The American Revolution
...TIVE campaign for the main armies opened August 27, 1776, when General Howe's army attacked Washington's lines on Long Island. For the next five months, the contending armies maneuvered and fought through New York and much of New Jersey, culminating in the American attacks on Trenton and Princeton in December and January. During those months, the political and military leaders of the United States turned to the militia to fulfill the functions and duties established in the months of preparation. The ensuing crises of the loss of New York City, the British invasion of New Jersey, and Washington's winter counterattacks forced the rebel leaders to modify their policies for the use of the state militia. Throughout this difficult campaign, however, the militia played a significant role in maintaining the American army in the field and ultimately in helping it to recover much of the ground lost early in the campaign. The American concentration of forces reached a peak in the last days of August. At this time, Washington's plans for this growing army revolved around a strategy known as a war of posts. By using fortified positions to guard key locations, Washington hoped to weaken the enemy army as it took each successive post. The first link in his chain of defended sites was the western end of Long Island, where he placed about thirty-five hundred men under the command of Major General Nathanael Greene. As of mid-August, about half Winter did not mean the cessation of activity. Washington and Sir William Howe, knighted for his victories around New York City in August and September, both settled their armies into winter quarters in January 1777, but the fighting did not stop. In fact, the partisan war that had erupted in the final weeks of 1776 continued almost uninterrupted throughout the winter. The war had taken on a different character around New York, and the leaders of both sides had to adapt. Washington in particular had to learn to engage in such a war with a small regular army and the larger but unpredictable state militia forces. After the battle of Princeton, Washington's strategy for the winter of 1777 was clear: he "would not suffer a man to stir beyond their Lines, nor suffer them to have the least Intercourse with the Country." He thus initiated a war of small detachments in New Jersey against enemy parties that emerged from their lines. To execute this harassment, he coordinated militia and Continental forces to attack exposed British posts and foraging parties, raid enemy supplies, and cut all communication between the enemy and the country. He urged Generals William Heath and Samuel Parsons to launch raids from Connecticut against enemy positions on Long Island, while he ordered out a series of small parties of Continentals and militia to sweep the area near the British lines. He hoped to collect all of the livestock Washingtonwas caught on the horns of a dilemma. Would General Sir William Howe make the Hudson River the objective of the coming campaign, or would the British attack Philadelphia? As the British army prepared to open its campaign for the summer of 1777, Washington found himself trying to guard against all possibilities. He thus had Continentals and militiamen scattered from the New Jersey coast to Long Island Sound in Connecticut. With his regular army under strength, and the state militia forces still unpredictable, the commander in chief faced a perplexing summer. Unsure of Howe's ultimate objective for the 1777 campaign, Washington forged a flexible strategy that would enable him to rush to the defense of the Highlands or Philadelphia. In order to accomplish this plan, he relied heavily on the militia to flesh out his Continental troops in New York and New Jersey. First he positioned his forces to hold the Highlands against a sudden assault and to attack the British in New Jersey if an opportunity arose. He then sent a committee of generals to view the Highland defenses, and held meetings with his generals on the advisability of attacking the different British posts in New Jersey and New York. He also planned to position a force in White Plains to watch the enemy in that area and to protect Connecticut. Another part of his strategy was a continuation of the partisan war. Washington suggested to Putnam at Peekskill The war changed dramatically in the year 1778. The alliance between the governments of the United States and France, signed in February 1778, had far-reaching consequences for the contest between Great Britain and the United States. The immediate effect was the British decision to concentrate their forces in 3 New York City, in anticipation of shifting their major effort in North America to the Southern states. This development had a direct impact on the fighting in the middle states in 1778 as the two main armies prepared to return to the New York City area and the partisan warfare raged unabated around New York City. Until news of the French alliance arrived in May 1778, the main British and American armies remained in Pennsylvania. As the Continental Army shivered in the cold and trained at Valley Forge, the defense of the country around New York City remained in the hands of the state governments, local Continental generals, and state militia forces. Though Washington and the Continental Congress tried to support the local efforts, they were far away and had no immediate control. The officers and government officials in the area, therefore, had to provide for the defense of the coasts and Highlands, and with few Continental soldiers available, the militia had the primary responsibility for manning the defenses, launching raids, skirmishing with enemy parties, and isolating the British from the countryside. The return of the main British and American armies to the New York City area brought to a close the Northern phase of the war. The active operations of the concentrated armies, which punctuated the campaigns of 1776-78 and which led to several full-scale battles between the contending armies, ceased after the fall of 1778. During the remaining five years of the war, the British and Americans concentrated on the growing Southern campaigns, while in the middle states, the two protagonists sparred with each other in detachments and raids but the opposing armies did not lock horns. On the other hand, the annual arrival of a French fleet in North America and Washington's desire to cooperate with his ally kept open the possibility of American operations on a grand scale. The American leadership had developed serious concerns by this point about the availability and efficiency of the militia forces. The militia clearly was incapable of stopping large British raids on its own, and Washington already allowed detachments of Continentals on occasion to support the militia in local defense. In addition, the number of militiamen that the state governments could muster had been declining, despite the occasional efforts to pass new militia laws. Washington therefore had to adapt not only to the changing circumstances of the war but also to the diminishing capabilities of the militia. Ironically, even as the militia grew less reliable, the war in AS THE WAR in North America entered its sixth year, both sides were searching for a way to end the conflict successfully. Though victory continued to elude the British and Americans, for fleeting moments in 1780 the opposing army commanders had high hopes. From Rhode Island to New Jersey, the two armies threatened to lock horns and finish the fight, even as larger detachments went to the South. Ultimately, the armies would remain distant and the state militia forces once again would help fill the space between them. While the remnants of the British army that had not gone south shivered in New York City and its environs during the cold winter months of 1780, and the American army remained scattered from Connecticut to New Jersey, the partisan war between the two armies raged through yet another winter. In Connecticut, the Assembly ordered militia companies, ranging in size from fourteen men in Branford to ninety-seven in New Haven, to guard the ports. As the militia guardsmen came and went, often without orders, town officials petitioned for more guards and occasionally the local militia general would order out a reinforcement on his own authority. The Assembly also ordered the creation of two state militia regiments of 440 men each to serve for the entire year, but as of May, it was still trying to complete the regiments. Washington, meanwhile, kept Poor's Continental brigade and the Continental cavalry in Connecticut until The leaders...