Merger, Separation, Independence
...lays in Singapore did not vote for them. If the Malays were expected to support them all along, which I quote again “the Malays in Singapore, who had always supported the UMNO all along”, it apparently shows that the UMNO (again from what UMNO stands for) was racially unequal. By campaigning there on behalf of the Alliance, he lent his prestige to a horse which stood little chance of winning.” Very much, he was agreeing on terms that the Tunku would have ruined his name if he rallied for the Alliance, which was bound to lose the election campaign. He wrote: ‘SUMNO’s leaders, in the words of American Consul, Arthur H. Rosen, immediately “orchestrated a campaign to recapture Malay popular support”2 ’ which he mentioned in greater detail in later chapters of his research publication. A very important point that he mentioned was the speaker invited to speak at the meeting of some 600 present which was held at SUMNO’s Jalan Penggaga branch on 25th September, Syed Ja’afar bin Hasan Albar, a noted UMNO extremist and UMNO’s Chief Publicity Officer since 19533. Assoc. Prof. Albert Lau mentioned him as a key figure in the racial implications of this meeting, which lead to undesirable effects and appeared to spark of the idea of racial riots during his speech. Baldwin too, noted that the resignation of Syed Ja’afar had “far-reaching implications for UMNO’s solidarity”. Albert mentioned that the key message of violence towards Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore was portrayed in Syed Ja’afar’s speech. An excerpt of his speech quotes “We are prepared to use both words and fists to teach him a lesson in democracy”4. His words then sparked off equally heated speeches from the defeated SUMNO candidates. H. Rosen made reports, “passions were stirred by a violent anti-PAP speech with strong racist overtones by Ja’afar Albar.”5. Rosen mentioned that another accident that the UMNO failed to accept the apologies was the firecracker accident where PAP supporters went overboard when they threw crackers at the UMNO branches in Geylang Serai, might have antagonized the UMNO leaders even more and resulted in a more serious consequence. Lee Kuan Yew wrote in his memoir that although PAP wants to cooperate with UMNO, it could never occur to him to work with an Alliance in which there were “unclean” (i.e. MCA/MIC) people.6 And came the reply from the other side of the Causeway. The argument proposed by the Tunku as quoted from his memoir, whose message to Lee was unmistakably clear, And whom Rosen too, commented, “(the Tunku) is putting Lee on notice that he is willing to cooperate in the context of Singapore/Central Government affairs but (the Tunku) is not receptive to Lee’s bid of having PAP to replace MCA in the Alliance”8. It was too, as mentioned in Dr Albert Lau’s research again that there was this major controversy when the Tunku allowed Lee to head the “truth mission” to Africa to counteract the lies put up by the Indonesians about Malaysia being a neo-colonialist plot. He only sent Sabah’s chief minister to “spy” on Lee. This happened after Lee’s speech of not having any mistrust and suspicion of one another. Yet this was a step Lee took in the game of his own. For Lee, however, there was a further, albeit more personal, reason for wanting to undertake such a mission: the chance to have friends in Afro-Asia was another useful lever against the uncertainty if his own political tenure in Malaysia. Mr Moore revealed too, in his minutes of a conversation with Lee, “Lee regards the trip as a further opportunity of enhancing his own international prestige so that the Tunku would have to pay the price if things ever came to a point where he wanted to lock Lee up.”9 As quoted from Albert’s research which showed the controversy within when mistrust and suspicion filled there air even when Lee spoke with his main topic of having absence of mistrust and suspicion that will unite Malaysia. Albert certainly showed in his research that Lee had suspicions and mistrusted the UMNO’s… Nevertheless, it was noted that in Albert’s and the American Consulate to Singapore and Malaya, Rosen, Baldwin, whom all mentioned a key variable (Syed Ja’afar) which/whom affected and resulted in consequent racial outbreaks in this controversial episode despite much differences in each and everyone of their perspective as noted in their airgrams back home, research publications and reports. Also, even the participants of the episode themselves have shown their perspectives of the period back then and their views about it which reinstated and reinforced the previous convictions as of Albert and the academics attached here. (i.e. Key disputes and speeches and probable attitudes as analysed by the people mentioned above.) Bibliography 1. Wee Shoo Soon, “The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia : Approaches and Issues” (Unpublished Academic Exercise submitted to the Department of History, NUS 1998), pg.9 2. Dr. Albert Lau (1998). A Moment of Anguish :Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement. Times Media Academic Publishing Division 3. Royal Malaysia Police (Singapore) Intelligence Journal, no.9, 30th September 1963, pg 114 4. Malayan Times, 25th September 1963 5. Airgram no. 60, American Consulate (Singapore) to Department of State, 27th August 1964, RG 59, Box 2457 Pol 23-8 1/1/64 6. The Sunday Times, 29th September 1963 7. The Straits Times, 30th September 1963 8. Airgram no. 215, American Embassy (KL) to