A EUROPEAN CULTURAL IDENTITY MYTH, REALITY OR ASPIRATION?
...etween Protestant northern and Catholic southern Europe, between the countries of the western tradition and those of the Orthodox world and between Christendom as a whole and of Islam have left boundaries in Europe today which are readily discernible and deeply embedded in European history and literature. EUROPEAN CULTURE AND IDENTITY: THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST There are a number of critiques of the traditional formulation of "Europe". First, it is argued, the above outline of European identity fails to come to terms with its own contradictions. Claims upon the Christian tradition must be juxtaposed against centuries of religious strife; between Constantinople and Rome, Catholicism and Protestantism, the religious and the secular. The claims on the Enlightenment are also deemed to be suspect. Against contemporary adherence to the principles of liberty and freedom, Europe is also the birthplace of devastating experiments in tyranny. If one denies that there are rents in this philosophical tapestry or perhaps argues that they are part and parcel of its warp and weave a second critique of a European identity is that the values and traditions claimed to constitute the substance of a European identity are not particular to Europe. There is, the argument goes, nothing uniquely European about a commitment to democracy and the rule of law anymore than mathematics and writing is the singular heritage of the Arab world. The humanist and rationalist principles upon which European identity is based are in fact universalist principles of what was once called western civilisation. Today, following the prostration of European communism, they are principles to which most states in the world aspire or are judged against and the basis upon which inter state relations are governed. The attempt to annex such principles to a European identity is, according to a third critique, simply an overt attempt to establish an artificial identity for politically inspired aims. According to this view the idea of a European identity, like the Atlanticism of the 1950s is an artificial construct designed to suit current political needs by rearranging tradition and history. The effort exerted to create a "Euro identity" is merely the rationalization of a bid to subjugate national identities and promote European 'myths' by presenting a highly selective interpretation of European history accentuating the common threads and underplaying the conflicts. Such a concept is based on enforced conformity and social engineering. The political purpose behind such attempts while perhaps an honourable one is nevertheless, highly questionable. Another critic's definition of identity, that it "...implies a relationship to what is different and thus a statement of boundaries...border flags which serve as internal as much as external boundaries protection from the 'barbarians' both within and outside the gates" leads to a fourth criticism of the idea of European identity. This analysis argues that the search for a European identity has led to a selectively pruned history of European distinctiveness and the deliberate elimination of African, Arab and oriental contributions. In talking about the Renaissance, for example, E.L. Jones makes the point that: "The term renaissance itself is suggestive. It is as if the scientific technical phoenix flew from the Middle East to Greece and then to Rome and then died, only to arise from the same Italian ashes a thousand years later. In reality the phoenix had gone back to Byzantium, travelled all over the Arab world, picked up some feathers from India and China and only then returned to Italy." Samir Amin makes much the same point in his book on Eurocentrism the deliberate minimalisation of the Other in order to define Self. For example, the contribution of non Christian strands in European culture are either absorbed, in the case of Judaism, or ignored, as in the case of Persian, Arab and oriental cultures. More significantly, this facilitates those who wish, philosophically or physically, to excise other worlds from the "European", despite, for example, the existence of national Muslim identities in Turkey, Bosnia and Albania and historic inflow of peoples from Africa and Asia to Europe. This critique has immediate saliency in the contemporary Balkan wars. The failure of Europe and the wider international (read "Western") community to tackle the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina earlier is seen in most islamic countries as consequence of European ambivalence towards Bosnia's muslim population. With at least some justification they insist that had a beleaguered Christian minority suffered the same aggression and ethnic cleansing from muslim forces within and without their state, European policy would have been radically different. Second, the question of Turkish membership of the European Union should be seen in this context. Turkey's application has been on the table for nearly 30 years. Throughout that period a number of reasons have been put forward by European institutions and member states rationalising why Turkish membership was not possible at that particular time. Turkey has not been told that it will never qualify for membership. Nonetheless it is clear, from unofficial statements, that a major question mark hangs over Turkey: Is it European? This is not a question of history or geography but one of cultural identity. Regardless of its secularisation, its level of economic development, the stability and plurality of its political system or its avowed European vocation, the Turkish application is a monument to Europe's implicit determination of its cultural and thus political borders. Third, the question of immigration is both germane and pressing. Europe was traditionally presented as the old country of the European diaspora to the Americas, Australasia and parts of Africa. Today, however, Europe is a destination, a new frontier for millions of immigrants from Africa and Asia usually arriving on the foot of colonial and imperial bonds. As Garry McDonagh points out in his article on European Integration, Immigration and Identity, they have settled in Europe to build lives, raise families and pursue their own vision