Kants groundwork
...red action to have moral worth it must also be done for the right reason or motive: An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined. The moral worth depends, therefore, not on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition according to which, without regard to any objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been done (Ak. 399-400). The right motive for an action is that it be done from duty. To perform an action from duty is to perform it out of respect for the moral law (Ak. 400). That is to say, to perform an action from duty is to perform the action because of, or for the reason that, the action is morally required. This distinction can be illustrated most clearly by means of one of Kant’s examples. Let us stipulate that it is a moral law that one act beneficently. Let us also consider a person who is naturally disposed, by virtue of a sympathetic constitution, to act beneficently toward others. Then simply by acting beneficently the individual acts in accordance with duty. But acting from duty is an additional requirement, which may or may not be satisfied when he or she acts in accordance with duty. To see this, Kant asks us to further suppose that misfortune has deprived this person of his or her natural sympathetic disposition. On this assumption, there are two possible motives, which may then determine the person’s action, the motive of sympathy, or the motive of respect for the moral law. If an inclination to sympathy is the sole, or at least the determining, motive for the individual’s acting beneficently, since those sympathetic inclinations are assumed to no longer be present, the person would no longer act beneficently. If, however, the (determining) motive or reason for acting beneficently were that such action is morally required, then even in the absence of a beneficent motive, even under the affliction of “deadly sensibility”, the individual would nevertheless act beneficently. Through the foregoing example, we can clearly see that it is possible for acting in accordance with duty and acting from duty to diverge under certain conditions; thus Kant is justified in distinguishing between them. In addition, we can see that action in accordance with duty may be performed even in the absence of a distinctively moral intent, and since intent is a crucial to our common conception of moral worth, acting in accordance with duty does not account for all that is important in characterizing morally worthy conduct. Finally, it is clear from Kant’s example that the motive or reason to act from duty is critical for reliably securing actions which are in accordance with duty. In answer to (b), one implication of the “in-accordance-with/from” distinction for deliberation and action is that in order to insure that one’s actions have moral worth; one must conscientiously choose to act for the right reasons. In practice this may involve reassessing the reasons on which we act in many areas of our life. For example, many of us occasionally give donations to charity, which is an example of conduct in accordance with the duty of beneficence. It is also possible in many cases to obtain a tax deduction for such donations. But, in order for our charitable conduct to have moral worth, the possibility of a tax deduction must not be our motive. Therefore, if we take Kant seriously we will be thoughtful about our motives for giving charity, as well as our motives for all actions, which are morally required of us. Another practical consequence of the distinction between “in accordance with duty” and “from duty” is that we can never know for sure whether an action of ours has moral worth, because we can never be entirely certain as to what our determining motive is in a given case (Ak. 407). Finally, in answer to (c), one of the things Kant’s distinction reveals about the nature of morality is that morality is grounded in the actualization of our capacity for rationality. In the first place, only beings with the capacity for rationality are capable of acting morally (or immorally for that matter). Secondly, it is also true on Kant’s account that morality is fully realized as moral worth only when a demand of rationality is in fact the determining motive of action. For as we have seen, one may act in accordance with duty even if one is motivated by desire. In such a case, although the capacity for rationality is present, it is not actualized. To act from duty, however, it is necessary that one actually act out of respect for the moral law, a purely rational motive. 3)Immanuel Kant had an interesting ethical system for reasoning. It is based on a belief that the reason is the final authority for morality. In Kant?s eyes reason is directly correlated with morals and ideals. Actions of any sort, he believed, must be undertaken from a sense of duty dictated by reason, and no action performed for appropriateness or solely in obedience to law or custom can be regarded as moral. A moral act is an act done for the "right" reasons. Kant would argue that to make a promise for the wrong reason is not moral you might as well not make the promise. You must have a duty code inside of you or it will not come through in your actions otherwise. Our reasoning ability will always allow us to know what our duty is. Kant described two types of common commands given by reason: the hypothetical imperative, which dictates a given course of action to reach a specific end; and the categorical imperative, which dictates a course of action that must be followed because of its rightness and necessity. The categorical imperative is the basis of morality and was stated by Kant in these words: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will and general natural law." Therefore, before proceeding to act, you must decide what rule you would be following if you were to act, whether you are willing for that rule to be followed by everyone all over. If you are willing to universalize the act, it must be moral; if you are not, then the act is morally impermissible. Kant believes that moral rules have no exceptions. Therefore, it is wrong to kill in all situations, even those of self-defense. This belief comes from the Universal Law theory. Since we would never want murder to become a universal law, then it must be not moral in all situations. Kant believes killing could never be universal, therefore it is wrong in each and every situation. There are never any extenuating circumstances, such as self-defense. The act is either wrong or right, based on his universality law. For example, giving money to a beggar just to get him to leave you alone would be judged not moral by Kant because it was done for the wrong reason. With Kant?s belief in mind; if the consequence of immoral behavior were dealt with in a legal structure, people would be prosecuted for EVERYTHING since there are no extenuating circumstances. Kant's categorical imperative is a tri-dynamic statement of philosophical thought:(1) "So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law."(2) "Act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person in that o...