Department of State, 4th October 1963, RG 59, Box 3975 ________________________________________________________ THE CHINESE HIGH SCHOOL INTEGRATED HUMANITIES MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER 2004 CHAPTER 1 1963-1965 A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY AND UNKNOWNS ________________________________________________________ MERGER : A THREAT TO SINGAPORE’S INDEPENDENCE By Lester Tan Bo Xue (12) 2C Subject Integration of History, Literature, Geography and Economics (Subjected to changes) Teacher Mentor : Mr Paul Ho 1963-1965, a period of uncertainty and unknowns The years 1963 to 1965 mark one of the most tumultuous periods in Singapore's history encapsulating the country's struggle for independence, first through merger with Malaysia and finally the separation from Malaysia when Singapore assumed complete independence as a republic. This study is an attempt to understand the circumstances, which sparked off the racial conflicts that may be inflicted due to actions and verbal wars, political disagreement, between the two countries’ political characters and the prior rivalry between them could be said as the catalyst in the event, some of the pandemonium caused by the racial riots, during the short period in which Singapore was part of the Federation of Malaysia that precipitated our independence. This also attempts to find out why the merger failed to bring about any measure of independence for Singapore, thus leading to the inevitable separation. It also serves to prove my hypothesis of the racial riots being the main cause and the consequence of it to be the separation. But as this topic is a sensitive and cotemporary, the information is surely hard to see and to that end, I hope to find key primary sources such as personal diaries, recounts of key participants in this historical event, and unpublished sources, police reports from the Internal Security Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, files from the PM’s office made available at National Archives of Singapore and related politicians’ recounts / recollections declassified government print-offs, declassified materials from the commonwealth countries’ archive, observations, assessments and reports by key British, US, New Zealand and Australian diplomats and ambassadors who reported on events and had access to top government leaders in KL and Singapore (these are the people who often have good insights into their thinking) and bibliographies of studies by diplomats on this subject area to provide me with the necessary and important documents needed in the critical analysis of this topic. The period will be analysed in the three main areas of conflicts, economy (finances), politics and social (further broken down into racial and livelihood matters). Characters as Catalyst Key message of violence towards Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore was portrayed in Syed Ja’afar Albar’s speech. An excerpt of his speech quotes “We are prepared to use both words and fists to teach him a lesson in democracy”. His words then sparked off equally heated speeches from the defeated SUMNO candidates. H. Rosen made reports, “passions were stirred by a violent anti-PAP speech with strong racist overtones by Ja’afar Albar.”. Rosen mentioned that another accident that the UMNO failed to accept the apologies was the firecracker accident where PAP supporters went overboard when they threw crackers at the UMNO branches in Geylang Serai, might have antagonized the UMNO leaders even more and resulted in a more serious consequence. Lee Kuan Yew wrote in his memoir that although PAP wants to cooperate with UMNO, it could never occur to him to work with an Alliance in which there were “unclean” (i.e. MCA/MIC) people. And came the reply from the other side of the Causeway. The argument proposed by the Tunku as quoted from his memoir, whose message to Lee was unmistakably clear, And whom Rosen too, commented, “(the Tunku) is putting Lee on notice that he is willing to cooperate in the context of Singapore/Central Government affairs but (the Tunku) is not receptive to Lee’s bid of having PAP to replace MCA in the Alliance”. It was too, as mentioned in Dr Albert Lau’s research again that there was this major controversy when the Tunku allowed Lee to head the “truth mission” to Africa to counteract the lies put up by the Indonesians about Malaysia being a neo-colonialist plot. He only sent Sabah’s chief minister to “spy” on Lee. This happened after Lee’s speech of not having any mistrust and suspicion of one another. Yet this was a step Lee took in the game of his own. For Lee, however, there was a further, albeit more personal, reason for wanting to undertake such a mission: the chance to have friends in Afro-Asia was another useful lever against the uncertainty if his own political tenure in Malaysia. Mr Moore revealed too, in his minutes of a conversation with Lee, “Lee regards the trip as a further opportunity of enhancing his own international prestige so that the Tunku would have to pay the price if things ever came to a point where he wanted to lock Lee up.” The mistrust and conspiracies between each other also increased when the Malayan Solidarity Convention was formed in demonstration against the ruling alliance in Malaysia. ________________________________________________________ THE CHINESE HIGH SCHOOL INTEGRATED HUMANITIES MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER 2004 CHAPTER 2 SURFACING PROBLEMS OUT! MALAYAN UNION RATIONALIZATIONS ________________________________________________________ MERGER : A THREAT TO SINGAPORE’S INDEPENDENCE By Lester Tan Bo Xue (12) 2C Subject Integration of History, Literature, Geography and Economics (Subjected to changes) Teacher Mentor : Mr Paul Ho Surfacing Problems: Out! Malayan Union Rationalizations The need to understand Many problems surfaced during this controversial episode in our history. Such problems were considered to be the prior causes of this conflict. So it is important to understand comprehensively about this period of problems that sparked on and that lead on to the main causes. The Malayan Union Scheme Malayan Union scheme was designed with the considerations of creating a united Malayan Peninsula, requirements of imperial security in the post-war world, and the Malayan community’s political rights in mind. It was to be formed comprising of the nine Malay states and the once-colonised settlements of Penang and Malacca, excluding Singapore. Singapore’s exclusion means … Singapore’s exclusion from the Malayan Union itself was a tacit recognition that the Island’s inclusion could only create obstacles to the Malay’s acceptance of the scheme. Rationalizations for Singapore’s separate treatment was justified on, economic, political and mostly on racial grounds. Economical interest divergence Speaking economically, there was a divergence of economical interests.1 Economically, Singapore has special interests distinct from those of the Malayan mainland. The prosperity of the Peninsula of Malayan depended mainly on the primary production which contrastingly, Singapore depended on its entrepot trade. Moreover, 90% of such entrepot trade is connected to the outside world. And only 10% with the Peninsula. It might be felt that this diversity of interest is an important argument then for including Singapore into the picture. Being that it would broaden the economic basis of the Union. The fact is that if the two parties has such great divergence, a inclusion of Singapore into a single political grouping was to create friction if the two were ever to combine at this stage. Psychological fears and influence Psychological factors played an important role too. The more important point was the psychological one. If Singapore was to be included in the Union from the outset .. which with its seat of power in the region, when established as the centre of Union affairs. The Malays would have the strong feeling and sensation, which they felt and have resented in the past, of being governed by an alien city. If, Singapore in the early stages were excluded from the Union plans, and the centre was placed in KL of the Malay states, the cooperation of the Malays in realizing the ambition of a Union would be much easier to obtain. 2 The racial factor of numbers and ratio But by far the “strongest argument”3 that sealed our fate of not being included in the Union was the racial factor. Statistics4 shows that by 1941, the Malays were already outdated in their own country. 1.9 million Malays to 2 million non-Malays(Chinese and Indians). Inclusion of Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore would cause a significant increase in the disparity. 3.1 million non-Malays to 2.2 million Malays. If only Penang and Malacca were included, non-Malays on the whole would still predominate at 2.4 million but the Chinese would be 0.4 million less than that of the Malays. Singapore’s addition, would make the Chinese the predominant race at 2.3 million. With Malays at 2.2 million relegated to second placing. Singapore, with its 700,000 inhabitants, is almost entirely a Chinese city. The aggregate of the population of Malaya was made up in almost equal proportions of Malays and Chinese. But population just tips in favour of the Chinese with Singapore’s inclusion. The new policy for Malaya meant the opening to the Chinese of many door which have hitherto been closed to them. They are to be admitted to citizenship on equal terms with the Malays. This new policy will in any case cause anxiety amongst the Malays. We must be careful not to create a situation in which the Malays are dispirited and antagonized, and can readily be seen how fundamental a difference in the inclusion or exclusion of Singapore may arouse in their attitude. Close ties controversially recognised Yet Singapore’s separation was not meant to be permanent. Britain recognized that “there were and will be close ties between the two entities. And it was “ no part of the policy of His Majesty’s Government to preclude in anyway the fusion of Singapore and the Malayan Union in a wider at a later date should it be considered that such a course was desirable.”5 Exclusion and Merger once again … But separation made its own paradox. Once detached from the mainland, it was not easy to reattach it back. During the post-war period, both parties charted their own constitutional path in struggle for independence. It came only to a brief crossroad in 1963 when both merged, only to experience anguish of the separation again in 1965. Bibliography 1. A.J. Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of empire, Series B Volume 3 : Malaya. Part I : The Malayan Union Experiment 1942 – 1948 (London : HMSO, 1995), p. lv. 2. Minutes by HT Bourdillon, not disclosed (undated, probably August 1945), CO 825/42 no.55104 3. Memorandum by Lord Hailey, 17 August 1943, CO 825/35 4. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (KL: Oxford University Press, 1967) 5. Statement on Policy of Future Constitution 6. Dr. Albert Lau (1998). A Moment of Anguish :Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement. Times Media Academic Publishing Division ________________________________________________________ THE CHINESE HIGH SCHOOL INTEGRATED HUMANITIES MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER 2004 CHAPTER 3 THE INTRODUCTION OF UMNO AS THE MAIN POLITICAL POWER ________________________________________________________ MERGER : A THREAT TO SINGAPORE’S INDEPENDENCE By Lester Tan Bo Xue (12) 2C Subject Integration of History, Literature, Geography and Economics (Subjected to changes) Teacher Mentor : Mr Paul Ho Background on the UMNO UMNO, in short for the United Malays National Organization, was formed in March 1946 and was led by the Johore aristocrat Onn bin Ja’afar. It was first formed to protest against the Malayan Union scheme. The UMNO worked hand in hand with the people’s traditional rulers – the Sultans. Rationale for support from the people for UMNO UMNO is heading for the very start at the Malays’ welfare, and everything, “by the Malays for the Malays”, and is definitely undoubted as the primary motivation and cause for supporting it of the Malays in Malaya. And as a result, the UMNO turned into what was a strong political powerhouse in the Malayan Peninsula. Powers, Strength and Ability of UMNO The ability of the UMNO to cause any major difference in the political scene of Malaya was undoubtedly true. As what can even be seen in its early years of existence, it can cause the Malay population to stand up to their cause and oppose the acceptance of the Malayan Union scheme, which was meant to be struck so much at the core of the Malays’ consciousness of Malaya being primarily a Malay country that not even Singapore’s “tactical” exclusion was sufficient to soothe the revulsion at the British bad faith and betrayal. Its constitutional uproar that this provoked was impassioned and threatened to undermine the very basis of British ruling in Malaya. Fears heightened and the Malay stuck up to the UMNO even though it was an early-formed organization, and they caused an intensified opposition, showing how much in the psychological war the UMNO could have had in their advantage. Psychological advantages UMNO had It was so much of the psychological advantages that the UMNO commanded that the British authorities had no choice only to concede and scrap the Malayan Union scheme and sit down face to face with the UMNO in talks of compromise, nothing the British had done to such a low-scoop extent. The Federation scheme It presented its Federation scheme instead and when the Federation finally displaced the Malayan Union, it did not represent a ‘Malayan victory’, instead it was a major Malay victory as claimed by the UMNO. Noting the above, the UMNO capabilities shouldn’t be in doubt, with their ability to rappel the Malays’ support. UMNO was mention to totally succeed in mustering the support of Malays as the main power and drive to get whatever it wants. Plans for alliance and gravitation of politics towards communal alignments UMNO saw a need to ramify its’ policies from time to time according to its circumstances, which was both its’ strength and weakness. Firstly, UMNO policies had always been that it will never in any circumstances open its’ ranks to Non-Malays, it was only when the communists elements and their problems, and when the British continued to uphold their pro-Malay policy. While the Chinese took their sides to the communists and the Malays nevertheless sticking with their new UMNO, UMNO recognised the need to rectify their policies to solve the problems that will relate to their Malay counterparts. Therefore they gravitated the politics in the Federation of Malaya towards a pattern of communal alignments, with collaboration with MCA, MIC and UMNO themselves. Showing the ability and power and might once again commanded by the UMNO in spearheading of plans and directions in Malayan politics. Tunku winning the first federal elections Thereafter, Tunku Abdul Rahman came on to win the first federal elections with the formula of such a conglomeration of communal-based parties. Fighting the communists given rise to an Alliance government of the above bodies with the UMNO holding the most say and has the final decisions made, this government is staunchly anti-communists, autocratic and right winged. Malay political domination The underlying principle of Malay political domination was underpinned by the UMNO’s hegemonic position in the Alliance. UMNO wanted to guard its negotiations for a new constitution to lead up to their plans for independence. Formal terms of the 1957 constitution of independent Malaya gave the preponderance of political power to the Malays by granting them citizenship on a more liberal basis than other races, communities. Singapore threatened From the above, the UMNO existed to be dominant over the other communities in the politics of Malaya, which would arise in Malay being the more dominant community. UMNO withheld much power and autonomy and had all rights to power in its reign throughout its merger with Singapore. UMNO, in taking much power over decisions in Malaysia and with its stronghold position in Malaya, arisen to the case of the inequality of decisions made, most of which are of threatening consequences to Singapore’s sovereignty as a state. UMNO’s actions that were taken in measure of Singapore as a threat and mostly were headed by the key political figures of higher authority and main spearheading