of a European dream. Many see themselves as Europeans while others prefer definitions which bring their own cultural identities into a new context as Afro Europeans, Arab Europeans or Asian Europeans. The existing cultural definition of the European house makes no room for these new Europeans. Europe fails to recognise and to take appropriate account of its imperial past and multi cultural present. Indeed, the politics of identity-- recognised by some as a new and defining political cleavage in a post-modernist age -- has more often than not resulted in the politics of exclusion, of marginalisation, of cultural homogenisation or of hatred and racism. A peculiar feature of the debate has been the way in which its agenda has been defined by the extremists. Parties of the traditional Left and Right ask not whether migration should be slowed or halted but how this should be achieved. The immigrant "question" -- with all the historical resonances that those quotation marks evoke-- is now part and parcel of our daily political discourse. As for those already living in Europe who are the object of this debate, they are defined only as residents entitled to either exclusion or assimilation. In turn, these populations demand protective self-definition, and sometimes even isolation from the communities around them. Rights, based upon group identification not individual entitlement, are then sought and sometimes won. A cycle of exclusion and marginalisation results which exacerbates fears, resentments and intolerance. In sum, the definition of Europe and European is dangerously incomplete. EUROPEAN CULTURE AND IDENTITY: THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR The response to such criticisms is, as yet, ill defined. First, the definition of any identity inevitably involves some degree of mystification, of simplification and, indeed, of sophistry. In the case of Europe, identification with the positive elements of European history and philosophy is a natural starting point. Indeed, it could be persuasively argued that it is the very bitterness of past continental conflicts which has led to a yearning for collective identification not a refusal to recognise those conflicts. This has not yet resulted in a strong sense of common identity but does indicate the existence of a "species of mental community" which, lacking an institutional framework, has perhaps languished beside consciously fostered and manipulated national antagonisms. Second, to make the substantive jump from a passive sense of common interest to an identification with, and active belief in a mutually supportive and bonded community or gemeinschaft requires both thought and action. Just as in the case of the emerging nation states of the nineteenth century, Europe needs to identify and to develop informal and formal patterns of integration if its identity is to be fostered. Formal integration necessitates the conscious development and/or manipulation of a shared mythology and symbolism. In the case of Europe this is reflected in its appropriation of a humanist and rationalist creed as its own. This may be less artificial than is sometimes suggested for the origin and arguably the most advanced development of these principles is to be found within the European cultural area. The fact that these principles have been spread far and wide around the globe is a reflection of the reality of European colonisation and imperialism. To claim that they are universal human values is both breathtaking in its arrogance and a denial of objective reality. The third critique of European identity is based in a political division between competing visions of Europe. Supporters of supranational or federal integration face a dilemma. Shared identity is a necessary condition of political institution building and yet such institution building is necessary to help foster a common identity. Meanwhile, those who prefer more pragmatic intergovernmental co operation are distrustful of attempts to establish what they regard as a competing European identity. They usually oppose institution building seeing it as the pretext for an attack on national identity, sovereignty and independence. The response to these latter concerns has been to try and foster the concept of unity from diversity that regional and national identities are strengthened by their common bonds rather than weakened by the articulation of those linkages. This model most successfully illustrated in Australia, the United States, and Canada is difficult to transplant to Europe. First, the rich cultural melange of North America for example is not, as in Europe, territory specific (with the obvious and illustrative exception of Quebec). Second, the basic ground rules of these polities were well established before the ancestors of most citizens arrived. In the European case they have crucially yet to be determined. Third, most emigrants to these states had to make a once in a lifetime commitment, and once there had to accept, or remake from within, the social, political and institutional structures they found. In the European case the integrative project is an ongoing process involving constant re evaluation of means and ends. The racism suggested implicitly by the fourth critique of European identity offers, perhaps, the greatest challenge. Identity does involve exclusivity. The definition of the Self inevitably establishes boundaries to the Other. What is crucial here are the terms of the definition. European identity has traditionally been defined at least partly in contra distinction to others; democratic Europe against authoritarian Europe and free market Europe against command economy Europe. More recently, however, Europe's cultural identity has been posited again in socio religious terms. On this basis the Turkic peoples, Muslim Bosnians and Albanians and Europe's African and Asian citizens are excluded from what is described as "European". More fundamentally, the development of identity politics in Europe is both dangerous and ultimately self-defeating. If the political debate continues in the patterns thus far established, Europe is in serious danger of feeding the centrifugal forces which work to pull it apart. Indeed, a European identity defined within ethnic, national or racial lines is one which undermines