The Korean War in the deepest darkest corner of American history
... political settlements to which we are dedicated and which we believe to be just. It was indeed a crime that those who attacked from the North invoked violence to unite Korea under their rule. Not as an official friend but as a personal friend I urge that your country not embark upon a similar course. Eisenhower believed that the goals of the Republic of Korea were the same as the goals of the United States as stated in the preamble of the United States Constitution, namely, “to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty.” He also believed these goals could not be achieved through war, but instead by peaceful means. He feared that the Republic of Korea and the United States would continue in their separate directions and stressed that they “must remain united.” * * * After a long winter recess, the Communists were willing to resume negotiations in March of 1953. Within a week of the Communist offer Rhee and his staff reopened their anti-truce campaign. In June 1953 there was further evidence of Korean dissatisfaction. A mob of schoolgirls appeared outside the US correspondents’ billet crying, yelling and screaming, “You are murdering our country.” Other demonstrations continued for weeks. UN troops, jostled by the mobs, were ordered to carry arms at all times. Again Rhee was to blame for stirring up this anti-American sentiment. Soon after, the government banned what it had previously called “spontaneous” demonstrations – occurring regularly, two or three times a day, for weeks. An order sent out by his Education Ministry read: “Students will not demonstrate against the cease fire until and unless there are further instructions from the ministry.” The political demonstrations of a year before were organized by black associations and herded along by Korean MPs. The latter were operated by a variety of groups – youth groups, actors’ associations, disabled veterans and school children.” The South Koreans were so agitated by the armistice they sometimes attacked UN troops. One GI in Korea wrote, “they are supposed to be our friends, the South Koreans... I don’t know if I’ll spend Christmas at home or in a prison camp somewhere. We don’t know who the hell’s the enemy over here.” South Koreans went to great lengths to oppose the armistice. However, the height of the armistice opposition was yet to come. In July of 1953 South Korean forces guarding the POW prison facility released 27,000 Korean non-repatriates. The council claimed that this action was in direct violation of the agreement reached by the two sides on June 8, 1953, which stated that the prisoners of war “shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.” Furthermore, only the armed forces of India should have “the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.” The General Assembly, outraged by Rhee’s actions, begged for his cooperation in their “efforts to obtain an early and honorable armistice.” This unilateral action marked the deviation of South Korea from the United Nations Command. This act by the Republic of Korea was a direct threat to the UN. The fear that the ROK might act independently UN was now greater than ever. The United States was smart enough, however, to call Rhee’s bluff. General Clark recognized this when he said, “I don’t think any competent American military man ever seriously believed that ROK ground forces could take over the entire UN front against the Chinese and the North Koreans. Brave as they are, the ROKs lack trained senior officers, man power, and logistical support units.” It was true. It would be mass suicide for the ROK army to fight alone – the ROKs could not conceivably succeed where the entire UN Command failed. By continuing to fight against U.S. policy the ROKs would become enemies of the UN. * * * Why was it that President Rhee despised the armistice so much when all the UN allies were all supporting it? The Koreans were afraid that it would mean handing over to the Communists what they had failed to gain by war. They also felt that in the past they have been the sacrificial victims of the political interests of the major powers. Consequently, they were fearful that history might repeat itself in the present circumstances. The sentiments of the Korean people were clearly expressed in the June 22, 1953 issue of Newsweek : The streets are now quieter than normal. The people appear unconcerned. Actually they are consumed with dread. Seoul residents have experienced two Communist occupations, and those I’ve spoken to are convinced that the present armistice terms mean a Communist return and the end of the Korean Republic. In the end, “the roots of ROK resistance to the armistice rested in a bed of insecurity and frustration.” As Armistice negotiations proceeded, South Korea became more agitated. They did not agree with the U.S. over the terms of the agreement. Non-repatriates would remain on South Korean soil during the period of explaining and Rhee opposed the selection of India as the chief custodial nation. South Korea feared the U.S. would abandon them after the agreement. Rhee said that a truce between UN and Communists “meant death” to his country. He believed that the Chinese Communists should be driven out from Korean territory, and he was willing to do it even if he had to fight alone. The ROK position stood firm: an indefinite truce in a divided Korea was unacceptable. In any case, Washington now meant to press for an armistice with or without Rhee’s participation. He refused to be satisfied by U.S. assurance of economic aid and a mutual defense treaty, and the premise to win political unity for all Korea. In a Swedish newspaper Rhee wrote: “I need something concrete