leaders of UMNO. Political figures and spearheading leaders within UMNO to be noted Political extremist exists in the party of UMNO, and sometimes political extremists such as the UMNO extremist, Syed Ja’afar bin Hasan Albar, who was then holding a key position in the UMNO as to spread propaganda and was in the position to be able to manipulate information to be disseminated to his people and supporters, to arouse their hatred against Lee’s policies in the later part of the episode which resulted in some serious race riots which will be discussed in chapter 5. He was a key factor in the ups and downs, and was the one who incited much animosity between the two involved states. ________________________________________________________ THE CHINESE HIGH SCHOOL INTEGRATED HUMANITIES MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER 2004 CHAPTER 4 BREAKING UP ________________________________________________________ MERGER : A THREAT TO SINGAPORE’S INDEPENDENCE By Lester Tan Bo Xue (12) 2C Subject Integration of History, Literature, Geography and Economics (Subjected to changes) Teacher Mentor : Mr Paul Ho Breaking up UMNO’s role in the racial riots At about 6:20 p.m. on July 21, 1964, the police were alerted that Malay-Chinese riots had broken out during the Prophet Mohammed's Birthday procession and the trouble had spread. Mr Lee dashed home to change and went to police headquarters at Pearl's Hill, where Mr Goh Keng Swee and he were briefed by John Le Cain, the police commissioner, and George Bogaars, the director of Special Branch. As reports of casualties continued to flow in, first of Chinese victims, then of Malays when the Chinese hit back, Le Cain conferred with police headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and ordered a curfew from 9:30 p.m. to 6 a.m. In a radio broadcast at 10:30 that night, Mr Lee described how, according to the police, the riots had started: Sometime after 5 p.m., the procession of some 25,000 Muslims passed by the Kallang Gas Works in a predominantly Chinese area. A member of the Federal Reserve Unit police sent down from peninsular Malaysia asked a group who were straggling away from the procession to rejoin the main stream. Instead of being obeyed, he was set upon by this group. Thereafter a series of disturbances occurred as more groups became unruly and attacked passers-by and innocent bystanders." In Mr Lee’s memoir, he wrote that he urged a return to sanity: "What or who started this situation is irrelevant at this moment . . . right now our business is to stop this stupidity. Rumors and wild talk of revenge and retaliation will only inflame men's minds." But racial passions had been aroused, and mayhem broken loose. The news, distorted and exaggerated, soon spread by word of mouth. All over the island, Malays began killing Chinese, and Chinese retaliated. The casualties came to 23 dead and 454 injured, and when the body-count was made at the mortuary there were as many Malay as there were Chinese victims. Secret society gangsters had stepped in to protect the Chinese and exact revenge, not least for the harsh behavior shown towards them by the men of the Malay Regiment and the Federal Reserve Unit, who were mainly Malay. The riots raged on intermittently over the next few days, during which the curfew was lifted for short periods to allow people to go to the market. Later the government published a memorandum setting out the events that had led to the riots. It read: "Unlike in the past, influential political leaders and newspapers were allowed to carry an open and sustained communal and political propaganda for many months. The purveyors of communal propaganda were not obscure fanatics with little resources and facilities to spread their message. This time, the propagandists of aggressive communalism included people and newspapers closely associated with the central government and with the ruling party of Malaysia." Nobody put a stop to it, and nobody was prosecuted for sedition, as they could so easily have been. The evidence produced clearly showed that the riots were not a spontaneous and unwilled manifestation of genuine animosities between the races. The purpose of the campaign was principally to reestablish the political influence of UMNO among the Singapore Malays. An even more important objective was to use the Singapore Malays as pawns to consolidate Malay support for UMNO in Malaya itself. By placing the blame for the riots on our government and depicting it as oppressing the Malays of Singapore, the perpetrators hoped to frighten those elsewhere in the Federation into rallying around UMNO for protection. A week after the riots, Othman Wok, who had been deputy editor of the Utusan Melayu, was told by a senior reporter of Utusan in Kuala Lumpur that at 2 p.m., on July 21, he already knew something was about to happen. Othman asked, "But the riots did not start till 4 p.m., how did you know beforehand that riots would take place?" The Utusan reporter replied, "We knew beforehand. We have our sources." Those responsible wanted to reserve the front page for the big news. The diplomats, both in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, reported back home what had happened. Britain's High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, Antony Head, told London he had "no doubt that this extreme element of UMNO played a considerable part in stirring up the first communal riots which took place in Singapore." The British high commission in Kuala Lumpur reported: "The r...