the very principles of rationalist and humanist thought-- the alleged foundations of modern Europe. Instead of respecting and empowering the individual, Europe will be riven by the zero-sum demands of competing ethnic affiliation and group rights. Instead of ethnicity, race, religion or nationality, Europe must rather be defined in its rationalist and humanist tradition-- Europe as a state of mind. EUROPEAN CULTURE AND IDENTITY: THE GENERATIONAL ISSUE While intellectuals dither over the content and extent of European cultural identity, others insist that popular taste, the market and media are making these decisions for us. A cultural armageddon is forecast by those who bemoan the reduction of culture to entertainment. This doomsday scenario sees the development of media and the entertainment industry as fundamentally dangerous to the survival of local, national or regional cultural identities. The evolution of a European 'pop' culture-- based largely upon North American models-- strikes fear into the hearts of 'high culture' intellectuals. These traditional European sensitivities to cultural invasion are today exacerbated by fears of technological inferiority. 'Digital colonisation' has been identified as the latest round of a battle which it is feared that Europe is loosing. Indeed it has been suggested that the dominance of new information technologies by North American firms could reduce Europe to the status of a cultural dependent. These fears are clearly based in European experience and are most obviously evident in youth culture. The predominance of North American cultural norms in European youth culture has, arguably, been the most striking cultural feature of the second half of this century. In clothing, music, food, cinema and even language, icons deriving from North American pop culture are shared across European boundaries. Arguments rage as to whether this 'domination' is a function of economic or cultural strength. Is it due simply to rampant consumerism driven by a wealthy and expansionist home market or is it a result of the dynamism and vibrancy of a catch-all cultural milieu which voraciously engulfs and then reprocesses cultural influences from around the globe? One counter-argument to what might be dubbed cultural defeatism is that the reproduction of North American cultural icons in Europe-- whether Coca Cola, baseball caps, Levi jeans, McDonalds or MTV-- are essentially value neutral. These items do not represent the 'defeat' of local analogues but are simply seen by their consumers as modern, modish and global. They are the icons of a global youth culture which in no way diminishes their sense of individual cultural identity. Whereas once, perhaps, sporting a pair of Levis in Warsaw was seen as a political statement, it is today nothing more than a reflection of the reality that 50 percent of Levis' sales are outside North America. A second argument relates to the successful exploitation of what might initially be seen as alien cultural frameworks by local, national or regional cultural content. The global commercial success of U2, the Cranberries and the Corrs while continuing to address issues of Irish identity through the medium of rock and roll is one example. While European supergroups are not thick on the ground, it is true to say that the levels of cross-fertilisation between Europe and North America in popular music are high. The establishment of the German video channel VIVA also illustrates the vibrancy of local cultural content. Broadcasting in German and focussing upon the German pop music industry, VIVA has challenged the commercial position of US-originated MTV Europe and led to a shift in the latter's programming toward greater European content. Finally, there is the possibility that these great consumerist forces can be subverted and reflected back-- and thus also contribute to a cultural exchange. The fact, for example, that EuroDisney has had to provide for the sale and consumption of alcohol at its suburban Paris location is a significant insurrection against the puritan ethos of that most American of American institutions. So too, the development of a 'slow-food' movement in Italy is a deliberate cultural response to the proliferation of American-based food franchise operations. One might also see the spread of café culture in the United States as an example of two-way cultural traffick In each case above, however, the argument is predicated upon the existence of a local, national or regional culture which is capable of interacting with global cultural influences. In other words, if an exchange is to occur, it must be based upon the continued existence of cultural pluralism. It is here that the argument becomes somewhat problematic for a European cultural identity-- particularly at the mass/pop level. How can one preserve variation in cultural form and content and encourage cross-cultural exchange at the European level while at the same avoiding the twin perils of cultural mummification or homogenisation? This is no small challenge and an issue with which policy makers continue (unsuccessfully) to grapple. EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION While most people appreciate the value of building a European identity distrust remains and is easily evoked by two emotional deterrents; the threat to national sovereignty and the threat to national identity. While sovereignty is a legal concept and one which is, on a practical level, effectively devalued in a modern and interdependent world it has an almost mystical hold on national consciousness. Even more potent is the idea of national identity. The model of the nation state is so pervasive in European political culture that many Europeans can only see the Union in terms of their nation state. Clearly, although what might be variously referred to as 'Europe', 'l'esprit europeen', or a 'European identity', does have some level of historical existence it has in fact never had the tangible kind of existence that traditional nation states have had. The kind of existence that it does appear to have gained is that of a "common market", a soulless place where merchants exploit their customers. Can this heartless market be transformed into political structures without being seen to undermine existing sovereignty or national