. The UN should consider the recent policy of the US toward Liberia, which has focused on achieving a careful balance between the American inclination to aid countries in need and the caution that must be exercised in allocating its already scarce resources. Under the current Bush Administration, the US has provided almost $30 million in humanitarian assistance to Liberia this year, and the Administration has indicated it will provide more assistance as the situation continues to settle. Currently, most of the country outside of Monrovia remains plagued by fighting and looting, but humanitarian efforts have achieved progress in improving the well being of the Liberian population. The situation in Liberia underscores how US values have supported contributions to humanitarian assistance in places of the world that appear to be beyond their control. In this new era of global terrorism, it is in the interests of the UN to support international efforts to bring, at the very least, humanitarian stability to countries that are failing. The successful humanitarian operation in Liberia provides evidence that under strong leadership, the UN can provide significant and effective humanitarian support. Economic Recovery After the establishment of security and a successful reconciliation, economic reconstruction can begin. The first step in the economic recovery and stabilization of Somalia should be the absolution of all international debt. Somalia, which does not participate in the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), would greatly benefit from this initiative. HIPC “reduces debts to sustainable levels for poor countries that pursue economic and social policy reforms.” This allows countries to focus their resources on development and growth instead of repaying debts owed to aid funding. A critique of poor countries that receive aid, including Somalia, is that the funds never reach the targeted areas where it is needed most. To that end, it is recommend that the UN create an oversight committee to ensure the proper spending and allocation of the international aid. This committee would work with the TNG and help develop an internal Department of Trade and Agriculture (DOTA) to help spur the growth of business and industry. DOTA would regulate Somalia’s sizable agrarian exports, which currently accounts for “about 40% of the GDP and about 65% of export earnings.” Given livestock disease problems within the past several years, a department that oversees and establishes quality control would renew faith in the safety of Somalia’s predominant export, livestock. The creation of a DOTA is tantamount to establishing legitimacy in the region, which will then lead to greater recognition by its trading partners. DOTA can also seek out new trading partners, other than Saudi Arabia, which “has traditionally accounted for 95% of the Somali livestock export.” Concurrent to the creation of a DOTA, Somalia needs to put in place economic incentives to attract new trading partners to facilitate a shift from an agrarian to industrial base. A portion of the international aid allotted to Somalia can be used to attract new businesses. These incentives would take the form of international grant money that would spur the development of refineries and processing plants. It is recommended that the UN hold an international summit to raise funds for the Somali effort. The TNG and UN oversight committee would oversee the dispersion of this money as well as the implementation of business development programs. Somalia has large, untapped reserves of iron ore and tin. Given the growing world population and the increased demand for building supplies, the smelting of iron ore into steel would prove to be an easily exploitable resource. The abundance of tin would also be a complement to Somalia’s potential steel industry. Tin is often used as an additional coating on steel containers, and tin deposits could be mined alongside the iron ore deposits. This would allow industrial companies to vertically integrate their iron ore and steel coating facilities for maximum profits. The mining of these minerals and metals in conjunction with refining facilities could lead to a substantial increase in exports and help expand Somalia’s economic horizons. Developing these new resources will expedite Somalia’s accession to the international realm. To facilitate Somalia’s transition to an industrial society, Somalia will need to invest in areas such as transportation, infrastructure improvements and workforce training. The private sector in Somalia has become stagnant because of “a lack of investment, trained manpower and the absence of a relevant legal and regulatory framework to enforce rules and regulations.” Before iron ore and tin can be exported, facilities need to be built to process the raw materials. Transportation infrastructure, such as railroads and usable highways must be created. There are currently no railroads in existence in Somalia. A workforce comprised of Somalis also needs to be trained and developed so that their abundant resources can be maximized. This entire transition to an industrial base will create jobs because most, if not all, of the railroads, highways, and mining facilities need either to be constructed or improved. Given its geographic location, Somalia is also conducive to the quick shipping of goods to the ever-growing populations of India and Asia, making it a convenient trade center for all these industries. The opportunity for foreign investment in the transportation, mining, and human resource development sector looms large. As mentioned, the grants provided to Somalia can be used to help pay for the training of Somali workers by foreign firms, as well as the improvement and construction of a transportation system. Once the industrial sector begins producing materials to export, Somalia can then work to increase their trade with the European Union, the Middle East, and Asian countries. It is important for Somalia to engage in industrial activity and spur industrial development so that they diversify their economic portfolio. “Diversifying the meat trade and supplying an ever-widening range of markets will reduce the current over-reliance of the Somali pastoralist on one commodity and a very limited market.” The resultant economic portfolio and export diversification would make Somalia less susceptible to recession. Conclusion and Recommendations There are no easy solutions to the problems that plague Somalia. The civil war and dissent that has torn the country asunder has also served to obstruct all attempts at governmental reconstruction. However, it is in the UN’s best interest to save this failing state. High levels of joblessness and hopelessness are conducive to terrorist organizations. Today’s disenfranchised citizens of Somalia can be easily be recruited and trained into the terrorists of tomorrow. All that is needed is an Osama Bin Laden or Hezbollah to channel the frustration and anger that comes from joblessness and hopelessness. The world has seen this repeatedly take place in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Afghanistan. This cannot be allowed to happen. The UN must also embark on humanitarian aid missions to help give the people of Somalia a feeling of hope. Given the high rates of starvation and infant mortality, any food and medical supplies that can reach the intended destinations would go a long ways in cultivating hope. Also needed are military operations that will stop the dissidents from obstructing government reconstruction and aid delivery. It is through these military and humanitarian operations that a government can be established. It is also imperative that the IC helps fund economic plans and aid in the creation of regulations so that trade may flourish. Even a small economy is a critical building block to a better Somalia. To these ends, it is recommended that the UNSC create a cohesive military force within an international central command that can effectively utilize a command, control, and communications infrastructure. It was due to previous failures in the ability to establish control over military operations that allowed the dissident warlords to exploit and kill UN troops during UNITAF. A singular military command with clear controls and communications infrastructure would prevent this from happening again. This group would also help establish order and security within the country by directly engaging dissident warlords and eliminating obstructionist threats. This would dramatically improve the chances of the TNG surviving. It is also recommended that the UN establish humanitarian distribution centers in non-urban sectors. This would eliminate the urban clashes between international forces and Somali militia that plagued previous distribution strategies, as well as increase the chances of aid reaching those who need it most. The IC also needs to fully commit to these aid programs, so that they may succeed. Previous failed attempts have been due, in part, to a lack of financial commitment to these programs. In order to fully fun...