Human Rights Universal?
...elativist’ argument, the very rationale of which is to deny claims of universality. Accordingly, in their modern form, human rights are considered a Western construct of limited application to non-Western nations. This is the so-called "West versus the Rest" debate. Some Asian political leaders have adopted this cultural relativist argument, for example, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, and the former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. However, others have counter-argued that Asian values and the universality of human rights are complementary, for example, President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea, Anwar Ibrahim, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, and President Habibie of Indonesia. In addition, the recently drafted Asian Charter on Human Rights (1998) forcefully reiterates the universality of human rights. If we in Asia wish to speak credibly of Asian values, we too must be prepared to champion those ideals that are universal and belong to humanity as a whole. It is altogether shameful, if ingenious, to cite Asian values as an excuse for autocratic practices and denial of basic rights and civil liberties. To say that our freedom is Western or UnAsian is to offend our traditions as well as our forefathers who gave their lives in the struggle against tyranny and injustices. Anwar Ibrahim, Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia One of the reasons why this diversion of opinion exists within Asia is that supporters of the cultural relativist argument believe the notion of universality to be promising more than it can deliver. Universalists disagree, pointing out that in fact the notion has definite limits. The universality of human rights does not mean that the rights of every human being are the same for everyone, all of the time and in every circumstance. In fact, this would be impossible to achieve. Individual human rights do not exist in isolation of each other. In fact, they are inextricably linked together. Sometimes they complement one another and at other times, there is tension between them. The potential for rights to conflict is often present. For example, the rights to freedom of expression or a fair trial may clash with the right to privacy; the right to cultural or religious practice may clash with the right not to be discriminated against on certain grounds; and the rights to a healthy environment, to an education, to health care or to welfare benefits may be in competition with each other over the same limited resources. In practice, compromises are made and balances are struck to enable individual rights to operate in concert with one another. For example, as Australians we are generally free to say whatever we like, though not to defame someone, or to invade their privacy to obtain information for public consumption. We can practise any religion of our choice, but we cannot use faith as an excuse to unfairly discriminate against others at work or in any other public forum. In the allocation of public resources, the environment may be favoured over expansions in health care, or the other way around. Welfare benefits might be enhanced at the expense of educational institutions, or the other way around. At times, all of these rights will lose out in the pursuit of some other policy goal. This differentiation between human rights is constantly changing. However, it should never develop into a formal or semi-formal hierarchy of rights, as this would jeopardise the concept of universality. Consider, for example, the perceived distinction between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights broadly covers both sets of rights in equal measure, though they are separated in by two covenants – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Part of the reason for this perceived distinction flows from the distinct form and nature of these two sets of rights. It is argued that civil and political rights are ‘negative’ rights or freedoms, as they generally require States not to interfere in the affairs of their citizens (eg privacy, freedom of expression, thought and religion, freedom of movement and assembly, and freedom from torture, arbitrary arrest and discrimination). Economic, social and cultural rights, on the other hand, are considered ‘positive’ rights – in that they require States actively to implement measures to secure these rights (eg right to a clean environment, and rights to education, health, welfare assistance, and the right to substantive equality). It is important to note that this distinction applies not only between the two Covenants mentioned above, but also in respect of those rights covered within other human rights instruments. For example, consider the many different ...