identity? Even in the most technical and seemingly arid areas of economic integration national sensitivities are evident. Whether it is the size and shape of electrical outlets or the prospect of the ECU replacing national figureheads on currencies, economic integration has hit a wall representing the heavy historical weight of national symbols. This is seen in even sharper focus in the cultural arena. Pressed between the competing goals of market integration and the preservation of cultural identity a growing ambiguity of European action in the cultural sector is being acknowledged. Not surprisingly, the debate about EU action in the cultural sphere is set against the background of the discussion on supranationality and intergovernmentalism. At one end of the spectrum exists Europe as an integrated state. Such a political construct, which might be based upon a unitary or strong federal model, This suggests the evocation of a new "European" nationalism on a far grander scale than we have seen heretofore. This, in effect, is what many opponents of political integration in Europe say that they fear and will resist the creation of a European "superstate". Wilson warns that those who believe that Europe will construct itself from the top down, on the model of Italy in the last century, by establishing the extent and limits to its sovereignty and then devising means of reconstructing local, regional and national cultures by injecting a new layer or level of 'Euro identity', should remind themselves of similar attempts in the former USSR and Yugoslavia. A second model is that of a new association of states or a political condominium which would, so to speak, shelter existing states within it. In terms of identity this would add a circle of Europeanness. Such a parallel development of identity might occur in some form of a looser, perhaps confederal structure. The issue, supporters argue, is not to supplant national identities, but to strengthen them by adding the threads of a shared European identity-- one which might also empower other identities. This compromise, however, gives no clear sense of an identity hierarchy and thus the way is left open to interminable disputes. The last model is based upon inter state co operation. European states, based upon their own unique national identities, would operate within various fora to respond pragmatically to shared challenges. These states, working in areas of particular interest and importance to them, might, over time, develop a wider commonality of interests. The national identities of such states, however, would remain paramount. The possibility of the emergence of a complementary European identity would not be excluded but it would be left to spontaneous forces rather than political direction. INTEGRATION AND IDENTITY All three models suggest a linkage between integration and cultural identity. This is at the heart of the European conundrum. The first point to be made is that a European identity whether that of Christendom or the Enlightenment existed for several hundred years without political integration. However, a uniting mythology or mystique must exist in order to build a polity. Rationalism and fiduciary considerations alone cannot build a sense of political identity. The dilemma facing advocates of integration is how to help a nascent European identity flower when "culture in the hands of bureaucrats is an unlovely thing". Until the late 1980s European integration was effectively driven by the fear of Soviet expansion, by the economic and political necessity of transforming national antagonisms and on an analytical appraisal of self-interest all combined with US encouragement. While many implicit assumptions about the future of "an ever closer (European) union" were made, the project was sold politically in the above terms. In the 1990s that formula has become largely redundant and Europe, reaching for the summit of neo functional integration, must now confront the fundamental issue of its political and cultural identity. For advocates of integration their European identity is an undervalued idea lacking a champion. Since the industrial revolution and the fusion of ethnic nations to bureaucratic and free market state structures, nation states have defined and exploited national cultural identities. In peace or in war, the nation was glorified and extolled in education, in science, in the arts and through the media. National mythologies and symbols were developed, refined and imparted to the mass population. Based on this model, some advocates of integration will argue, European cultural identity is in need of a champion to make the case for European cultural identity to the citizens of an emerging Europe. The EU is now on the brink of creating a political identity but it must be able to draw on the strengths, both material and emotional, which have in the past distinguished the states of the EU. CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN IDENTITY It is the thought of a premeditated construction of European identity that evokes either hope or hostility in contemporary European debates. Europe is composed of 50 odd languages, 30 40 ethnic groups and a patchwork of established, diverse and compact populations all of which have been developed in the framework of distinct nationalities each seeking political reflection in statehood. Is it legitimate, or indeed practicable, to take this mosaic and attempt to build a cohesive and shared identity from the fragile bonds of rational humanism, liberal democracy and free markets? The European Community attempted to address the "identity gap" through its programme on "A People's Europe". This endeavour was launched in 1984 with the establishment of the Adonnino Committee (a parallel initiative with the Dooge Committee) and its specific remit was to suggest ways in which the people of Europe might identify more closely with Community institutions. European institutions have embarked upon an effort to develop such linkages between citizens and the Union. The European flag, anthem and burgundy passport, rights deriving directly from citizenship, exchange programmes, and the 1992 programme are all, in whole or in part, designed to create a sense of identity and belonging in the hearts and minds of European citizens. In