to show the people that our security has been guaranteed... If the U.S. government is ready to conclude a mutual-security pact, it will be a great encouragement to our people – so long as it is not conditioned, as it is [now], by so perilous an armistice.” However, President Eisenhower agreed to negotiate the defense treaty only after the signing of the armistice. Rhee, on the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of the Republic’s Independence in Seoul, delivered an address expressing his feelings of dissatisfaction against the UN’s actions. He said the termination of hostilities and the commencement of negotiations was not their own choice. He felt that the war could have been won, but “the UN deliberately decided against victory as its goal.” Rhee said he would then march north at the earliest possible time to save his “North Korean brethren from sure death they are facing today.” Rhee believed that the fundamental issue was “the withdrawal of the Chinese communist aggressors” from ROK soil. Rhee, unlike Eisenhower, believed that the reunification of Korea was not possible unless the Communists were defeated. He stated that “if this battle for a free, re-united and democratic Korea is lost the communist world will see the green light held out to invite its further advance.” In a moving speech delivered on July 4, 1953 in Seoul, Rhee asks the United States to remember our Independence Day. The American ideals that were instilled that day inspired many revolutions around the globe including the French revolution, the uprising of the Russian serfs, and the Korean revolt against Japan. He reminds us that: Those American ideals and all the institutions they sustain are challenged as never before at this very moment by ever-expanding world communism that knows no culture, no religion, no moral standards, but blind power that smothers civilization and alters all its processes of evolution. He asked the American people to “take up this Communist challenge” and help the Republic of Korea do what the founding fathers of our own nation did to make the United States what it is today. He reiterated that “the Korean people will never swerve from the original objective of their common cause,” to reunite the nation and that they “will never abandon the struggle halfway.” Rhee’s strong beliefs can be best explained by his personal history. Rhee had been struggling 60 years for the freedom of Korea. In his attempts to do so he had been thrown in prison for 7 years, and spent 33 years in exile, and endured months of torture by the Japanese. To such a man, the war that began in 1950 could only be a struggle to unite his country, not simply a police action to preserve the Southern half. General James Van Fleet, the Eighth Army Commander in Korea , became a close friend of Rhee during the war. He described Rhee as an extremely modest man who would not even accept an offer by his officials to have his own airplane for trips around the country. His response was immediate and emphatic: “If I had an airplane,” he said, “I would want it to carry bombs to the enemy.” General Van Fleet responded to the attacks that Syngman Rhee was uncooperative from his own personal experiences. In my efforts to build up the ROK forces I was forced to call upon him repeatedly for all manner of sacrifice and assistance. He never failed or even hesitated. I can only conclude that the denunciations of his lack of cooperation have come from people who wanted him to abandon the goals of his own nation and accept programs which he felt were ruinous to Korean freedom. What he was often asked to render was not cooperation, but subservience – and we can never build strong and dependable allies unless we treat them as sovereign powers. Before we condemn him for refusing to accept all our past policies, we should consider how much better off we might be if instead, we had ‘cooperated’ with him. He fought with all his strength for the privilege of developing a large ROK army for several years before our government finally permitted it. If he had had his way, the Communist attack probably never would have occurred. General Van Fleet also pointed out the “superior wisdom” of Rhee, “a statesman of great experience and insight,” when Rhee warned the U.S. that the peace negotiations were just a Communist “trick” to save a defeated enemy. Rhee repeatedly tried to warn the U.S. of Communist tactics. According to Rhee “the communists well understand that attack is the best form of defense.” He foreshadowed that the ROK should “expect to be vilified, slandered, insulted, and denounced in every vile form their spiteful ingenuity, can invent.” The Communists, Rhee said, would claim that “if Red China and the puppet regime of North Korea are admitted to the UN this event may mark the beginning of a new era of peace.” As always the threat of atomic weapons would be present. Rhee believed the UN had superior ground battle advantages and that they should not give this up for the “old, familiar maneuver of pointless denunciation masquerading as political discussions.” It can positively be foretold that the communists will make every attempt to prevent the political conference from being a success but it will equally be assiduous to keep it from being labeled a failure... In every conference in which Communists take part, their aim is to prolong the discussion as a sounding board for their hateful ad hurtful propaganda, and to make the talks a screen behind which to carry on their own programs of infiltration and subversion. This is why we have insisted that the conference should not be prolonged beyond ninety days. That is ample time for the Communists to demonstrate the degree of their sincerity in being willing to ...