short, the European Union is struggling to develop a collective identity to which its citizens can relate. This is no easy task. Several writers have spoken of the "passive consensus" which governs popular attitudes towards Europe. Indeed, the European Union's own polling agency Eurobarometer can only point to 53 percent of its population which claims that it feels a sense of European identity "sometimes" or "often". It is upon this very soft ground that the foundations of identity are being constructed. This analysis will consider how this has been pursued through a European agenda on audiovisual policy and in education. AUDIOVISUAL POLICY The European Commission first proposed a policy program on broadcasting as early as 1984-- setting it in both economic and cultural terms. The Commission sought to regulate trans-boundary television broadcasts and to deal with a number of technological issues for European manufacturers. The former involved standard rules to govern advertising time, content and programming. The technological interest was an attempt to establish a European-based format in High Definition Television (HDTV) to compete with Japanese and US initiatives. Later, with the launch of the Single Market initiative in 1985, the Community sought to promote the economic prospects of the audiovisual sector in an integrated European market. In addition, the 1984 Adonnino report on a People's Europe spoke of need for a European cultural identity-- for which broadcasting is a useful mechanism. Just two years after the Commission's initial foray the Council of Europe-- with its specific treaty mandate on cultural policy-- agreed to put broadcasting on its own agenda. The Council's Committee of Ministers agreed at its 1986 Vienna meeting to draw up policy proposals which would address both cultural and technological issues. Progress within the Council of Europe was comparatively swift with its own European Convention on Transfrontier Broadcasting opened for signature in 1988. In December of that year the Commission's efforts were trumped when the EC Council of Ministers asked it to use the Council of Europe's Convention as a basis for its own continuing deliberations. These did not reach final fruition until October 1989. The relative ease with which the Council of Europe arrived at its policy is at least in part reflective of its decision-making model. The Council of Europe may only proceed on the basis of consensus. Because every state knows that nothing will be decided without its consent, each is willing to introduce topics of political sensitivity-- such as culture. Communitarian decision-making in the Union is both its strength and weakness. It is a strength because decision-making is tangible, explicit, potentially majoritarian and legally binding. It is a weakness because for these very reasons states are sometimes unwilling to extend the Union's remit into areas of political sensitivity. The European Community's 1989 directive on broadcasting Television without Frontiers contained an explicit cultural aim. It sought to establish a European cultural space within which European broadcasters would take on cultural responsibilities. The directive attempted to set cultural content rules for broadcasters. In its initial draft it would have required that 60 percent of broadcast transmission time be reserved for European works-- as defined in the directive. The premise behind such a policy is that there is a distinct European cultural identity in need of protection from other cultural sources. Commission President Jacques Delors made just this point when, speaking rhetorically, he asked whether Europeans had the right to "use the audiovisual sphere to ensure the protection of their identity". Whether Europeans, as defined by the Community, have such a right was contested within and without. The United States launched a vigorous campaign, insisting that such content requirements flew in the face of both free trade and freedom of information. The United Kingdom, supported by Denmark, fought an ultimately successful action against enforceable regulation. As a result of these complementary pressures, the directive's final stricture on content requirements was no more than a declaration of principle with no juridical force. Broadcasters were enjoined in Article 4 to "ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means," a majority share for European works. The Directive came up for review five years later. When the last Delors Commission returned to the issue in 1994 the same arguments were replayed. The Commission again proposed mandatory quotas by withdrawing the words "where practicable" from the directive's provisions. Attempting to soften the pill, the Commission built in a ten year review clause on that provision. The UK, supported by Denmark and Germany (on foot of a constitutional court judgement) opposed the principle of mandatory quotas while France questioned the time limit placed upon the provision. When the Santer Commission revisited the proposals in the Spring of 1995 it faced even greater political challenges. The French government had put cultural matters-- including the revised directive on broadcasting-- among four priorities for its presidency of the EU Council of Ministers. Meanwhile, opposition to the draft directive had strengthened with most of the new EU member states opposing mandatory restrictions. A final compromise, won under the Spanish presidency, strengthened the political language underpinning the quotas and undertook to revisit the question of enforcement. When the European Parliament addressed the issue in 1996, in the context of its new co-decision powers, it insisted that quotas without enforcement were meaningless. The failure to agree binding cultural content requirements in broadcasting has been offset to some extent by the Commission's relative success at putting together a set of policy tools under the MEDIA initiative. The "Measures to Encourage the Development of an Audiovisual Industry" programme focuses on the training and support of a skilled audiovisual workforce as well as the financing, production and distribution of audiovisual goods. All told, the MEDIA programme totaled a budget of about 200 million ECUs in the period 1989-1994 while proposals for MEDIA II amo...